1 MONGOLIA SIGNALS READINESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST DESERTIFICATION WWW.QAZINFORM.COM PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      2 MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES REACH USD 6 BILLION WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      3 FUEL SUPPLY STRENGTHENED AS DECEMBER PURCHASE ORDERS CONFIRMED WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      4 MONGOLIA LAUNCHES AI AND BIG DATA TRAINING PROGRAM IN COLLABORATION WITH ORACLE WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      5 NETFLIX’S REALITY SHOW PHYSICAL: ASIA BRINGS GLOBAL SPOTLIGHT TO MONGOLIA WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      6 UZBEKISTAN TO LIFT IMPORT DUTIES ON GOODS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, MONGOLIA AND SEVERAL NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES WWW.KUN.UZ PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      7 MAN ARRESTED FOR POACHING ENDANGERED BLACK-TAILED GAZELLE IN MONGOLIA WWW.XINHUANET.COM PUBLISHED:2025/12/04      8 MONGOLIA, ITALY ESTABLISH A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/12/03      9 MONGOLIA TO CHAIR CAREC PROGRAM IN 2026 WWW.QAZINFORM.COM  PUBLISHED:2025/12/03      10 GOLD PURCHASE BY MONGOLIA'S CENTRAL BANK DOWN 14.2 PCT WWW.XINHUANET.COM PUBLISHED:2025/12/03      Н.ЦЭРЭНСАМБУУ: ГАДААДЫН ХӨРӨНГӨ ОРУУЛАЛТААР БОР ТЭЭГИЙН ОРДЫГ ЭДИЙН ЗАСГИЙН ЭРГЭЛТЭД ОРУУЛНА WWW.EAGLE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     С.БЯМБАЦОГТ: ЗЭС ХАЙЛУУЛАХ ҮЙЛДВЭРИЙГ БАРИХ ХӨРӨНГӨ ОРУУЛАГЧИЙГ НЭЭЛТТЭЙ СОНГОН ШАЛГАРУУЛНА WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     NETFLIX-ИЙН МОНГОЛД ХИЙХ ШИНЭ НЭВТРҮҮЛГИЙН НӨЛӨӨ БА АЛГАН ДЭЭР ТАВЬСАН БОЛОМЖОО АШИГЛАХУЙ WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     ГАДААД ВАЛЮТЫН УЛСЫН НӨӨЦИЙН ХЭМЖЭЭ 6.0 ТЭРБУМ АМ.ДОЛЛАРТ БУЮУ ТҮҮХЭН ДЭЭД ХЭМЖЭЭНД ХҮРЛЭЭ WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     ДАЛАНЗАДГАД СУМАНД 50 МВТ-ЫН СТАНЦ БАРИХ АЖЛЫГ ИРЭХ ОНООС ЭХЛҮҮЛНЭ WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     МАНАЙ УЛСАД 37,097 ГАДААДЫН ИРГЭН ОРШИН СУУХ БҮРТГЭЛТЭЙ БАЙНА WWW.GOGO.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     ТӨМӨР ЗАМЫН ТӨСЛИЙН БҮТЭЭН БАЙГУУЛАЛТ 84 ХУВЬТАЙ ҮРГЭЛЖИЛЖ БАЙНА WWW.GOGO.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/04     ЭМИЙН ЧАНАРЫН ХЯНАЛТЫН ҮНДЭСНИЙ ЛАВЛАГАА ЛАБОРАТОРИ ИРЭХ ОНЫ НЭГДҮГЭЭР УЛИРАЛД АШИГЛАЛТАД ОРНО WWW.EAGLE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/03     НИЙСЛЭЛД ТАВАН ДЦС, НЭГ ДУЛААНЫ СТАНЦ ЖИЛД 5.8 САЯ ГАРУЙ ТОНН ТҮҮХИЙ НҮҮРС ТҮЛДЭГ WWW.NEWS.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/03     2026 ОНД НИЙСЛЭЛД 53.74 КМ АВТО ЗАМ ШИНЭЭР ТАВИНА WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/12/03    

Events

Name organizer Where
MBCC “Doing Business with Mongolia seminar and Christmas Receptiom” Dec 10. 2025 London UK MBCCI London UK Goodman LLC

NEWS

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Power of Siberia 2: Ulaanbaatar Gas Supply Project Highlighted at 10th Eastern Economic Forum www.montsame.mn

