ADB to Support Mongolia’s Disaster Preparedness Through Innovation and Technology www.adb.org

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved a $32 million financing package to help the Government of Mongolia strengthen disaster preparedness by modernizing the country’s disaster early warning system.
The financing comprises an $18 million loan from ADB’s concessional ordinary capital resources, $12 million loan from ordinary capital resources, and a $2 million grant from the ADB administered Asian Development Fund (ADF). The project will enhance Mongolia’s capacity to respond to major hazards such as floods, storms, wildfires, earthquakes, and dzud—a severe winter condition that can cause mass livestock deaths.
“Around 40% of rural Mongolians live in poverty, many of whom depend on traditional herding, which is highly vulnerable to extreme weather and disasters,” said ADB Country Director for Mongolia Shannon Cowlin. “Climate-related and geophysical disasters pose serious socioeconomic and health challenges for these communities, especially for women. This project will modernize and integrate Mongolia’s disaster early warning systems, improve how risk information is shared, and strengthen preparedness capacity—benefiting the entire population.”
Mongolia is among the world’s most disaster-prone countries. From 2015 to 2024, the country recorded over 40,000 hazardous events, including 1,220 severe weather incidents, resulting in 726 deaths, 2,014 injuries, and the loss of over 11.5 million livestock. Located in a seismically active zone, Mongolia also experienced 73 earthquakes with a magnitude of 3.5 or higher in 2024 alone. These disasters have caused direct financial losses estimated at MNT1.9 trillion, placing a heavy burden on both the government and affected communities.
Climate risks are worsening as hazards intensify faster than the pace of the country’s current early warning systems. Mongolia lacks an integrated multi-hazard early warning system, leading to fragmented coverage and coordination gaps and overlaps. Alerts are limited to certain hazards and locations, such as earthquake warnings in and around Ulaanbaatar. This leaves many, particularly remote herding communities, without timely warnings.
The Strengthening Integrated Early Warning System in Mongolia Project will use digital technologies to improve hazard monitoring, early warning dissemination, and public awareness nationwide. It will upgrade emergency dispatch centers for two-way disaster communication, introduce cell broadcast alerts across mobile networks, enhance emergency broadcasts, expand siren towers, and deploy mobile communication units to remote areas.
The project will also establish a disaster risk monitoring system that addresses the different needs of men and women, upgrade seismic monitoring equipment around Ulaanbaatar, and conduct training for national and local emergency staff. It will mobilize volunteer groups in 21 provinces and develop harmonized national and local disaster procedures.
The initiative supports Mongolia’s National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (2024–2030), the Disaster Protection Law (2003, amended in 2020), and the “Vision-2050” Long-Term Development Policy, all of which identify disaster risk management and resilience as key national priorities.
ADF provides grants to the poorest and most vulnerable countries in Asia and the Pacific. During its 2021–2024 period, the fund helped 384,000 people emerge from poverty and generated around 500,000 jobs.
ADB is a leading multilateral development bank supporting inclusive, resilient, and sustainable growth across Asia and the Pacific. Working with its members and partners to solve complex challenges together, ADB harnesses innovative financial tools and strategic partnerships to transform lives, build quality infrastructure, and safeguard our planet. Founded in 1966, ADB is owned by 69 members—50 from the region.

Minister G.Damdinnyam: “We Have Firmly Demanded That Rio Tinto End the Management Contract Based on the “Expired” Dubai Agreement” www.arctusanalytics.com

