The recent Mongolian regional, capital, soum and district council elections have further solidified the dominance of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP). With 17,278 candidates across 10 parties, two coalitions, and a number of independents competing for 8,031 seats, the outcome has reaffirmed the stronghold these two parties maintain over Mongolian politics. MPP emerged as the victor in 14 provinces, while DP claimed seven, leaving little room for third-party influence, especially in the capital, where no third-party candidate won a seat.

A rare exception to this trend was the limited but symbolic representation of the HUN Party, which secured one seat each in Arkhangai, Selenge and Dornod provinces. While these wins indicate some level of third-party presence, they lack the numbers or concentration to influence policy direction in any significant way. At the soum and district levels, third-party parties similarly struggled to make inroads, with only isolated pockets of representation amid a sea of MPP and DP dominance. The Civil Movement Party (CMP) did manage a breakthrough, securing a majority in a single constituency, an uncommon and notable feat for a third party.

This entrenched two-party dominance raises questions about the viability of third parties in Mongolian politics. Structural factors, such as a lack of financial resources, limited access to media, and the entrenched networks of the major parties, create considerable barriers. For third parties to gain ground, they must navigate these obstacles while carving out a unique identity that resonates with the electorate. However, the persistence of third-party actors, however small their representation may currently be, suggests there is potential for alternative voices in the political landscape. In fact, the steady presence of the HUN Party and the rare success of CMP could signal latent demand for change. Yet, realizing this potential will require strategic organization and coalition-building among third parties, especially if they wish to present a viable alternative to MPP and DP duopoly. Without these steps, third parties may continue to function as marginal actors rather than influential stakeholders.

In short, while the current political landscape in Mongolia is largely polarized between MPP and DP, there is space for third-party involvement if these parties can effectively mobilize and distinguish themselves. The challenge lies in their capacity to create sustainable support bases, articulate distinct policies, and adapt to an environment that has historically favored established players.

CMP secures 23 mandates

In the recent local elections in Bayan-Agt soum of Bulgan Province, the political landscape took an unexpected turn, showcasing an intriguing shift in voter sentiment. The CMP, a relatively small third-party entity, won a majority with 12 out of 21 seats in the council, marking a rare victory for third-party influence at the local level in Mongolia. DP won three seats, MPP one, and five independent representatives were elected, creating a unique council composition that breaks from the longstanding dominance of MPP and DP.

This success is part of a broader wave for CMP, which secured 23 seats across multiple soums, making it the most successful third-party party in these local elections and marking the first time a third-party party has achieved a majority independently. The party now holds a presence in Bugat in Bulgan Province, Must in Khovd Province, Altanbulag in Selenge Province, Delger in Govi-Altai, Tsagaan-Ovoo in Bayankhongor and Yeruu in Selenge, symbolizing the public’s growing openness to alternatives outside the traditional two-party system.

CMP’s origins add depth to this story. The party was founded by political activists J.Batzandan and O.Magnai in 2007, who previously led the “Healthy Society-Citizen Movement.” Their grassroots activism drew attention to corruption and social justice issues, initially attracting widespread support. However, following the July 1, 2008, protests - during which the government accused them of inciting violence - the founders faced accusations of incitement, leading to detentions and eventual exile for some members. Despite these challenges, the party’s ability to secure significant seats reflects enduring public loyalty to its founding principles and a growing frustration with the status quo.

The results also hint at a subtle but significant undercurrent in Mongolian politics. Voter support for CMP and other independent representatives indicates a growing appetite for diversity and accountability, as citizens seek alternatives to the MPP-DP dominance. For many, the CMP’s anti-establishment roots and stance on corruption offer a compelling counter-narrative. Additionally, its recent showing, with 126 candidates in parliamentary elections, underscores its momentum and suggests that it could play a transformative role in Mongolia’s political future.

Third parties take 0.5% of total representation

Despite some isolated successes - such as CMP, Truth and Right Party, National Alliance, and Civil Courage Green Party collectively winning only 31 out of 6,922 soum council seats (0.4 percent) - third-party influence remains marginal. Urban districts saw a stronger presence of third-party candidates, as these groups strategically allocate resources where outreach efforts are more viable. Altogether, third-party parties captured 43 of the 8,031 seats available nationwide, representing just 0.5 percent of total seats.

A.Buddorj, a journalist affiliated with CMP, won a seat in Tsogttsetsii soum of Umnugovi Province, marking his shift from parliamentary candidacy to local governance. Additionally, the National Alliance secured three seats in Khulunbuir soum of Dornod Province, while the Civil Courage Green Party won four seats in Bayanchandmani soum of Tuv Province. Beyond these isolated victories, 86 independent candidates were also elected to soum councils.

