Mongolia is a landlocked country uneasily poised between China and Russia. The Pope’s historic trip may be a diplomatic opportunity as well as a pastoral visit to one of the world’s most remote Catholic communities. -- In March, the new head of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia was announced. At a large gathering of monks in Dharamshala, the north Indian Himal-ayan town where the Dalai Lama has been based since 1960, a year after he took exile in India after fleeing China, he indicated that the small boy sitting next to him was the tenth reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. It was an event of considerable political as well as religious significance. The Jebtsun-damba is considered the third-highest spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism globally — after the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama himself. Mongolia is economically dependent on neighbouring China, which has made clear its disapproval of unauthorised reincarnations of Buddhist lamas within its own territories.

The announcement of the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba by the Dalai Lama is being followed six months later by another significant religious event with political overtones. On 31 August Pope Francis is due to arrive in the capital Ulaanbaatar for a four-day visit, following an invitation from the Mongolian President, Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh, in August 2022. It will be the first visit of a Pope to Mongolia, though John Paul II made known his wishes to visit in 2003. It follows the nomination of Fr Giorgio Marengo, Apostolic Prefect of Ulaanbaatar, as a cardinal in August 2022. A little more than half of the 3.3 million population of Mongolia is Tibetan Buddhist; only 2 per cent is Christian (most of them Protestant). According to Aid to the Church in Need, the remainder of the population is 39 per cent atheist, 3 per cent Muslim and 3 per cent Shaman.

The Pope plans to visit the small Catholic community of under 1,500 baptised native Mongolian Catholics. He will speak with Mongolian authorities, open the House of Mercy charity centre, which will provide assistance for the poor and shelter for women fleeing domestic violence, and preside at an ecumenical and interreligious meeting. The trip is the latest sign of Pope Francis’s determination to support small Catholic communities in regions beyond North America and Europe and his desire to encourage the reinvigoration of the Church’s missionary activity in Asia and Africa. His arrival in Ulaanbaatar also illustrates Mongolia’s complex and delicate geopolitical position. This landlocked country’s other neighbour is Russia, embroiled in its conflict in Ukraine. The Church of the East has had a presence in Mongolia since the seventh century. The Catholic Church was first introduced in the thirteenth century, during the Mongol Empire, but disappeared with the ending of Mongol dominance in the Far East. It would not reappear until missionary activity began in China in the mid-nineteenth century and a mission was founded in Mongolia. This ceased when the communist Mongolian People’s Republic was established in 1924. After the collapse of communism in the early 1990s there was a smooth transition to democracy, and religious freedom established itself, allowing for the return of Catholic missionaries.

In 1992 the Vatican established diplomatic relations with Mongolia. This return of Catholicism and its previously small-scale presence in the country has meant, in the words of Cardinal-designate Marengo, that “at a popular level, it is believed that it is something new, which has come from abroad”. However, Catholicism since 1991 has slowly developed and blended itself within local communities. A Catholic bible in Mongolian script was published, a Verbist Centre for street children was established, and in 2016 Joseph Enkh Baatar became the first indigenous priest from Mongolia in a millennium. The growth of the community, especially in Ulaanbaatar, owes much to the rapid urbanisation rate of a city with a population three times as large as its infrastructure was built to shelter.

The cramped conditions, brutally cold winters, high pollution, unemployment, and alcoholism which has often been associated with domestic abuse have created social problems that Catholic charities have sought to address. However, to this day there is only a tiny number of baptised Mongolians in the Catholic community, alongside many more worshippers from the Philippines, South Korea and elsewhere. Tibetan Buddhism is by far the most significant religious community in Mongolia: ethnic Mongolians outnumber ethnic Tibetans among Tibetan Buddhists globally. Shamanism remains reportedly widespread in Mongolia, though the difficulty of defining shamanism, with its strong integration with aspects of Buddhism and Mongolian culture, make the precise numbers hard to pin down.

Buddhism is not the official religion of Mongolia but it is acknowledged as being of “civilisational importance” to the state and has had an identity-informing role for ethnic Mongols during their history, especially post-1991. Mongolia’s government has in general remained aloof from “temple affairs”. This arm’s length approach is being challenged by the geopolitical complexities raised by the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, given China’s heavy involvement in Mongolia’s economic, political and religious affairs. Mongolia shares a land border of 4,700km (2,920 miles)with China and more than 4 million ethnic Mongols live in China’s Inner Mongolia region, though they remain under 20 per cent of the population of the province.

Mongolia has significant natural resources that China manufacturing-based economy needs, and almost all Mongolia’s exports go to China. It is thus wary of being dragged into disputes with Beijing over religious matters. China’s role in Tibetan Buddhism is complex. The political activism of the Tibetan diaspora under the leadership of the Dalai Lama is a major irritant for Beijing. This movement pits Tibetan nationalism against the Chinese desire to maintain control over the Tibetan plateau. In 2007, China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs issued an order requiring official registration and Chinese government approval of all reincarnations of Buddhist lamas. Beijing also supports pro-Chinese Mongolian Buddhist movements and has ties to Mongolia’s historic Amarbayasgalant monastery.

In 1995 the Dalai Lama’s candidate for the Panchen Lama disappeared; three days later he was replaced by a candidate selected by Beijing. Then in 2016 the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia, when he is now believed to have identified the new Jebtsundamba, after which it is reported that Beijing imposed damaging fees on transit and commodity imports, exposing Mongolia’s economic dependence. Therefore, the Dalai Lama’s declaration in Dharamshala of the tenth reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba presents a religious and political conundrum for Beijing and Ulaanbaatar. The relationship is further complicated by ingrained Sinophobia within parts of Mongolian society. Anti-Chinese rhetoric has often played a role in domestic politics. Mongolia has complicated historical relations with both its neighbours, while it has bilateral security relations with the US and pursues relationships with Asian states such as Japan and India, Mongolia gets much of its energy from Russia and sells most of its exports to China. It is understandably wary of antagonising either.

The war in Ukraine has brought the precarious geopolitical situation into sharp focus. Mongolia has abstained from UN votes condemning Russia’s invasion, but has refused to criticise sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, even though they have made it more difficult for Russian banks to pay Mongolia for imports. The prospect of a new Cold War with the West facing off against a Beijing-Moscow axis is a major concern.

The Pope is aware of the sensitivities around the Buddhist presence, authority and legitimacy in contemporary Mongolia. He is no stranger to the difficulties of establishing positive relations between religious authorities and the Chinese Communist Party: the Vatican’s 2018 deal with the government in Beijing over the appointment of bishops – intended to bring Chinese Catholics together under a single hierarchy – is under increasing strain. Diplomats say Mongolia might be used as an intermediary with China. Francis’ visit to Ulaanbaatar will provide pastoral support to the Catholic community, revive the historical memory of Christian encounter with Mongolia and potentially begin to chart the contours of a new relationship between the religious authorities and the governments of the region.

BY

Jerome O’Mahony is a freelance writer with a special interest in geopolitics and religion in Asia.