Mongolia and Rio Tinto have begun negotiations to amend the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, focusing on lowering shareholder loan interest rates, revising management fees, and improving corporate governance. The talks are co-chaired by Finance Minister B.Javkhlan and Industry and Minerals Minister G.Damdinnyam, with the goal of achieving a fairer and more transparent arrangement for Mongolia.
In an interview with journalist U.Orgilmaa, Minister G.Damdinnyam discusses Mongolia’s priorities in the ongoing Oyu Tolgoi negotiations, including loan-interest reductions, management-fee reform, and the call for greater transparency and board oversight.
The negotiations have temporarily paused. How would you assess progress so far?
G.Damdinnyam: Naturally, the fact that we are negotiating means there are unresolved issues. Both sides have stated their positions and are continuing discussions in a constructive and respectful manner. There have been moments of tough exchange, which is normal, but overall, the talks have begun on a productive footing.
What outcomes is the Mongolian side aiming for?
Our first objective is to reduce the interest rate on the shareholder loan. Mongolia today faces far lower financial risk than it did 15 years ago. The country’s credit standing has improved: international rating agencies have assigned us BB- with a Stable outlook, our government bonds are traded internationally, and we are seen as a credible borrower. Second, the underground mine construction is essentially complete, which means project risk has declined significantly. Therefore, the interest rate must reflect current market and risk conditions. Third, governance improvements are urgently needed, as recent events have clearly demonstrated shortcomings in transparency and oversight.
Do you have a specific target for the new interest rate?
The negotiations are ongoing, so it would be premature to mention an exact figure at this stage. What matters is that both sides have recognized the need to align loan terms with current market realities and Mongolia’s improved credit standing.
You also mentioned management fees. What issues are being raised there?
Managing a complex underground mine certainly requires expertise, skill, and experience. We recognize that such expertise deserves compensation. However, according to international practice, management fees should be performance-based. Currently, Mongolia pays 34 percent and Rio Tinto 66 percent of total management costs. Our question is why these costs are so high and why we must pay above the global benchmark. Independent reviews have already found evidence of cost duplication. Rio Tinto’s corporate overheads are charged to the project, and an additional fee is applied for project management itself. We believe this is unjustified. Fees should reflect actual efficiency and cost reduction, not simply scale with expenses. The higher the cost base, the more we end up paying. That is not acceptable and cannot continue under fair-dealing principles.
So, management cost discussions include several sub-issues?
Exactly. Rio Tinto currently calculates its fee as a percentage of costs. We are asking for that to be revised in line with international standards. Excessive charges must end. In addition, governance reform is critical. Oyu Tolgoi’s board has no independent members, and Mongolia’s representatives are not given full access to operational information. We have even discussed the possible use of the “golden share” mechanism to suspend implementation if needed. Governance must become open and transparent so that both partners share responsibility equally. Only with such reform can we reduce costs, lower loan interest, and bring forward the time when Mongolia begins to receive dividends.
Have the negotiations produced any tangible results so far?
Yes, some progress has been made. The shareholder agreement currently stipulates that the loan interest rate may be reviewed only once every seven years. No one can explain why “seven years” was chosen or on what basis. Both sides now agree in principle to revise this clause. The last opportunity to adjust the rate was seven years ago, but it passed without any change. At present, the government’s working group has initiated discussions to remove this limitation entirely so that interest rates can be reviewed as needed, not just once every seven years.
Some politicians claim the government is acting too slowly before the current seven-year window closes on January 31, 2026. Does this deadline still apply?
No, that date is no longer a barrier. The agreement to start negotiations effectively nullified it. We have secured Rio Tinto’s consent to continue talks until the matter is fully resolved, without being constrained by the previous “lock-in” date. Let me be clear: the government and its ministers are committed to defending the national interest. Since the day I took office, our team has been working continuously, backed by strong technical experts. Our goal is to finalize an agreement that brings concrete benefits to Mongolia, and we will continue negotiations until that goal is achieved.
Which topic has been the most contentious so far?
The management-fee issue. Rio Tinto initially refused to accept our proposal, so we temporarily suspended the negotiations and made it clear that the talks could not continue unless this matter was included. We cannot leave such a major issue unresolved. The government’s mandate to our working group is clear: no concession that undermines Mongolia’s interest can be made. After our position was reiterated, Rio Tinto agreed to reopen discussions on management fees. Talks have since resumed.
Parallel to the talks, corruption probes have emerged involving Oyu Tolgoi’s procurement department, with large sums reportedly seized. Has this affected the atmosphere of negotiations?
I cannot speak for what information the other side had, but from our perspective, we emphasized the need to improve governance and transparency. Oyu Tolgoi is a joint venture, so mismanagement harms both parties. We told Rio Tinto directly: “Either we fix this together as partners, or such a situation cannot continue.”
Some of these issues have been raised under previous governments as well. What makes this round different?
The management-fee issue again stands out. This fee structure originates from the now-defunct Dubai Agreement, which Parliament has already declared invalid. The question is simple: why is a management contract based on an annulled agreement still in effect? It must end. We are working to stop this arrangement entirely and to ensure that all related matters are properly resolved through negotiation. On this, our position is firm.
Did Rio Tinto refer to any prior commitments made with earlier governments?
I cannot disclose details of the internal negotiation process. What I can say is that we are acting strictly within the mandate to protect Mongolia’s long-term interests. We do not engage in emotional politics; we rely on knowledge, evidence, and professional diligence. Our team is composed of capable young professionals who are dedicated to their country’s future. By the end of this month, Rio Tinto will deliver its written response to our proposals, after which we will consolidate and finalize the draft agreement.
Translated and edited by Arctus Analytics. The views expressed are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arctus Analytics.
Ulaanbaatar, October 2025
Interview by U.Orgilmaa

