SEOUL, July 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's major convenience store chain CU said Thursday it has launched two stores in a new international airport in Mongolia as part of efforts to boost its presence in the country.

CU said the company has become the first South Korean convenience store chain that has established outlets in the New Ulaanbaatar International Airport.

The sole international airport in Mongolia, which opened on July 1 and is also known as Chinggis Khaan International Airport, is about 50 kilometers from the Mongolian capital and has a daily passenger capacity of around 12,000.

The opening of the two outlets in the airport came four years after CU made forays into the Mongolian market through a franchise deal with local retailer Central Express.

One store in the departure lounge caters to travelers and offers instant noodles, snacks, beverages, instant coffee and instant prepared foods, with the other outlet available only to airport staff, CU said.

CU currently operates 130 stores in Mongolia after launching its first outlet in Ulaanbaatar in August 2018.

Mongolia is seen as a promising market for South Korean convenience store operators, with the number of people aged under 35 accounting for more than 60 percent of the total population.

South Korea's convenience store chain operators have been setting their sights on the overseas market as the domestic market has become increasingly saturated.

The 5th batch of Pfizer/Biontech vaccines with 39,780 doses arrived in Mongolia on July 14.

With 84,240 doses supplied on June 16, 85,410 doses on June 23, 85,410 doses on June 30, 30,420 doses on July 7 respectively, Mongolia has received a total of 325,260 doses of vaccines so far as part of the agreement of the Government of Mongolia and Pfizer Inc. (Pfizer / Biontech) to purchase 2,5 million doses of Pfzier vaccines.

The 2.35 million doses of the vaccine are purchased through the grant funding of the Project for Strengthening Capacity of Mongolia to Cope with the COVID-19 and Other Public Health Emergencies Agreement signed between the UNICEF and the Embassy of Japan on March 11, 2021.

UNICEF Mongolia

Mongolia received 20,000 doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine on July 13. The vaccine supply was made via Mongol Em Impex Concern LLC.

Starting today, the country is vaccinating its citizens with Sputnik V without age restrictions. “The Ministry of Health has given instructions to immunize citizens with Sputnik V without age restrictions starting today. The the vaccine is currently being distributed to vaccination sites and citizens will be able to receive Sputnik V shots at any vaccination site by tomorrow,” said spokesperson of the Health Ministry B.Uuganbayar.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia to the Republic of Poland B.Dorj had a meeting with Director of the Institute of Paleobiology of the Polish Academy of Sciences Jarosław Stolarski to discuss restoration and expansion of cooperation between the two sides.

Underlining that joint expeditions made large discoveries in Mongolia in 1960 and 1970, the Mongolian Ambassador showed an interest in restoring the cooperation.

The paleobiology institute director expressed his willingness to continue the cooperation and promote cooperation between the two countries in paleontology and biology.

The sides had discussions about determining possible areas of cooperation, exchanging scholars, jointly celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Mongolia-Poland joint expedition, establishing field research stations in Mongolia, staging paleontology exhibitions, and receiving support from Poland in paleontological research in Mongolia.

Mongolia’s mediating role in the Korean Peninsula has emphasized the significance of small states’ soft power in global diplomacy.

Joseph Nye’s notion of “soft power” has untapped potential for understanding the power of so-called small states, which can significantly contribute to peace mediation in the global policy arena by marshaling their soft diplomatic power. In this vein, Mongolia’s diplomatic mediation efforts on the Korean Peninsula, facilitated through its multilateral peace activist foreign policy and its cordial relations with all of the parties involved, have the potential to broaden its foreign policy reach in regional affairs.

‘Soft Power’: Bringing Warmth to a Frozen Conflict

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have, in recent years, shaken the precarious stability established by the 1953 Armistice between the two Koreas. The growing tensions on the peninsula evoke power struggles between big powers such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, historical adversaries with direct strategic interests in revisiting the Korean conflict. The region remains trapped in the logic of obstinate realpolitik.