Interestingly, the concentration of third-party candidates has been highest in urban areas, where they tend to focus their resources and efforts. In the recent elections, 15 third-party parties and two coalitions participated in the capital elections, with some success. For instance, the HUN Party won four seats in Baganuur District, and the National Alliance captured two seats in Bayangol District Council. The Khan-Uul District Council showed the most diversity in representation, with the United People’s Participation Party, led by former lawmaker Ts.Oyungerel, securing one seat, alongside single representatives from the HUN Party and the New United Coalition.

The factors limiting third-party influence in rural areas are multifaceted. Many third-party groups lack the manpower and financial resources needed to penetrate these vast regions effectively. Consequently, they prioritize more concentrated urban constituencies, where their messages can reach a larger audience with relatively lower resource expenditure. Nonetheless, with 43 total seats won at the provincial, soum, and district levels, third-party parties still represent only a fraction of the country’s political spectrum, with little ability to influence policy at any meaningful level.

Does the problem lie with the party leaders or the system?

In Mongolia’s political landscape, although 37 parties are officially registered with the Supreme Court, only MPP and DP have consistently held governmental power over the past 34 years. This two-party dominance is not only a product of historical precedent but also a result of organizational weaknesses among smaller parties, as well as strategic limitations in the political system itself.

Many smaller parties are built around individual leaders rather than sustained ideologies or comprehensive organizational structures. Such “one-man parties” have limited agendas that revolve around their leaders’ personal goals rather than broader, national policies. Examples include B.Jargalsaikhan’s National People’s Party and L.Gundalai’s People’s Power Party. Both parties have used elections and party structures primarily to advance their leaders’ political and personal interests, rather than aiming for long-term electoral viability. For instance, B.Jargalsaikhan gained a seat in Parliament in 2004 and leveraged his position to join a coalition government, eventually becoming Minister of Industry and Trade. L.Gundalai similarly secured an appointment as Minister of Health. Over time, these leaders moved between parties and even aligned with DP, reflecting a personal rather than ideological commitment. This “one-leader” phenomenon weakens the foundation of these smaller parties, limiting their appeal and preventing them from cultivating a broad, sustainable voter base.

A second category of smaller parties consists of those that appear primarily around election cycles, operating with a transactional approach to politics. These parties are sometimes perceived as working with the intention of splitting votes or entering deals that benefit the main parties, particularly MPP and DP. For instance, during the pandemic, A.Otgonbaatar, leader of the Truth and Right Party, gained public attention for his protest against the government’s handling of a sensitive health incident. This activism, while briefly successful in prompting government change, is seen by many as politically motivated rather than aligned with a consistent platform. Moreover, such parties sometimes form “alliances” with one of the two main parties during elections, diluting their own influence and failing to establish a distinct political identity. These tactics suggest that for many of these smaller parties, the goal is not long-term political transformation but short-term influence and potential benefits from affiliations with the main parties.

A third category consists of parties that participate regularly in elections but lack sufficient organizational structure, financial resources, and credible leadership to build significant support. The Freedom Party serves as an example of a party that has been present in elections yet has consistently failed to secure substantial votes or representation. The Civil Courage Green Party was once a notable third-party with parliamentary representation, but its influence waned after its leader, S.Oyun, left the party for other governmental roles. Its internal challenges have only deepened, with recent reports of division and criticisms about its leadership forming internal factions.

In an attempt to foster multi-party representation, Mongolia’s electoral system was reformed to a mixed representation model. This was intended to give smaller parties a greater opportunity to secure seats in Parliament. For example, in recent elections, the HUN Party won eight seats, while the National Alliance and CMP each won four seats, marking a modest step toward multi-party representation. However, these third-party victories have not translated into a powerful opposition or a cohesive third force in Parliament. In 2012, the Justice Alliance briefly formed a coalition with 11 seats, partnering with DP to form a government. Yet this coalition was short-lived and underscored the challenges smaller parties face in building long-term influence. Today, instead of forming a consolidated opposition, smaller parties often find themselves co-opted into government roles, such as the two ministers from the HUN Party in L.Oyun-Erdene’s administration. This tendency to align with the ruling parties limits the potential for true third-party opposition.

Voter interest in third-party options has gradually increased, as evident by the rising percentage of votes for smaller parties in recent elections. On average, MPP has garnered around 45 percent of the vote, while DP captures 35 to 40 percent, leaving 15 to 20 percent of the electorate favoring smaller parties or independents. This signals a clear public appetite for alternatives to MPP and DP. However, despite this growing demand, many smaller parties fail to capture sustained public trust due to inconsistent messaging, limited resources, and leadership fragmentation.