Mongolia’s Defector Dilemma: Navigating the Korea Divide www.thediplomat.com

In the intricate geopolitical web of Northeast Asia, Mongolia has long clung to its identity as a “neutral bridge,” leveraging its “Third Neighbor Policy” to carve out autonomy amid the overlapping influence of China and Russia. What began in the 1990s as an expedient to reduce economic dependence on Beijing and Moscow has evolved into a values-based diplomatic stance, earning Ulaanbaatar credibility as a nonaligned mediator. 
Yet between 2024 and 2025, three converging crises shattered this delicate balance: the collapse of the soft power narrative embodied by the Mongolia-South Korea co-produced film ”On the Way to the South,” the exposure of a South Korean spy scandal, and a diplomatic crisis sparked by the defection of a North Korean interpreter. 
Together, these incidents laid bare a sharp contradiction at the heart of Mongolia’s neutrality: how to reconcile humanitarian idealism with economic pragmatism, and how to safeguard national sovereignty while appeasing both Seoul and Pyongyang. Coming in 2025 – the 35th anniversary of Mongolia-South Korea diplomatic ties – and on the heels of Ulaanbaatar’s renewed engagement with Pyongyang in 2024, the crisis has become a defining test of Mongolia’s diplomatic maturity.
Soft Power Ambitions Collide with Sovereign Compromises
Premiering in Ulaanbaatar in September 2024 and Seoul in April 2025, ”On the Way to the South” was intended to consolidate both countries’ soft power. Co-directed by South Korea’s Sangrae Kim and Mongolia’s Battulga Suvid, the film eschewed political grandstanding for a human-centric narrative: a North Korean mother fleeing border patrols with her child, a Mongolian border guard torn between duty and compassion, and a defector grappling with separation trauma. Starring prominent Mongolian actors Sarantuya Sambuu, Erkhembayar Ganbold, Samdanpurev Oyunsambuu, and Zamilan Bold-Erdene alongside South Korean stars Park Kwang-hyun, Oh Su-jung, and Choi Jun-yong, the film deliberately framed Mongolia as a “moral mediator” – rejecting Seoul’s hardline stance toward Pyongyang while disavowing North Korea’s isolationist policies.
The film’s release was meticulously timed to coincide with the 2025 bilateral anniversary, aiming to enhance Mongolia’s voice in Korean Peninsula mediation while aligning with South Korea’s “New Northern Policy,” which positions Mongolia as a Eurasian resource hub. Domestically, it stoked national pride in a small nation contributing to regional stability; internationally, it successfully rebranded the Third Neighbor Policy from a mere economic diversification strategy to a diplomatic framework rooted in humanitarian values. This narrative resonated because Mongolia remains one of the few countries to maintain stable long-term relations with both Koreas since the Cold War.
Yet this idealistic vision crumbled within months amid an espionage scandal. 
In late 2024, Mongolian authorities arrested two officers from South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) – a lieutenant colonel and a major – accusing them of recruiting Mongolian intermediaries to infiltrate North Korea’s embassy in Ulaanbaatar. The act violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, constituting a direct infringement of Mongolia’s sovereignty.
Ulaanbaatar initially issued a stern condemnation, calling the incident a “serious breach of trust,” but reversed course after KDIC Director Moon Sang-ho personally traveled to Ulaanbaatar to apologize. Mongolia dropped the charges and released the officers. This compromise stemmed from Mongolia’s deep economic reliance on South Korea, yet it exposed diplomatic double standards: Ulaanbaatar was simultaneously deepening friendly engagement with Pyongyang, eroding its neutral image. 
More alarmingly, an investigation by South Korean Special Prosecutor Cho Eun-seok revealed potential links between the spy operation in Mongolia and former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law less than two weeks later. The probe found the KDIC’s actions were a deliberate attempt to fabricate a security crisis over North Korean threats, providing a pretext for Yoon to suspend civil liberties and dissolve parliament in an authoritarian power grab. 
Notes from former KDIC Director Noh Sang-won – now on trial for treason – detailed plans to “launch provocative attacks along the Northern Limit Line (NLL).” Lee Seung-ho, the former operational chief of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the former defense minister had ordered drones to infiltrate North Korean territory. Internal KDIC memos also referenced using “abandoned balloons” equipped with propaganda or incendiary devices to provoke a North Korean response. Mongolia’s territory had unwittingly become a stage for this political conspiracy, violating both its sovereign principles and cherished neutrality.