Since the early 1990s, major powers have engaged in “hard power” mediation initiatives, employing a primarily carrot-and-stick approach that incorporates elements including financial assistance, humanitarian aid, and economic sanctions. However, these efforts have so far failed to resolve the Korean conflict. This suggests that hard power approaches may not be the best foreign policy solution for frozen conflicts, and they have proven to be especially ineffective in changing the “hearts and minds” of policymakers in conflicting states.

Many observers were surprised when Mongolia quietly revived declining multilateral engagement with North Korea following the gradual breakdown of the Six-Party Talks, which were held intermittently beginning in 2003. Notably, Mongolia’s mediating role has emphasized the significance of small states’ “soft power” in global diplomacy.

In 2014, Mongolia’s then-President Elbegdorj Tsakhia established a new dialogue venue in Ulaanbaatar to facilitate a breakthrough on the Korean issue. The conference type was track two, with diplomats from the Six-Party states invited as well as academics.

The conference aimed to increase trust and confidence among the various parties while decreasing tension and hostility on the Korean peninsula. The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security (UBD), as it is widely known, has aided high-ranking officials in developing mutual understanding and in reestablishing working relations. Social interactions at events and meals, undertaken as part of the UBD initiative, have helped to soften hardline positions on sensitive security issues. The dialog has also included non-security issues such as economics, energy, infrastructure, humanitarian issues, and the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding initiatives.

The number of participants attending the UBD has grown over time, as has its influence. The UBD has now firmly established itself as a stable multilateral security dialogue mechanism in which North Korea has consistently participated.

Mongolia’s Soft-Power Assets

Mongolia is a small state, with an annual GDP of just $13.84 billion, but has a rapidly growing economy. In 1990, it underwent a remarkable political transformation, from communism to holding democratic elections, without reverting to authoritarianism or political backlash, unlike in other emerging Sino-centric Asian countries. Mongolia’s successful sociopolitical transition was not novel. The roots of Mongolian soft power can be traced back to the Great Yassa (Mongol Empire law) and the cosmopolitan Mongolian identity that developed in the Central Asian steppe (c.1280–1360), when nomadic Mongols secured “Pax Mongolica” hegemony over much of Eurasia.

Today, Mongolia is an advanced democracy with a firmly established market economy that has a reputation for diplomatic mediation and peacekeeping operations. Mongolia’s regional peacemaker role may reflect its desire for renewed global prestige.

In recent decades, the art of using soft power has been enshrined in Mongolia’s foreign policy and via its cordial diplomatic relationships. Pursuing a pacifist foreign policy, Mongolia has sought an “open, independent, multi-pillared” foreign policy and is pursuing a “Third Neighbor” policy in global relations, emphasizing the development of diplomatic ties with both the West and East on pragmatic grounds.

Under this concept, Mongolia has enjoyed positive relations with a cluster of advanced democracies and global institutions including the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the U.N., the World Trade Organization, and ASEAN, all while maintaining its strategic relations with its two great power neighbors, China and Russia. Furthermore, Mongolia has declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has striven to formalize its nuclear-weapon-free status. These efforts have helped establish Mongolia’s reputation as an honest and dependable broker committed to regional nuclear non-proliferation.

Mongolia’s expansion of its mediator profile may not have been achievable without a cordial diplomatic record; its amicable relations with both Koreas have allowed its efforts to mediate as a third-party country to come to fruition. In a rare feat, Mongolia has gained North Korea’s trust. The two countries’ historic ties, dating back to 1948 and based on their shared communist ideology, have remained solid, despite Mongolia’s transition to democratic government and a liberalized economy. Mongolia may serve as a window to the outside world for North Korea, providing an opportunity for economic development by learning from its experience.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1990, Mongolia has also maintained close relations with South Korea. Today, as part of Ulaanbaatar’s Third Neighbor policy, relations with Seoul have evolved into comprehensive partnerships in several fields, including politics, economics, and culture. Politically, the two nations have sought greater diplomatic engagement by hosting an annual ministerial meeting to exchange foreign policy perspectives, including discussions regarding Ulaanbaatar’s support for the Korean Peninsula peace process.