The 10th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, and the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing were not only major geopolitical events but also strategically interconnected.
During these gatherings, the Heads of State of Mongolia, Russia, and China reached a landmark agreement on the construction of the “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline. In parallel, Russia’s Gazprom and China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a legally binding memorandum to lay a gas pipeline through Mongolian territory, further cementing trilateral energy cooperation.
During the 10th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) held in Vladivostok under the theme “The Far East: Cooperation for Peace and Development”, Mongolian Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojav met with Russian President Putin for a bilateral discussion. President Putin noted that energy cooperation had been a central focus during his earlier talks with Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa in Beijing, underscoring the strategic importance of trilateral engagement among Russia, Mongolia, and China.
Both the EEF and the preceding SCO summit have proven highly beneficial for Mongolia, facilitating regional dialogue and advancing joint initiatives in energy infrastructure, including the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline and the Ulaanbaatar gasification project.
Mongolia, Russia, and China have reached a long-awaited agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, representing a major advancement in trilateral cooperation. In addition, the three countries signed a memorandum of understanding in Vladivostok to jointly support the Ulaanbaatar gasification project.
The memorandum was signed by Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister Amarsaikhan Sainbuyan and Deputy Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee Vitaly Markelov during Prime Minister Zandanshatar’s meeting with Gazprom executives. The agreement outlines a joint effort to study the feasibility of introducing natural gas infrastructure in Ulaanbaatar, a city currently struggling with air pollution and energy sustainability challenges.
The construction of the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline through China’s Heilongjiang province required the development of new gas fields on the Russian side, involving extensive infrastructure work and investment. In contrast, Power of Siberia-2 will utilize existing deposits. Eliminating the need for new extraction. A distinctive feature of this project is that the pipeline is planned to be laid underground across the Mongolian steppes, a region known for its harsh natural climate and challenging terrain.
During his bilateral meeting in Vladivostok, the legal framework of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project has been resolved, but an equally critical phase involves securing the investment for its implementation. Discussions are now focused on financing strategies and determining the ownership structure among Mongolia, Russia, and China. A joint working group with representatives will be formed to oversee these negotiations. According to sources, the group’s first meeting is expected to be held in Ulaanbaatar.
The Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline is a strategic priority for Mongolia. The project is expected to generate substantial revenue for the state budget, create thousands of jobs, and help reduce air pollution in Ulaanbaatar – a persistent challenge for the capital. Additionally, access to the ports of Russia’s Far East remains vital for Mongolia, a landlocked country aiming to expand its trade and energy transit routes.
Professor Ulambayar Denzenlkham, Doctor of Science and Professor of International Studies at the University of Humanities of Mongolia, highlighted the long-term impact of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), which has been held annually in Russia’s Far East from 2015 to 2025. He noted that over 2,740 agreements were signed during this period, including 314 agreements in 2014 alone, valued at RUB 5.5 trillion, or approximately USD 68 billion. Participation also grew significantly, with over 1,500 delegates from 25 countries in 2016 and more than 7,000 delegates from 75 countries in 2025.
Professor Ulambayar emphasized the progress made in expanding port capacity in the Russian Far East, a point echoed by President Vladimir Putin during the forum’s plenary meeting. The president referred to infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy systems, as the ‘main artery’ of economic growth, and credited the forum with driving development and connectivity in the region.  
The planned route of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolian territory is considered vital to Mongolia’s energy future and broader economic development.
Since 2016, Mongolia has actively participated in the Eastern Economic Forum, with four presidential-level attendances and seven high-level delegations led by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and key ministers. This consistent engagement reflects Mongolia’s growing interest in the forum’s role in promoting regional cooperation, investment, and strategic partnerships.
During the bilateral meeting at the 10th EEF, Russian President Vladimir Putin described Mongolia as “Russia’s most reliable partner in the Asia-Pacific region”. The statement, made shortly after the trilateral summit in Beijing, highlights the strategic importance of Mongolia in regional energy and infrastructure initiatives.