The Defector Crisis
In August 2025, the defection of an interpreter during a high-level North Korean academic delegation’s visit to Mongolia worsened the country’s diplomatic predicament. Led by Tae Hyung-chul, president of the Academy of Social Sciences, the delegation marked Pyongyang’s first senior academic mission to Mongolia in seven years. Tae and his group were tasked with promoting the narrative that “Seoul has abandoned reunification.” Chaos erupted during the visit, however, when an accompanying interpreter sought asylum at South Korea’s embassy in Ulaanbaatar. According to Japan’s Kyodo News, Pyongyang responded with an unprecedented retaliation: recalling its ambassador to Mongolia – the first such move since 1999 – ending Oh Seung Ho’s eight-year tenure.
This retaliation stood in stark contrast to the warming of Mongolia-North Korea relations in 2024. That year, Mongolia became the first country besides China and Russia to increase embassy staff in Pyongyang following the COVID-19 pandemic. In January, Mongolian Ambassador Luvsantseren Erdenedavaa presented his credentials to Choe Ryong Hae, chairman of the Presidium of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, with both sides commemorating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties and the 35th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s visit to Mongolia. 
In March 2024, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Park Myong Ho led a delegation to Mongolia – the first from Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry (Ulaanbaatar has repeatedly invited Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s female Foreign Minister, to visit Mongolia. However, in recent years, she has visited Moscow and Beijing more frequently) to Ulaanbaatar since the pandemic. These interactions reflected Pyongyang’s recognition of Mongolia’s decision to keep its embassy open during the pandemic and trust in its neutral stance. 
On July 31, 2025,  Chairman of the State Great Khural, Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held another official meeting with Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pak In Chol. The Mongolian side emphasized its commitment to further strengthening long-term friendly cooperation based on the profound traditional friendship between the two countries, prioritizing the common interests of their peoples, and supporting regional peace and prosperity. The North Korean side expressed gratitude for the enthusiastic and friendly exchanges on bilateral relations and reaffirmed its commitment to close collaboration to advance stable and long-term cooperation between the two countries. The two sides also exchanged views on enhancing inter-parliamentary cooperation.
The interpreter’s defection shattered this trust, with North Korea issuing a stern warning: it would not tolerate Mongolia becoming a “transit hub for defectors” or a “platform for South Korean conspiracies.”
Faced with the crisis, Mongolia adopted a “strategic silence,” neither confirming nor denying the defection. Despite international accusations of “hypocrisy,” the choice was a pragmatic one for a small nation: prioritizing avoidance of direct confrontation with Pyongyang and long-term regional stability over short-term moral grandstanding. Still, the cost of silence was significant: it disconnected Mongolia’s actions from the humanitarian narrative of ”On the Way to the South,” seriously undermining its credibility as a “neutral mediator.” More importantly, the incident thrust Mongolia’s long-concealed role as a secret transit country for North Korean defectors into the geopolitical spotlight.
Mongolia-North Korea relations have long been guided by pragmatism. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1948, with Mongolia among the first to recognize Pyongyang. Even after Mongolia’s democratic transition in 1990, bilateral relations endured. In 1999, North Korea closed its embassy in Ulaanbaatar citing “financial difficulties” – a de facto protest against Mongolia’s growing closeness to South Korea. Ulaanbaatar subsequently took initiative to repair relations by facilitating a visit by North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in 2002 to sign a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and enabling the re-opening of Pyongyang’s embassy in 2004. 
Between 2004 and 2019, Ulaanbaatar hosted up to 5,000 North Korean workers and provided food aid during times of famine. This low-key engagement maintained crucial communication channels, laying the groundwork for Mongolia’s mediatory ambitions. The 2025 defection crisis squandered decades of accumulated trust, leaving Mongolia’s North Korea policy mired in reactive crisis management.
Economic Dependence: The Shackles of South Korean Influence