In economic terms, South Korea was Mongolia’s fourth-largest trading partner in 2019, with bilateral trade volume totaling $266 million. Culturally, Mongolia remains one of the top tourist destinations for Koreans, while South Korea is the preferred immigration destination for Mongolians. It hosts the largest proportion of the Mongolian diaspora abroad, amounting to around 48,185 people in 2019, including 7,381 students.

Mongolia’s diplomatic achievements have demonstrated how small states can use soft power to enhance their foreign policy influence. The country has emerged as a key player in Northeast Asia over the last decade by employing soft power via its multilateral peace activist foreign policy and amicable diplomatic relations with key regional actors and powers beyond. Mongolia’s soft diplomatic mediation efforts through the UBD have thawed a frozen conflict, particularly with North Korea, offering a path to peace. Mongolia has quietly worked to revive the Korean Peninsula’s declining security dialogue, fostering regional cooperation among parties and raising its own profile as a foreign policy actor in the process.

This article is based on the findings of a research paper published in The Pacific Review; an international relations journal covering the interactions of the countries of the Asia-Pacific. The Pacific Review has a particular interest in how the region is defined and organized, and covers transnational political, security, military, economic, and cultural exchanges in seeking greater understanding of the region.

BY: GUEST AUTHOR

Shinae Hong

Dr. Shinae Hong is a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, Korea, and a former professor and founder of the Department of International Relations at the Mongolia International University in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Her research interests include Korean Peninsula security, international politics, and human security.

TOKYO, July 14 (Reuters) - A coronavirus cluster at a Japanese hotel where dozens of Brazilian Olympic team members are staying has raised new concern about infections at what the world's top Olympics official promised on Wednesday would be "historic" Games.

Just over a week before the opening ceremony, new cases linked to the Games and spiking infections in the host city highlight the risks of staging the world's biggest sports event during a pandemic even without spectators in sports venues.

Seven staff at the hotel in Hamamatsu city, southwest of Tokyo, had tested positive for the coronavirus, a city official said.

But a 31-strong Brazilian Olympic delegation, which includes judo athletes, are in a "bubble" in the hotel and separated from other guests and have not been infected.

The host city Tokyo, where a state of emergency has been imposed until after the Games end on Aug. 8, also recorded 1,149 new COVID-19 cases on Wednesday, the most in nearly six months.

Highly contagious virus variants have fuelled the latest wave of infections, and failure to vaccinate people faster has left the population vulnerable.

Medical experts are worried that Olympic "bubbles", imposed by Tokyo 2020 Olympic officials in an effort to keep out COVID-19, might not be completely tight as movement of staff servicing the Games can create opportunities for infection.

The Olympics, postponed last year as the virus was spreading around the world, have lost much public support in Japan because of fears they will trigger a surge of infections.

International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach praised the organisers and the Japanese people for staging the Games in the midst of the pandemic.

"These will be historic Olympic Games ... for the way how the Japanese people overcame so many challenges in the last couple of years, the great east Japan earthquake and now the coronavirus pandemic," Bach told reporters after meeting Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

When Japan was awarded the Games in 2013, they were expected to be a celebration of recovery from a deadly earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident in 2011.

Japanese leaders had hoped the re-scheduled Games this year would be a celebration of the world's victory over the coronavirus but those celebrations are on hold as many countries struggle with new surges of infections.

MUTED INTEREST

The coronavirus cluster at the Brazilians' hotel was found during routine screening required before staff started work, said city official Yoshinobu Sawada.

Many Olympic delegations are already in Japan and several athletes have tested positive upon arrival.

The refugee Olympic team has delayed its travel to Japan after a team official tested positive in Qatar, the International Olympic Committee said. read more

Members of the South African rugby team are in isolation after arriving, as they are believed to be close contacts with a case on their flight, said Kagoshima city, which is hosting the team.