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Mongolia's exports fall 13.8 pct in 8 months www.xinhuanet.com

Mongolia exported goods and raw materials worth 9.1 billion U.S. dollars in the first eight months of 2025, down 13.8 percent from a year ago, official data showed on Monday.
Mining commodities, such as copper, iron ore and unprocessed or semi-processed gold, constituted 93 percent of Mongolia's total exports during the period.
Meanwhile, goods and raw materials worth 7.5 billion dollars were imported into Mongolia, down 0.3 percent year-on-year.
Some 18.3 percent of imports were petroleum products, and 11 percent were passenger cars, the data showed.

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New copper deposit with 357 million tons of ore discovered in Mongolia www.akipress.com

 A newly identified mineral deposit, known as 'Oyut', has been discovered within the territories of Bayan-Undur and Jargalant districts, located in Orkhon province, Mongolia, Montsame reported.
Preliminary geological exploration has revealed that the Oyut deposit holds an estimated 357 million tons of ore reserves. This positions it as a potential asset comparable in scale to Erdenet, Mongolia's largest copper and molybdenum ore mining operation.
Prime Minister of Mongolia Zandansahtar Gombojav attended the official opening and preparatory activities for the operational launch of the newly discovered Oyut copper deposit on September 7.
The Prime Minister has authorized a feasibility study for the construction of a concentrator designed to process 5 to 10 million tons of ore per year at the Oyut deposit.
Early estimates suggest the deposit could support operations for 30 to 35 years, marking it a long-term strategic resource. Initial geological exploration was independently conducted by specialists from the Erdenet Mining Corporation, whose senior engineers will oversee the project’s design and construction.
PM emphasized Mongolia's constitutional commitment to equitable resource distribution, stating that the benefits from subsoil resources shall be consolidated into the National Sovereign Wealth Fund and fairly allocated to all citizens.
The Oyut copper deposit is situated approximately 8 kilometers from the Erdenetyn-Ovoo deposit, the basis of the Erdenet Mining Corporation, and just 3 kilometers from the infrastructure of the Industrial and Technology Park near Erdenet city.
The launch of operations at the Oyut deposit is expected to make a substantial contribution to the Sovereign Wealth Fund. It will also serve as a key driver of socio-economic development in Erdenet city, Orkhon aimag, the Northern region, and Mongolia as a whole.

 

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Mongolia Exits SCO Observer Status, Draws Closer to China and Russia www.news.mn