Mongolia’s series of compromises in 2024-2025 stemmed from severe economic vulnerability. Over 80 percent of its trade relies on China and Russia, making its economic lifeline vulnerable to fluctuations in their economies and policy shifts. The Third Neighbor Policy is essentially a survival strategy to mitigate this risk. By 2025, South Korea had emerged as the policy’s core pillar: Seoul’s semiconductor and electric vehicle industries create a strong demand for Mongolia’s silver, molybdenum, coal, copper, and rare earths (critical minerals), forging a deeply complementary economic bond built on earlier energy and infrastructure cooperation.
Economic data from 2025 underscored the urgency of this dependence. Amid a slowdown in China’s economy, Mongolia’s exports to China fell by 9.4 percent in the first three quarters, with coal revenues plummeting by 41 percent. While South Korea sought to fill the resulting gap, the actual data indicates that the outcome was less favorable for Mongolia: according to South Korean statistics, bilateral trade volume exceeded US$550 million in the first three quarters of 2025. Notably, although total trade volume rose by 19 percent, this growth was driven by 21.2 percent increase in South Korea’s exports to Mongolia, whereas South Korea’s imports from Mongolia declined by 16.3 percent. Seoul pledged to establish a “Mongolia-South Korea Rare Earth Cooperation Center” in November 2025 to promote joint exploration and smart mining. The ongoing negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) promises not only immediate economic relief but also critical technology for Mongolia’s sustainable development. This economic allure has gradually translated into significant South Korean diplomatic influence.
Amid these diplomatic and economic crosscurrents, high-level parliamentary diplomacy emerged as a critical tool for Mongolia to navigate the Korea divide. 
In April 2025, even as South Korea descended into domestic turmoil – with former President Yoon facing impeachment over his 2024 emergency decree – National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-sik led a delegation to Mongolia. His framing of Mongolia as a “core partner for regional stability”” implied a quid pro quo: economic support contingent on Ulaanbaatar aligning with Seoul on the Korean Peninsula.
After three months, on July 30, 2025, Chairman of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held an official meeting with Speaker of the Republic of Korea National Assembly Woo Won-sik. Notably, this meeting came just one day before Amarbayasgalan would hold a similar meeting with North Korea’s Pak In Chol.
Expressing pleasure at the follow-up meeting after Woo’s April 2025 visit to Mongolia, Amarbayasgalan emphasized South Korea’s importance as a key “Third Neighbor,” a Northeast Asian cooperation partner, and a shared advocate of democratic values. He put forward three core demands: resolving obstacles in the construction of central heating plants in 10 Mongolian provinces funded by South Korean concessional loans and overseeing the selection of new contractors; facilitating mutual people-to-people exchanges (including relaxing conditions for Mongolian citizens’ humanitarian travel to South Korea and addressing the issue of Mongolian citizens being repatriated at South Korean borders).
In response, Woo pledged to promptly resume and advance the 10-province heating plant project, and stated that South Korea was exploring measures to facilitate Mongolian citizens’ travel, including introducing electronic visas, increasing consular staff at embassies, and simplifying visa procedures for group travel. The two sides also exchanged views on topics from previous official visits and reached a consensus to promote practical economic cooperation between the two countries.
Following South Korea’s June presidential election, new President Lee Jae-myung tightened this linkage further. In a September call with Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh, Lee proposed “accelerating EPA negotiations” and “promoting visa-free entry for Mongolian citizens” – one of Ulaanbaatar’s key demands, given that approximately 50,000 Mongolians work or study in South Korea, half of them illegally – in exchange for Mongolia’s support on the Korean Peninsula. 
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok later explicitly tied rare earth cooperation to regional tensions, urging Mongolia to “support our efforts to address regional instability.” Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister Nyam-Osor Uchral’s response was telling: he pledged to deepen critical minerals cooperation but avoided any mention of “neutrality,” exposing the diplomatic compromises behind economic dependence.
Essentially, Mongolia was betting that Pyongyang would not sever ties because it needed ally support on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. This compromise thus achieved short-term risk management while securing economic rewards from Seoul – yet it carries significant long-term risks. Over-reliance on South Korea could distort the Third Neighbor Policy from diversification to dependence, ultimately eroding Mongolia’s diplomatic autonomy. 