The 21 members of the South African squad were due to stay in the city from Wednesday, but that plan has been halted until further advice from health authorities, said city official Tsuyoshi Kajihara.

Global interest in the Tokyo Olympics is muted, an Ipsos poll of 28 countries showed, amid concerns over COVID-19 in Japan and withdrawals of high-profile athletes, with the host country among the most disinterested.

The poll released on Tuesday found a global average of 46% interest in the Games, and in Japan 78% of people were against the Games going ahead.

With spectators barred from all Olympic events in Tokyo and surrounding regions officials are asking people to watch the Games on television and keep their movements to a minimum.

"Billions of people around the globe will be glued to their screens and they will admire the Japanese people for what they have achieved under these very difficult circumstances," Bach said.

Among those will not be competing in Japan is former world number one golfer Adam Scott. He questioned whether holding the Tokyo Olympics was a responsible decision, pointing to fear among people in Japan as it battles its resurgence of infections. read more

Switzerland's Roger Federer became the latest big name in tennis to withdraw from the Tokyo Olympics after the 20-times Grand Slam champion said on Tuesday that he had picked up a knee injury during the grasscourt season. read more

Reporting by Ju-min Park, Antoni Slodkowski, Joseph Campbell and Sam Nussey; Editing by Michael Perry, Robert Birsel & Simon Cameron-Moore

Japan's industry ministry says it aims to increase renewable energy output from fiscal 2019 levels by 70 percent by the year 2030. It is part of the government's goal of cutting greenhouse-gas emissions by nearly half.

A panel of experts met Tuesday to discuss specific measures to boost renewables, and also cut emissions by 46 percent by fiscal 2030 from levels in 2013.

The experts said solar panels at half of the country's public facilities would generate 7.5 billion kilowatt-hours.

And solar power systems at airports would create another 2.8 billion kilowatt-hours.

Other renewables could bring the total up to 312 billion kilowatt-hours by 2030. But some of the experts say these measures would not be enough to reach the goal.

The industry ministry said it would compile a revised basic energy plan later this month.

Much like the reference in this piece’s headline, it’s a cliché to call a country the Saudia Arabia of something.

The top search suggestion at the moment is the Saudi Arabia of wind. That’s Boris Johnson’s dream for the UK and from a leader with an affinity for hot air, perhaps not unexpected.

The Saudi Arabia of lithium query takes you to a story about Chile, which is wrong. Neither is it Afghanistan as this article in the NYT would have it. It’s Nevada; Elon Musk confirmed it last year.

The Saudi Arabia of sashimi is… well just google it. (it’s Palau – ed.)

Chile is not the Saudi Arabia of copper either.

It’s the Saudia Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Venezuela, Libya, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea of copper.

Chile’s share of global copper output is on par with the combined output of the 13 members of Opec in the crude trade.

In 2020 the South American nation produced 5.7m tonnes of copper out of a global total of 20.2m tonnes, according to the US Geological Service. Opec countries were responsible for 24.3m of the 76.1 million barrels per day produced during March this year, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

Chile+

Chile and Peru together constitute close to 40% of world production, which is roughly the share of what is known as Opec+ (add Russia). And consider that Chile and especially Peru suffered frequent covid-related mining disruptions last year (not to mention blockades at some of the biggest mines and transport strikes).

The concentration at the top is only going to increase. The Democratic Republic of the Congo could as soon as next year overtake China as the no 3 producer when the Ivanhoe-Zijin JV, Kamoa-Kakula, adds 400,000ktpa to the country’s total (and doubling its contribution six years later).

Apart from Rio Tinto’s much-anticipated block cave at Oyu Tolgoi (330ktpa) in Mongolia on the Chinese border, the only near-production projects close to this size are in South America.

Anglo American’s greenfield Quellaveco project (300ktpa) in Peru and Teck Resources’ phase 2 at Quebrada Blanca (295ktpa) in northern Chile will further entrench the two countries’ dominance.

Playing with monopsony money

As in other spheres, China plays the long game in mining.