In September 2025, amid the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, a pivotal geopolitical shift took hold for Mongolia: after two decades as an SCO “observer state,” the country formally stepped away from this neutral role. The move followed the SCO’s restructuring of its partner framework, which merged “observer states” and “dialogue partners” into a unified “SCO partners” category. Mongolia pointedly declined to transition to the new status.
Instead, Ulaanbaatar announced a “strategic focus on trilateral cooperation with China and Russia,” a pivot that reflects not just diplomatic recalibration, but the deepening gravitational pull of its two giant neighbors. For a nation long defined by its “multipillar” foreign policy – crafted to balance great powers and avoid overreliance – this shift is a symptom of a reshaped Eurasian order, where China and Russia’s economic, energy, and security networks are tightening around Mongolia.
From Observer Caution to Trilateral Alignment: A Calculated Pivot
Mongolia’s SCO observer status, granted in 2004, was once a cornerstone of its geopolitical survival. It allowed Ulaanbaatar to participate in the bloc’s economic dialogues and cultural initiatives (like anti-desertification efforts) without committing to binding security or infrastructure deals. As recently as 2024, President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa described the observer role as a “buffer” in a parliamentary address, stressing it let Mongolia “engage without being entangled” in great-power rivalries.
By 2025, that caution had evaporated. According to Mongolian diplomatic sources, China and Russia applied quiet but persistent pressure on Ulaanbaatar to “upgrade” its engagement. For Moscow – still reeling from a 40 percent drop in European gas demand since the 2022 Ukraine conflict – Mongolia’s neutrality hindered its goal of securing eastern energy export routes. For Beijing, the observer status slowed progress on the China-Mongolia-Russia (CMR) Economic Corridor, a flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project linking Chinese manufacturing hubs to Russian resource basins via Mongolian territory.
Mongolia’s response was a clear break from tradition. In a September 1 statement, its Foreign Ministry framed the “exit” from observer status as a choice to prioritize “tangible trilateral outcomes” over “broad regional forums.” Days later, at the Beijing trilateral summit, Khurelsukh explicitly aligned Mongolia’s “Steppe Road” infrastructure plan with China’s BRI and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – a far cry from the tentative language of observer diplomacy. He also highlighted domestic priorities tied to regional cooperation: the “Billion Trees” environmental campaign and plans to host the 2026 U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification (COP17) in Ulaanbaatar.
The SCO’s reaction underscored the shift’s significance. Russian President Vladimir Putin praised Mongolia’s “deeper engagement” as a sign of the bloc’s growing Eurasian influence, while Chinese President Xi Jinping commended its role in “safeguarding regional peace” – a nod to Ulaanbaatar’s pledge to join SCO counterterrorism exercises and avoid foreign military bases.
For Mongolia, however, the move was an admission: neutrality is no longer viable in a region where China and Russia set the terms of engagement.
The Pipeline That Binds: Power of Siberia 2 and Mongolia’s Double-Edged Bargain
If Mongolia’s SCO pivot was a political signal, the “Power of Siberia 2” (PoS2) natural gas pipeline is the economic mechanism cementing its integration with China and Russia. On September 2, 2025, the three countries signed a legally binding memorandum in Beijing to build the 3,000-kilometer pipeline, which will transport 50 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually to China via central Mongolia. For Ulaanbaatar, the project is a double-edged sword: a lifeline for an economy recovering from COVID-19 and a coal price slump, yet a chain locking it into decades of dependence.
The short-term benefits are tangible. Over 30 years, PoS2 will generate more than $10 billion in transit fees for Mongolia – roughly a few hundred million annually, equivalent to a few percentage points of its 2024 GDP – and create 10,000 construction jobs. It will also provide Mongolia with affordable Russian gas, reducing its 90 percent reliance on coal for electricity generation and supporting its climate goals.
For China, PoS2 is critical to energy security. Amid China-U.S. tensions and uncertain Middle Eastern LNG access, the pipeline will meet 15 percent of China’s projected 2035 natural gas demand. For Russia, it offsets lost European markets. Combined with the expanded “Power of Siberia 1” (now carrying 44 billion cubic meters of LNG annually), PoS2 will make China Moscow’s largest gas export market by 2030.
Yet the costs to Mongolia’s sovereignty are steep. China and Russia will fund 85 percent of the $40 billion project with Russia’s Gazprom and China’s CNPC holding majority control. Mongolia contributes only land and labor – no ownership stake, and no role in pricing or maintenance. This deepens an already lopsided economic relationship: China buys 65 percent of Mongolia’s exports (coal, copper), while Russia supplies 90 percent of its gasoline and 70 percent of its electricity. Critics in Ulaanbaatar warn PoS2 will turn “multipillar” diplomacy into a “two-pillar” reality.
The imbalance was evident weeks before the SCO Summit, when Gazprom signed a separate transit deal with Mongolia, precluding Ulaanbaatar from seeking alternative partners. Khurelsukh has defended the project as a “win-win,” noting Mongolia retains control over its pipeline section and will use fees to fund renewable energy. But experts remain skeptical. “If Gazprom and CNPC dispute prices, Mongolia gets caught in the middle. We have no Plan B,” said a Mongolian government official familiar with cross-border energy cooperation negotiations.