The key to Mongolia’s escape from this dilemma lies in accelerating cooperation with other “third neighbors” such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, ensuring economic pragmatism truly serves sovereignty rather than reducing Mongolia to a great power vassal.
A Path Forward: Toward Principled Pragmatism
To address internal and external challenges, Mongolia urgently needs to upgrade its strategic thinking – shifting from passive compromise to principled pragmatism, anchoring its foreign policy in sovereignty and core values to build a flexible, sustainable framework. This transformation must proceed in parallel in relations with both South and North Korea, while strengthening domestic institutional capacity.
Mongolia must convert its resource advantages into substantive diplomatic leverage. In EPA negotiations, it should clarify two non-negotiable core demands: first, that South Korea sign a binding agreement prohibiting all intelligence activities on Mongolian territory, repairing the trust deficit caused by the KDIC spy scandal; second, that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) take the lead in a defector processing mechanism, balancing humanitarian principles with sovereign security. Economically, Mongolia needs to move beyond the low-value-added “raw material exporter” model, promoting value-added cooperation in rare earth processing and smart manufacturing to nurture domestic industries. Reducing dependence on a single market and resource exports will reshape Mongolia from a resource supplier to an industrial partner – aligning with Seoul’s supply chain security interests while granting Ulaanbaatar economic initiative.
Restoring trust with Pyongyang requires a shift from reactive to proactive diplomacy. First, Ulaanbaatar should use backchannel communications to address the interpreter defection candidly, reaffirming the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs,” echoing Ambassador Erdenedavaa’s 2024 commitment to “traditional friendly cooperation,” and clarifying that Mongolia will not become a tool to confront North Korea. Second, it should restart low-sensitivity cooperation projects – cultural exchanges, agricultural aid, and public health collaboration – avoiding contentious Korean Peninsula issues and repairing official trust through people-to-people interactions. Third, it should revive the “Ulaanbaatar Regional Forum on Denuclearization and Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula,” proposed by Mongolia’s Foreign Ministry, positioning it as a nonconfrontational technical dialogue platform (focused on issues such as family reunions) to reactivate inter-Korean communication channels and revitalize its “bridge” value. Meanwhile, Mongolia can maintain its goodwill gesture of “not joining sanctions against North Korea” – a key bond in bilateral relations.
The fundamental solution to the defector dilemma lies in establishing an institutionalized response mechanism. Supported by the UNHCR, this framework should include three core elements: clear asylum application criteria, strict confidential processing procedures, and third-country resettlement options. Such a system would safeguard the humanitarian rights of vulnerable groups while preventing individual incidents from escalating into diplomatic crises, translating the “humanitarian intermediary” vision of ”On the Way to the South” into actionable policy – and freeing Mongolia from the cycle of “passive response.”
Conclusion
Mongolia’s most valuable strategic asset is not its abundant mineral resources, but the trust recognized – or tolerated – by all stakeholders in the region, particularly Central Asia or the Korean Peninsula. This trust, forged over decades of balancing Seoul’s economic allure with Pyongyang’s demand for respect, represents the wisdom of transforming geographical vulnerability into diplomatic flexibility. Squandering this trust for short-term economic benefits or temporary appeasement of Pyongyang would inflict irreversible damage on Ulaanbaatar’s regional standing.
For a nation that has turned vulnerability into flexibility for centuries, the current crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity for transformation. Mongolia must uphold principled pragmatism, maintaining a precise balance amid inter-Korean competition – avoiding becoming a tool of either side while refusing to abandon its core commitments to humanitarianism and sovereign dignity. Only then can its “neutral bridge” identity take root – safeguarding its own sovereignty, security, and development interests while contributing unique value to Northeast Asian stability, and establishing a model for medium, small-state diplomacy in an era of great power competition.
BY By Sumiya Chuluunbaatar