It bagged the largest new copper mine to come on stream in decades – Las Bambas in Peru – by making its sale to a Chinese concern a requirement for approving the 2014 Glencore-Xstrata merger.

In 2016, China Moly picked up Tenke Fungurume in the biggest overseas splash since Las Bambas, paying $2.7 billion to take it off Freeport-McMoRan and Lundin’s hands.

In all, China has spent $16 billion on buying copper projects around the world and at the moment owns 30 operating copper mines and 38 exploration projects.

That’s over and above Beijing’s annual foreign direct investment in mining and exploration, which reached $2.2 billion in 2019.

Go downstream, things will be great when you’re downstream

It’s not only primary production that’s highly concentrated, there’s a lock on the midstream.

Overall, 63% of China’s copper concentrate comes from Chile and Peru, and after decades of investment in the sector, the country refines over 40% of the world’s copper, six times its nearest rival, Japan.

The Tenke deal supercharged the 4C supply chain – Congo-Copper-Cobalt-China – as Chinese imports of concentrate from central Africa and elsewhere accelerated towards 2020’s total of just under 22m tonnes per year.

Cobalt is a by-product of copper mining — primarily in the DRC which is responsible for some two-thirds of global output. China owns 82% of global midstream processing of cobalt for batteries. For nickel in the EV supply chain it’s 65%.

The Biden administration reportedly wants to copy the Chinese playbook, but in order to placate environmentalists will skip the mining part.

In the words of one official involved in critical minerals policy, “it’s not that hard to dig a hole. What’s hard is getting that stuff out and getting it to processing facilities.”

Just like all the oil processing facilities in the US shielded it from the Opec-induced oil supply shocks of the 1970s. Right?

Earthquake in Chile

While the Middle-East is a volatile region (to use a well-worn euphemism), its hereditary leaders and pseudo-democracies have a way of keeping the oil flowing regardless of any palace intrigue, proxy wars, or sanctions.

In contrast, Chile and Peru are in the early stage of fundamental political shifts driven by elections fought over income inequality, poverty and the environment – hardly on the political agenda in places like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

A debate between Opec’s crown princes and emirs has sent oil to three-year highs, up 50% in 2021.

Let’s count the ways Chile can cause a copper market meltup:

It’s rewriting its Pinochet-era constitution, new copper windfall taxes and royalties already approved by the lower house, could, to put it mildly, dampen enthusiasm (your last euphemism – ed.) for new projects, so-called tax stability deals for half the country’s mines (including Escondida, the copper world’s Ghawar) expire in 2023 if they last that long, a powerful mining union is lobbying for state-owned Codelco to have dibs on projects, and if the current frontrunner becomes president in November elections he would be the first person from the Communist Party to do so.

Daniel Jadue also has other ideas to increase the state’s take and involvement – creating a Codelco for lithium (gentle reminder: Codelco was created by seizing mines from US companies in the 1970s) and like Indonesia renegotiate state shareholding in private companies like Freeport had to with Grasberg.

Another successful Indonesian strategy Chile and others would want to copy is to force miners to build smelters and refineries in-country by banning ore exports.

A bit like the current US administration’s clever strategy around critical minerals, focusing on processing facilities, except Chile also produces feedstock for said facilities.

Dear prudence

Now take all of the Chilean political and mining trends, turn them up a few notches, and apply to Peru and its new president Pedro Castillo.

At the start of his campaign, Castillo said he wanted to nationalize the mines but later softened his stance by calling for Chile-like royalties in the 70-percents.

This is a recent headline about Castillo’s latest plans for the industry:

Peru’s Castillo expects mining firms to accept “prudent” tax changes, adviser says

You can read that as having a conciliatory tone, or perhaps it sounds more like: “Nice little copper mine you have there. It would be a shame if something were to happen to it. We’ll make you an offer you can’t refuse.”

Ocec nocec

The copper-oil analogy only goes so far.

While regional co-operation to align mining rules for Chile, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and others so as to “not compete for investments” (Jadue again) is being discussed, an Opec-like cartel in copper is never going to happen.