Infrastructure, Security, and the Binding Web
Energy is just one thread in the China-Russia-Mongolia cooperation network. On the same day the PoS2 agreement was signed, the three countries extended the CMR Economic Corridor until 2031 and added 33 new infrastructure projects, including three cross-border railways. The Shiveekhuren-Ceke and Khangi-Mandula lines will link Mongolia’s coal-rich South Gobi region to China’s steel hubs. A modernized Central Railway Corridor, will connect Mongolia to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway. And then there’s the already operational Gashuunsukhait-Ganqimaodu line, streamlining coal exports to China.
Together, these projects will cut Mongolia’s reliance on road transport for mineral exports by 50 percent – but bind its economy all the more tightly to China’s manufacturing sector and Russia’s resource-driven growth.
Security cooperation is also deepening. At the Tianjin Summit, Mongolia pledged to join the SCO’s “Comprehensive Center for Countering Security Threats” and participate in 2026 joint anti-terror drills. While Mongolian officials frame this as a response to extremism, the SCO’s definition of the threat aligns with China and Russia’s agenda. Moscow focuses on countering “hybrid threats” (Western disinformation), while Beijing prioritizes fighting “separatism” in Xinjiang. For Mongolia – with 4,710 km of border with China and 3,485 km with Russia – such cooperation is a prerequisite for market access.
History as a Tool: Soft Power and the “Shared Struggle” Narrative
To legitimize this alignment, China and Russia have leveraged the 80th anniversary of World War II (China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, Russia’s Great Patriotic War). The symbolism was deliberate: On September 2, Khurelsukh traveled to Zhangbei County, Zhangjiakou city of Hebei, China, to lay a wreath at the Soviet-Mongolian Martyrs’ Cemetery, honoring soldiers who liberated northern China in 1945. The ceremony, broadcast live in all three countries, was framed by Chinese state media as a tribute to the “unbreakable bond” between the nations.
“Our grandfathers fought side by side against fascism; today we defend their legacy,” Khurelsukh declared. This narrative undermines Western criticism of the China-Russia partnership as an “authoritarian bloc” and lets Mongolia see itself as a “guardian of shared values” rather than a pawn.
Soft power extends beyond symbolism. China has expanded the number of Confucius Institutes in Mongolia from five (2015) to 15 (2025), focusing on trade-specific language training. Russia has doubled scholarships for Mongolian students to study engineering and energy – fields critical to PoS2. By 2025, over 10,000 Mongolian students were enrolled in Chinese and Russian universities, compared to over 2,000 in the U.S. and Europe.
The Fading “Third Neighbor” Policy
Mongolia’s pivot has raised doubts about its “third neighbor” policy, which for decades has seen Ulaanbaatar balance China and Russia with U.S., EU, and Japanese partnerships. The U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Millennium Compact Challenge have conducted multiple grants and programs to support Mongolia’s development of clean water and energy sources, and the EU pledged 79.67 million euros in financing aimed at enhancing Mongolia’s energy infrastructure. But these sums pale next to the $40 billion committed to PoS2 and the CMR Corridor. Western investment has also declined since 2022, as companies shift focus to the Ukraine war and the Middle East.
Mongolian officials reject the “pawn” label, emphasizing their transit leverage. “Without Mongolia, PoS2 and railways are logistically impossible or too costly,” one such official said. Ulaanbaatar has extracted concessions: China and Russia will fund PoS2-related environmental protections and build schools in rural Mongolia. Hosting COP17 in 2026 also lets Mongolia assert global environmental leadership.
Yet pressure to align with China and Russia will grow, from adopting Beijing’s “cyber sovereignty” model to avoiding Western sanctions on Moscow. Mongolia’s “multipillar” identity, once a strength, is increasingly rhetorical.
Conclusion: A Microcosm of Eurasian Geopolitics
Mongolia’s exit from SCO observer status in favor of expanded trilateral cooperation is more than a regional story; it mirrors Eurasia’s broader shift. As the United States focuses on Indo-Pacific alliances and Europe navigates energy transition, China and Russia are building a parallel order centered on the SCO, EAEU, and projects like PoS2. For smaller states like Mongolia, the choice is no longer “alignment vs. neutrality,” but “engagement vs. marginalization.”
In the short term, Mongolia gains stability: transit fees, infrastructure investment, and SCO market access. In the long term, it risks losing the autonomy that defined its foreign policy for decades. As Khurelsukh acknowledged in Tianjin, “Mongolia’s future is tied to the stability and prosperity of our neighbors.” The question is whether that tie becomes a lifeline – or a constraint.
For the West, Mongolia’s shift is a warning: post-Cold War unipolarity in Eurasia is over. Smaller states are increasingly choosing partners based on tangible benefits, not ideology. For China and Russia, it validates their vision of a Eurasian order built on “sovereignty, non-interference, and pragmatic cooperation.” For Mongolia, the tightrope walk between autonomy and dependence has never been more precarious. As PoS2 breaks ground and cross-border railways expand, its fate is increasingly shaped not in Ulaanbaatar, but in Beijing and Moscow.
By Sumiya Chuluunbaatar

