In May 2025, Mongolia witnessed peaceful youth-led protests in Sukhbaatar Square reacting to the Government’s handling of corruption and a perceived lack of transparency. The demonstration led to the Government’s resignation after a failed vote of confidence. Such governmental crises are not unprecedented in Mongolia, but the reaction to it is: the current political episode stands for an emerging constitutional culture in which civil society is reclaiming constitutional mechanisms for a more participatory and responsive democratic system.
Mongolia’s constitutional system
Mongolia’s current political regime emerged from the peaceful democratic revolution that unfolded at the end of the 1980s, when the new generations mobilized to demand change. Following the 1924 Constitution, which was the first pro-communist constitution proclaiming the independence of Mongolia – postulating that Mongolia is a free country and would remain independent from other powers – the country was ruled under the socialist constitutions of 1940 and 1960. This transition culminated in the 1992 Constitution, which scholars often describe as representing a move towards liberal democracy, establishing a parliamentary republic and the protection of fundamental rights. Within the new regime, the government is politically accountable to Parliament and the President is directly elected. The system could thus be defined as a hybrid semi-presidential regime. Mongolian scholars, however, emphasize its predominantly parliamentary nature. The President holds limited autonomous powers, mostly of influence rather than of decision-making, while real governing authority rests with the State Great Khural (unicameral Parliament) and the Government of Mongolia. Notably, the lack of dissolution power – such as the one held by the French President – renders the Mongolian President “somewhat weaker than the French” (p. 67).
Under Articles 38 and 39 of the 1992 Mongolian Constitution, the executive branch is composed of a Prime Minister and a cabinet, forming the Government of Mongolia. The Prime Minister is nominated by the political party (or coalition) that holds the majority of seats in the State Great Khural following general elections. While the Constitution lays out the broader framework, the nomination process is also governed by the Law on Government (Article 4.1). Although the Constitution allows for an alternative procedure in case no majority is reached (in Article 39 par. 2), this mechanism has been rarely activated. For the most part, the Government has emerged from either a clear majority or a post-electoral coalition.
The Prime Ministerial candidate must be proposed to the State Great Khural within five days of legislative elections, following consultation with the President. Once appointed, the Prime Minister then proposes the remaining cabinet members, again in consultation with the President. This constitutionally mandated collaboration between the President and the Prime Minister can prove complex, especially in cases of cohabitation – when the two officeholders belong to different parties. Unlike France, where the three experiences of cohabitation have not led to a deadlock, in Mongolia such situations have proven more complicated. However, if disagreements persist, the Great Khural has the authority to resolve the deadlock.
Since 1992, Mongolia’s political life has been dominated by two major parties – the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP). The MPP, originally the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, later split into two factions, with the MPP remaining dominant in Parliament today. The DP, formed out of the 1990s democratic movement, serves as the main opposition, alongside a growing number of smaller parties that are progressively gaining seats in Parliament. Political parties in Mongolia are powerful and highly centralized, making it difficult for the general population to gain access to party membership and influence. In 2023, a constitutional amendment approved by a large majority (62-6) increased the number of parliamentary seats from 76 to 126 to overcome legislative deadlock and to improve pluralistic representation, introducing a new electoral system, combining majoritarian and proportional elements. Though some criticize the enlarged parliament as more costly, proponents and constitutional law specialists argue it broadens access to political participation. Subsequently, debates on reforming the Law on Political Parties have gained momentum, until it was amended in 2024. An OSCE’s opinion acknowledged significant improvements, particularly regarding the creation of new political parties and access to existing ones.
Constitutional accountability in action
After the resignation of Ukhnaa Khurelsukh, who later became President, Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene was appointed Prime Minister in 2021. After the MPP won the 2024 parliamentary election, he was able to continue his tenure.
A prominent figure in national politics, Oyun-Erdene had previously served as Head of the Cabinet Secretariat. He holds a strong academic profile, including legal training and studies at Harvard University, and is the youngest head of government in recent Mongolian history. Upon taking office, he formed a cabinet composed largely of young, U.S.-educated professionals, signaling a generational shift in Mongolia’s political leadership. In contrast to his predecessors, many of whom had been shaped by the socialist era, Oyun-Erdene represented a new, internationally oriented generation – an image that attracted attention from foreign media.
Between May 13 and May 27, 2025, Mongolia witnessed youth-led protests in Sukhbaatar Square. The demonstrators, largely from younger generations, expressed deep frustration with the Government’s handling of corruption and a perceived lack of transparency. These protests revived an old public outcry over earlier scandals – in particular, unresolved cases from 2023 involving corruption in the coal mining industry and abuse of resources from national funds. Those protests were violent, culminating in an attempt to occupy the Parliament building and force the cabinet to resign. The attempt ultimately failed. Despite promises made by the government at the time – which involved the Prime Minister as well – to bring those responsible of corruption to justice, progress stalled.