Air India to fly relief aircraft to Mongolia to bring back 228 stranded passengers www.indiatoday.com

Air India will operate a special relief flight on Tuesday to bring back 228 passengers stranded in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, after their San Francisco–Delhi flight was diverted on Monday due to a suspected technical issue.
The airline said the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, operating as flight AI183, will depart from Delhi on Tuesday afternoon and return with the affected passengers on Wednesday morning.
Flight AI174, a Boeing 777 operating from San Francisco to Delhi via Kolkata, made a precautionary landing in the Mongolian capital after pilots reported a possible technical issue mid-air. The aircraft, carrying 245 people — including 228 passengers and 17 crew members — landed safely.
“Air India will be operating a relief flight to ferry the passengers of flight AI174 (San Francisco–Delhi of November 2), which was diverted to Ulaanbaatar on Monday. The ferry flight AI183 is scheduled to depart Delhi this afternoon and return with the affected passengers on Wednesday morning,” the airline said in a statement.
The carrier added that it has been coordinating with local authorities and the Indian Embassy in Mongolia to assist passengers and crew, providing hotel accommodation, meals, and regular updates.
“At Air India, the safety and wellbeing of our passengers and crew remain our top priority,” an airline spokesperson said.
The diverted Boeing 777 is currently undergoing technical checks in Ulaanbaatar and will return to India once cleared by engineers.
This marks the third instance in recent years of an Air India San Francisco–Delhi flight diverting mid-air due to technical reasons. In 2023, a similar flight made an emergency landing in Magadan, Russia, and another diversion occurred in 2024 to Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. In both cases, passengers were later flown home on alternate aircraft.

Construction of oil pipeline nears completion in Mongolia www.akipress.com

43 months ago, a government resolution was issued regarding the construction of Mongolia's first large-scale oil pipeline.
The plan was to build a 530-kilometer pipeline from the Tamsag Basin in Matad and Khalkhgol districts of Dornod province to Dornogovi province, with a budget of $388 million.
The Chinese state-owned company Norinco International Cooperation was selected as the general contractor and began work in June 2022. The company was awarded a contract to build the pipeline over a three-year term, until the commissioning of Mongolia's first oil refinery. The cost of the pipeline alone is $380 million. The country will pay this amount entirely in coal.
The government is working on the project, but the construction of the pipeline has not yet been completed.
"The work is being finalized. The reason for the delay in the pipeline construction work is COVID-19 and the delay in approving additional financing," Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Damdinyam Gongor stated.
"The construction of the first oil refinery (NPP) is in progress. Just four months ago, the project was over 20% complete, and today it has reached more than 50%. When the plant will be completed, it will produce 1.5 million tons of petroleum products per year, and Mongolia will be able to cover 50–100% of its domestic fuel needs. 1,500 new jobs will be created," he said.

ICFG secures $25 million loan facility to expand Mongolia operations www.investing.com

LONDON - ICFG Limited (LON:ICFG), an international financial services group, has secured a loan facility of up to $25 million from Alternative Investments VCC, acting on behalf of Helicap Income Opportunities Fund, according to a press release statement issued Tuesday.
The initial disbursement under the facility amounts to $11 million, with $9.5 million allocated to ICFG’s subsidiary Pocket NBFI LLC and $1.5 million to ICFG Limited. ICFG PTE. Ltd. will serve as guarantor for the loan.
Pocket NBFI operates the Pocket fintech application, which currently serves over 875,000 registered customers. The platform functions as a financial marketplace connecting customers with multiple financial service providers.
"We are delighted to partner with Helicap to further our mission of advancing financial inclusion across emerging markets," said Enkhmaral Batkhuyag, Interim CEO of ICFG. "This facility will enable us to scale our lending operations in Mongolia and strengthen our digital financial ecosystem."
Helicap is described as a fintech investment management firm specializing in the alternative lending sector across the Asia-Pacific region. The company aims to address what it estimates as a more than $500 billion credit gap in the region.
ICFG indicated that the partnership aligns with its mission to expand financial access for underbanked and unbanked populations while promoting the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises across emerging markets. The company expects to announce further updates as additional tranches of the facility are agreed and disbursed.