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Rio Tinto dials up the diplomacy with Governor-General Sam Mostyn visiting Mongolian copper mine www.thewest.com.au

Australia’s Governor-General has visited Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi copper mine in Mongolia amid simmering tensions between the mining giant and the Asian country’s government.
Sam Mostyn was at Oyu Tolgoi this weekend as a key part of her trip to Mongolia — the first by an Australian Governor-General in more than 30 years.
The Governor-General was greeted by Rio’s new chief Simon Trott and chair Dominic Barton before venturing into the bowels of the massive underground copper mine.
“Earlier in my visit, the President of Mongolia and I spoke at great length about the strength of partnership between Australia and Mongolia. We agreed that Oyu Tolgoi is one of the greatest examples of that partnership,” Ms Mostyn said.
“The result of long-term and substantial investment by Rio Tinto, and benefiting from the expertise and ingenuity of hundreds of Australian mining and engineering companies, Oyu Tolgoi was also built by Mongolians for Mongolia’s future.
“The visit to Oyu Tolgoi was an extraordinary experience — we travelled 1.3 kilometres underground and saw first-hand the ingenuity and effectiveness of world class deep block cave mining, delivered with focus on safety and a strong, inclusive and enthusiastic workforce.”
Rio will be hoping Ms Mostyn’s diplomacy blitz can reset its strained relationship with key officials in Ulaanbaatar.
The Mongolian government in May reportedly filed a lawsuit against Rio in a UK court. The lawsuit accused the mining giant of corruption and political bribery.
A few weeks later, Rio was forced to overhaul its plans to grow Oyu Tolgoi after the Mongolian government delayed a decision to grant the company access to mining tenements.
Rio and Mongolia are also in a long-running legal battle over $US438 million ($665m) worth of disputed taxes.
Oyu Tolgoi, which produced first copper as an open-pit mine in 2013 and then as an underground mine in 2023, accounts for nearly 30 per cent of Mongolia’s gross domestic product.
Ms Moyston’s visit to Oyu Tolgoi comes days after the miner changed plans for one of its other copper projects thousands of kilometres away.
Rio on Wednesday cut the development envelope for its Winu copper-gold development in the East Pilbara by almost 14,000 hectares to 23,649ha.
This decision followed negotiations with the local Aboriginal corporation and concerns raised by environmentalists about the potential impact to habitat of a rare parrot species.
In May, Rio sold a 30 per cent stake in Winu for $430.4m to Japan’s Sumitomo Metal Mining.

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Rio Tinto’s Newly Appointed CEO Simon Trott Visits Mongolia www.montsame.mn

Newly appointed Chief Executive Officer of Rio Tinto Group, as of August 25, 2025, Simon Trott is visiting Mongolia to meet with colleagues and review operations. He is also scheduled to visit the Oyu Tolgoi mine.
During a meeting with employees, Simon Trott outlined the Group’s future goals and priorities while introducing last week’s decision to restructure Rio Tinto’s operations. The company will continue to operate through three global product groups: iron ore, aluminum, and energy transition minerals such as lithium and copper. According to Simon Trott, this streamlined structure will strengthen Rio Tinto’s supply capacity, competitiveness, and growth while sharpening its focus on key green development metals.
Simon Trott has over 20 years of leadership experience at Rio Tinto, having managed product groups including iron ore, salt, uranium, borates, and diamonds. He has also served on the executive leadership team as Chief Commercial Officer.

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Gazprom Expands Gas Collaboration with Kazakhstan, Mongolia www.menafn.com

On Friday, Russian energy giant Gazprom announced it has finalized agreements with Kazakhstan and Mongolia to deepen their gas cooperation, including plans to boost gas deliveries to Kazakhstan during 2025-2026 and to conduct a feasibility study for gasification in Mongolia’s capital, Ulaanbaatar.
The supply contract was signed by Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller and Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar during an official working session, the company reported.
The discussions also covered joint efforts in gas supply, transportation, and processing.
Back in November 2023, Gazprom and the Kazakh government entered into a strategic partnership pact focusing on energy collaboration.
In a separate meeting, Miller engaged with Mongolian Prime Minister Gombojav Zandanshatar to explore opportunities in the natural gas sector.
Participants highlighted that natural gas would serve as a more efficient and environmentally friendlier energy source, fostering industrial development and enhancing living conditions.
Following this, Gazprom Deputy Chairman Vitaly Markelov and Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister Sainbuyan Amarsaikhan signed a memorandum of understanding concerning gasification prospects in Ulaanbaatar.
Earlier, in August 2025, Gazprom and Mongolia’s government had signed a memorandum to reinforce cooperation in the oil and gas industries.
Kazakhstan, a leading energy producer in Central Asia, still depends on Russian imports to fulfill its domestic gas needs.
Meanwhile, Mongolia has long aimed to increase natural gas access to lessen coal usage and improve air quality in Ulaanbaatar, considered one of the world’s most polluted capitals.

