Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev said early this month that President Vladimir Putin had renamed the long-planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline the “Power of Baikal.” The proposed 2,600-kilometer route would carry up to 50 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year from the Yamal and West Siberian fields through Mongolia to China, exceeding the existing Power of Siberia line’s 38 bcm capacity.

The announcement revived debate in China over whether Mongolia could one day exploit its position as a transit country to restrict Russian gas flows.

Writing in the Chinese news and commentary outlet Guancha, Zhang Chenyi, an international relations scholar affiliated with Moscow State University’s Faculty of Global Studies, argued that Mongolia’s dependence on its two giant neighbors limits that risk.

“Mongolia may hold the valve in a geographical sense, but it would struggle to turn that valve into a strategic weapon against China at low cost,” Zhang said.

A Route Closer to China’s Main Gas Markets

Mongolian route offers China advantages over an earlier proposal to send West Siberian gas directly into Xinjiang through the Altai Mountains.

Xinjiang already produces substantial volumes of gas and serves as the entry point for pipeline supplies from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Adding another 50 billion cubic meters there would concentrate more imports in western China and require the gas to travel thousands of kilometers to major northern and eastern markets.

A pipeline entering through Inner Mongolia would arrive closer to major Chinese cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong. It could also connect with the Shaanxi-Beijing pipeline system and China’s national gas grid. The route avoids the difficult terrain and protected areas along the Altai border, reducing construction challenges.

Mongolia’s Valve Comes With Constraints
Mongolia recorded approximately $27.1 billion in foreign trade in 2025. China accounted for $18.7 billion, or 69.2 percent, of that trade and purchased 89.4 percent of Mongolian exports. Coal and copper concentrate together generated more than four-fifths of the country’s export earnings.

Mongolia also depends on Russia for around 97 percent of its petroleum-product imports. Fuel shortages would directly affect its mines and the trucks carrying coal to China.

“Mongolia has thus formed a pronounced two-way dependence: its energy supply to the north is closely tied to Russia, and its export market to the south is closely tied to China,” Zhang wrote. “This structure makes it very difficult for Mongolia to choose one side and bear the cost of a prolonged confrontation with the other.”

Zhang also dismissed the prospect of Russia using its fuel leverage over Mongolia to engineer a cutoff. Moscow needs a new long-term buyer for its gas after losing much of its European market. China is the only nearby customer capable of absorbing 50 bcm a year. A deliberate interruption would cut Russian export revenue and risk leaving production stranded.

Supplier Concentration Is the Longer-Term Risk
For Zhang, China’s more consequential concern is supply concentration. The existing Power of Siberia pipeline, a planned 10 bcm Far Eastern route and the new 50 bcm project would bring Russian pipeline capacity to China close to 100 bcm a year. Further expansion could push it above that level.

Large volumes of inexpensive Russian gas could gradually displace Central Asian supplies, seaborne LNG and higher-cost domestic production, which helps explain Beijing’s caution over the project. 

by Rudy Lu
September 15, 2026

Published Date:2026-09-15