By contrast, the 2025 protests were entirely peaceful: there were no instances of violence or aggression, neither from the protesters nor from the police. The immediate trigger for the recent protests was a scandal involving the Prime Minister’s son, whose luxury lifestyle sparked widespread outrage. Protesters demanded that the Prime Minister clarify the source of the wealth, raising questions about financial impropriety. While some local media praised the civic engagement and peaceful nature of the protests, others noted signs of political instrumentalization, as the scandal unfolded amid rising tensions within the ruling coalition over the budget, anti-corruption efforts, and internal party divisions.
A vote of confidence
The mounting pressure from both protesters and coalition members led the Prime Minister to ask for a vote of confidence, according to Article 44 of the Constitution. The Democratic Party – part of the broad governing coalition that also included smaller parties – chose to protest the process, with its members walking out of the parliamentary chamber prior to the vote. The vote was held on June 2, 2025: out of 82 votes cast, 44 supported the Prime Minister (53.6%) while 38 voted against. However, the confidence motion required the majority of all 126 members of the Great Khural, at least 64 votes in favor, to pass. As this threshold was not met, Speaker D. Amarbayasgalan announced that Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene was officially dismissed from office. On June 13, 2025, Gombojavyn Zandanshatar was appointed Prime Minister by the President.
In Mongolia’s constitutional system, the popularly elected President is expected to embody the unity of the nation. As head of state and commander-in-chief, the President has significant constitutional prerogatives but is not meant to intervene directly in parliamentary confidence votes. In the 2025 political crisis, President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh – a former Prime Minister with extensive parliamentary experience – maintained a neutral stance. Rather than siding with any political faction, he delivered a speech before Parliament emphasizing the importance of resolving the crisis through democratic institutions, not in the streets. He called on lawmakers to respond to public discontent with a vote of confidence, framing the protests as an opportunity to strengthen democratic accountability rather than disrupt institutional order.
With the departure of the Democratic Party from the governing coalition, Mongolia now has a more clearly defined parliamentary opposition. Previously, the broad coalition government had drawn criticism for weakening parliamentary oversight and blurring the lines between majority and opposition. While some smaller parties remain represented in the cabinet, the Democratic Party – now functioning fully as an opposition force – has reestablished a more balanced institutional dynamic. This development strengthens democratic accountability by restoring the essential role of parliamentary scrutiny in government affairs.
Mongolia’s emerging constitutional culture
Mongolia’s political culture today is shaped by a unique blend of influences. Decades of Soviet collaboration left a legacy of Western institutional thinking, while Buddhist traditions and recent Asian models (especially Japan and South Korea) have introduced new social expectations. The growing role of social media – especially among young, globally connected citizens – has increased public scrutiny and demands for transparency. For example, scandals tied to personal displays of wealth, reminiscent of controversies in neighboring countries, now resonate strongly with Mongolian youth.
The 2025 episode reflects a broader shift in Mongolian constitutional culture. While scandals are not new, what was different in this case was the institutional response: both popular protests and the use of constitutional mechanisms to challenge or remove a government stand in stark contrast to the authoritarian practices of the socialist regime. Although some interpreted the events through a partisan lens, especially within internal party divisions, the process itself followed constitutional norms.
The involvement of civil society in the recent resignation of the government illustrates the growing public interest in the Constitution and its mechanisms – an interest largely driven by the perception of widespread political corruption. As Mongolia does not have direct democracy mechanisms like referenda or recall mechanisms for government dismissal, parliamentary votes remain the primary tool for expressing democratic accountability. While cabinets often change – sometimes even due to policy disagreements, as during the COVID-19 crisis –, the increasing activism of young citizens and their ability to mobilize around corruption cases mark a new and more participatory phase of Mongolian democracy.
The active role of civil society in reclaiming the Constitution is also evidenced by the increasing — and, in some cases, excessive — use of actio popularis before the Constitutional Court. This legal avenue has become a crucial outlet for frustrations that cannot be addressed through conventional democratic processes. The Constitutional Court is more and more active, and a reform of its functioning is currently being examined in Parliament. A few months ago, at the request of the President of the Court, the Venice Commission published an opinion on the Draft Law on the Constitutional Court.
A new constitutional culture is thus emerging in Mongolia, one marked by a growing reliance on the Court, which is increasingly perceived as the only effective check on the entrenched power of political parties. In this context, peaceful popular protests have become also an essential means for citizens to express their demands and influence parliamentary behavior. The political transition of 2025 stands as a clear illustration of this new dynamic.
By Eleonora Bottini
Eleonora Bottini is a Professor of Public Law at the University of Caen Normandie.
Antonia Baraggia
Antonia Baraggia is an Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at the State University of Milan, Italy.
Uyanga Myagmar
Uyanga Myagmar is Associate Professor of law at the National University of Mongolia.
Nicoletta Perlo
Nicoletta Perlo is a Professor of Public Law at the University of Burgundy, France.
Authors’ note: This article was written in the framework of the existing collaboration between the University of Milan, the University of Caen and the National University of Mongolia (Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education project “COMP-LAW”). We would like to thank Geser Ganbaatar for his comments on an earlier draft.

Published Date:2025-07-29