 

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President of Mongolia and Governor-General of Australia Hold Official Talks www.montsame.mn

President of Mongolia Khurelsukh Ukhnaa and Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia Samantha Mostyn held an official meeting on September 5, 2025.
During the meeting, the two Heads of State reviewed the achievements in bilateral relations and cooperation over the past 50 years, expressing their commitment to further expand and enrich these ties with new content. They affirmed their intention to deepen cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including education, mining, and agriculture. Both sides praised the development of relations under the framework of an “Expanded Partnership” since 2007 and reaffirmed the mutual goal of elevating the relations of the two countries to the level of a “Comprehensive Partnership” in the near future.
President Khurelsukh noted that the current visit, taking place more than 30 years after the last Governor-General-level visit, marks a new chapter in bilateral relations. He highlighted Australia as an important “third neighbour” that shares the core democratic values of Mongolia, such as human rights, freedom, and a market economy, and as a close partner in the Indo-Pacific region. The President emphasized the symbolic role of the Oyu Tolgoi project and the “Mongolia–Australia Minerals Cooperation Program” in refining Mongolia’s legal and regulatory environment in the mining sector, expanding business cooperation, and strengthening human resource capacity. He underscored the importance of increasing Australian investment in Mongolia and implementing joint projects and programs.
Governor-General Mostyn stressed that Australia attaches great importance to its relations and cooperation with Mongolia, a country sharing common democratic values. She noted with satisfaction that people-to-people ties and exchanges have been strengthening year by year, and expressed her delight that young Mongolians educated in Australia are making valuable contributions to their home country’s development. The sides discussed expanding cooperation in education, gradually increasing scholarship quotas, aligning with the “President's Scholar 2100” Scholarship Program, facilitating Australian volunteer teachers to work in Mongolia, and implementing short- and medium-term training programs.
The two Heads of State agreed that, as nations with pastoral and farm-based livestock sectors, overcoming and addressing global challenges such as climate change, desertification, land degradation, and food security constitutes a shared objective. They discussed implementing joint projects and programs in this regard, including with the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. They also exchanged views on opportunities for effective cooperation within the National Movements of Mongolia, such as “Billions of Trees,” “Food Supply and Security,” and “Healthy Mongolian.”
The two sides noted their active collaboration and mutual support within the United Nations and other international organisations and expressed commitment to further strengthening regional and international cooperation. In this context, President Khurelsukh extended an invitation for Australia to participate at a high level in the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, which will be held in Ulaanbaatar in 2026.

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The China-Russia Energy Pact: Reshaping Global Markets and Emerging Investment Opportunities www.ainvest.com