Government Plans to Expand Fuel Reserve www.montsame.mn

Mongolia’s parliament members’ hospitality expenses to be cut as teachers’ and doctors’ pay rises www.asianews.network

The ruling Mongolian People’s Party group meeting held on November 3, 2025 agreed on measures to raise public-sector wages while cutting other expenditures to free up resources for the 2026 state budget. MPP group leader J.Batjargal said the party has estimated funds to raise the basic teacher salary to MNT 2.8 million from December 1, 2025, and to increase doctors’ and healthcare workers’ pay by 15% from January 1, 2026; the resources have been included in the government’s 2026 budget proposal.
J.Batjargal added that the group discussed increases in pensions and social welfare and “made an estimate of the resources to increase the 6% budget by 8.6%” which have also been reflected in the 2026 draft budget. He said the measures aim to address urgent social needs while remaining within fiscal constraints.
Kh.Gankhuyag, head of the working group tasked with finding the necessary funds, said total expenditures tied to salaries and pensions amount to MNT 1.1 trillion, and that matching the planned rises requires offsetting cuts elsewhere. He said core social funds, including the Social Insurance Fund, Social Welfare Fund, Health Insurance Fund, and performance financing for education and health institutions, as well as disaster prevention, search-and-rescue, interest on government loans, current expenses financed by foreign loans and aid, and child support will not be touched.
To generate savings, Kh.Gankhuyag said most other budget items will be reduced by 10–13%. Specific discretionary expenses, such as domestic hospitality for MPs, Cabinet Secretariat costs, and subsidies of the Minister of Culture, will be eliminated or cut. Investment spending on equipment and devices outside the health and education sectors will be reduced by 50%, and transitional investments will be trimmed by 15%, freeing MNT 150 billion.

Air India San Francisco-Delhi flight lands in Mongolia over suspected tech issue www.punjabnewsexpress.com

Air India on Monday said that its flight from San Francisco to Delhi, via Kolkata, made a precautionary landing in Mongolia, after the flight crew suspected a technical issue. 
The airline said that the incident occurred when flight AI174, on November 2, operating from San Francisco to Delhi via Kolkata, "made a precautionary landing at Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, after the flight crew suspected a technical issue en route". 
"The aircraft landed safely at Ulaanbaatar and is undergoing the necessary checks. We are working closely with our partners to support all passengers while we make efforts to get everyone on their way to the destination at the earliest opportunity, " an Air India spokesperson said. 
Air India said it "regrets the inconvenience caused to passengers due to the unforeseen situation. At Air India, the safety of passengers and crew remains a top priority". 
Meanwhile, Air India has been granted a temporary extension of flight duty time for two-pilot Boeing 787 Dreamliner planes flying on European routes, which have become longer due to the closure of Pakistani airspace, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) said last week. 
The extension was based on specific operational reasons linked to planes on European routes having to undertake longer flight paths following the shutdown of Pakistan’s airspace, according to the civil aviation regulator.

China-Mongolia Railway Completes Pile Foundation Work within China www.ceic.com

On October 31, the final pile foundation of the second China-Mongolia cross-border railway bridge (section within China) was completed at the Ganqimaodu Port in Inner Mongolia. With this, all 340 pile foundations for the section have been successfully finished, laying a solid foundation for the subsequent construction of the bridge’s main structure.
The China-Mongolia cross-border railway is the second railway linking the two countries, following the Erenhot–Zamyn-Uud line that opened in 1956, nearly 70 years ago. The groundbreaking ceremony for the new railway was held at the border port on May 14 this year, and on June 15, drilling began for the first pile foundation, marking the project’s transition into the construction phase.
During construction, CHN Energy Baoshen Railway Group optimized the construction plan and adopted a 24-hour rotating shift system with full-time technical supervision to strengthen coordination and process control, ensuring the quality of pile foundation work. The section of the project within China is invested and constructed by CHN Energy, while the section within Mongolia is invested and constructed by Tavantolgoi Railway LLC. Both sides adhere to the principle of unified design, respective construction and simultaneous connection.
Once completed, the China-Mongolia cross-border railway will connect the Ganquan Railway with Mongolia’s southbound railway network, further enhancing infrastructure connectivity and economic and trade exchanges between the two countries.