The China-Russia energy partnership has entered a new era with the formalization of the Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline, a $13.6–$34 billion infrastructure project that will transport 50 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually from Russia's western Siberian fields to northern China via Mongolia. This development marks a seismic shift in global energy dynamics, as two of the world's largest economies deepen their strategic alignment to counter Western influence and diversify energy supply chains. For investors, the pact opens a corridor of opportunities in emerging markets, particularly in Mongolia, Russia, and China, where undervalued equities stand to benefit from infrastructure development, transit fees, and energy distribution.  
A Strategic Shift in Energy Geopolitics
The PoS-2 pipeline is more than a commercial agreement—it is a geopolitical recalibration. For Russia, the project offsets the collapse of European gas exports following the invasion of Ukraine and Western sanctions. European demand for Russian gas has plummeted, leaving Moscow scrambling to find alternative markets. China, meanwhile, seeks to reduce its reliance on volatile LNG imports and diversify its energy mix to fuel industrial growth. The pipeline's 30-year contract horizon ensures a stable revenue stream for Russia and a long-term supply buffer for China, while Mongolia's role as a transit hub could generate up to $1 billion annually in fees.  
This partnership disrupts traditional energy dynamics in two key ways:
1. Reduced U.S. LNG Influence: China's shift toward pipeline gas from Russia could cut U.S. LNG exports by 40 million tons annually, undermining the economic viability of U.S. shale projects.
2. European Energy Vulnerability: With Russia pivoting to Asia, Europe's reliance on costly LNG imports will intensify, exacerbating energy insecurity and inflation.  
Emerging Market Equity Opportunities
The pipeline's construction and operation create a web of investment opportunities across three countries:  
1. Mongolia: Transit Fees and Infrastructure Development
Mongolia's 960-kilometer segment of the pipeline is a critical linchpin. While the country's government has yet to confirm financing details, local firms are poised to benefit from construction contracts and long-term maintenance. Undervalued Mongolian equities include:
- Mongolian Pipeline Construction Firms: Smaller-cap companies like Mongolstroy and Altai Engineering could secure contracts for earthworks, pipeline laying, and ancillary infrastructure. These firms are currently underfollowed by analysts but have strong ties to state-backed projects.
- Logistics and Energy Distributors: Companies such as TransMongolia Logistics may profit from expanded transportation networks and gas distribution hubs.  
2. Russia: State-Owned Energy Giants and Regional Development
Gazprom, the state-controlled energy giant, is the linchpin of the project. While its shares are widely followed, investors should also consider smaller, sector-specific plays:
- Siberian Gas Processing Firms: Companies like SibGasTech and Yakutia Energy could benefit from increased gas production and processing needs.
- Regional Infrastructure Developers: Firms involved in Siberian road and rail upgrades, such as TransSiberia Rail, may see demand surge as the pipeline spurs economic activity in remote regions.  
3. China: Energy Security and Industrial Growth
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is central to the project, but smaller players in the energy distribution and logistics sectors are also positioned to gain:
- Pipeline Infrastructure Firms: Companies like Sinopipe and China Gas Pipeline Co. could secure contracts for the Chinese segment of the pipeline.
- Industrial Gas Users: Firms in energy-intensive sectors, such as Shanghai Steel Group and Beijing Petrochemical, may see reduced costs and supply stability from the pipeline.  
Risks and Uncertainties
While the project's strategic benefits are clear, investors must navigate several risks:
- Pricing Disputes: Russia's preference for oil-indexed pricing (potentially $265–$285 per 1,000 cubic meters) clashes with China's push for lower rates ($120–$130). A compromise will determine profitability for both sides.
- Financing Delays: The lack of clarity on who funds the Chinese and Mongolian segments could delay construction beyond 2030.
- Geopolitical Tensions: U.S. and European pressure to isolate Russia could complicate project approvals or financing.  
Conclusion: A New Energy Corridor for Investors
The China-Russia energy pact is a masterstroke of strategic diversification, with far-reaching implications for global energy markets. For investors, the pipeline represents a unique opportunity to capitalize on emerging market equities in Mongolia, Russia, and China—sectors that are currently undervalued but poised for growth as the project progresses. While risks remain, the long-term economic and geopolitical alignment between Beijing and Moscow suggests that this corridor will only deepen, offering a compelling case for those willing to navigate the complexities of energy geopolitics.  
By targeting undervalued players in pipeline construction, transit fees, and energy distribution, investors can position themselves at the forefront of this transformative shift. The Power of Siberia 2 is not just a pipeline—it is a blueprint for the future of Eurasian energy integration.

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Korean influencer dies in fall at Mongolian volcano www.chosun.com

A fatal accident occurred in Mongolia’s representative volcanic tourist site, where a famous South Korean travel influencer fell to her death.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on the 7th that Ms. A, a woman in her 20s, died in a fall at the Uran Togoo Volcano in Bulgan Province, Mongolia, on the 28th of last month.
Ms. A, who had approximately 90,000 followers and primarily operated through Instagram, was reported to have been on a business trip to northern Mongolia when the incident occurred.
A source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told TV Chosun, “Ms. A is presumed to have lost her balance and fallen while taking photos atop the volcano due to sudden strong winds, resulting in her death. We are investigating the exact circumstances in cooperation with local authorities.”
The Uran Togoo Volcano stands approximately 1,680 meters above sea level, with a crater diameter of 500–600 meters and a depth of 50–60 meters. The crater interior features grasslands and small ponds, and its unique terrain and geological value make it one of Mongolia’s representative volcanic tourist sites. Currently a dormant volcano, it is known as a trekking destination near the Khovsgol region, which attracts many South Korean tourists.

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