Most Opec disagreements are about how much to up production (the UAE wants to pump more oil now because the assumption is as the world moves away from fossil fuels it would be stuck with stranded oil and gas assets down the line).

Codelco is spending more than $40 billion just to keep output steady. Opec-members output hikes can also hit oil markets within months. For copper it takes years, often decades to bring new supply online.

Low and declining grades and with it ever costlier and bigger mines, uninspiring green discoveries, modest brownfield expansions, thin project pipelines, underinvestment in exploration, and glacially slow permitting processes, have become rules of thumb in the industry. And when tailings reprocessing is being discussed as a significant source of new supply, you know something in the industry has changed.

Depletion is oddly little discussed (must be in miners’ DNA – it’s always about the next discovery, not this old hole in the ground – ed). A recent study found that most porphyries (which supply 80% of the world’s copper) are fast nearing the end of their productive life due to the specific nature of how these deposits are formed.

So why is the price falling? idk

The copper price is down 10% since hitting all-time highs of $10,500 a tonne ($4.75/lbs) in May and forecasts are for further declines.

Two years out among more than 30 investment banks, economists and research houses polled consensus is for an average $8,131 a tonne ($3.68/lb).

Technically, that means copper is entering a bear market.

But it’s worth remembering that the metal also traded at these levels as far back as 2011.

Rapid demand growth and rising risks to supply since then does not seem baked into today’s price, much less in continuing declines.

At 10.30pm on a cold December night in 2019, a former titan of the global car industry lay bundled inside a box on board a plane, waiting to flee Japan.

"The plane was scheduled to take off at 11pm," recalls Carlos Ghosn.

"The 30 minutes waiting in the box on the plane, waiting for it to take off, was probably the longest wait I've ever experienced in my life."

Now, for the first time, the man who was once the boss of both Nissan and Renault has detailed his daring escape.

In an exclusive interview with the BBC, Mr Ghosn tells how he disguised himself to slip unnoticed through the streets of Tokyo, why a large music equipment box was chosen to smuggle him out of Japan and the elation he felt when he finally landed in his native Lebanon.

"The thrill was that finally, I'm going to be able to tell the story," he said.

Mr Ghosn was arrested in November 2018 over allegations by Nissan that he had understated his annual salary and misused company funds, which he denies.

At the time, Mr Ghosn was the chairman of the Japanese carmaker. He was also chairman of France's Renault and the boss of a three-way alliance between both carmakers and Mitsubishi.

His cost-cutting at Nissan - initially controversial - was ultimately seen to have saved the carmaker and he became a highly respected and recognisable figure. But he insists he was "collateral damage" in a fight back from Nissan against the increasing influence of Renault which still owns 43% of the Japanese company.

Documentary series Storyville details his extraordinary rise and sudden fall in Carlos Ghosn: The Last Flight which will be shown on BBC 4 on Wednesday 14 July.

'Shock, frozen trauma'

Describing the moment of his arrest at Toyko airport three years ago, Mr Ghosn said: "It's like you're being hit by a bus or something really very traumatic happened to you.

"The only memory I have of this moment is shock, frozen trauma," he said.

Mr Ghosn was taken to the Tokyo Detention Centre where he was given prison clothes and confined to a cell. "All of a sudden I had to learn to live without the watch, without the computer, without the telephone, without the news, without the pen - nothing," he said.

For more than a year, Mr Ghosn spent long periods in custody or was held under house arrest in Tokyo after being bailed. It was not clear when a trial would take place - the fear was it could take years - and Mr Ghosn faced a further 15 years in prison if convicted, in a country which has a 99.4% conviction rate.

Carlos Ghosn: The fall of the god of cars

It was during a period of house arrest, when Mr Ghosn was told he would not be allowed to have any contact with his wife, Carole, that he decided to find a way out.

"The plan was I could not show my face so I have to be hidden somewhere," he said. "And the only way I could be hidden [was] to be in a box or be in a luggage so nobody could see me, nobody could recognise me and the plan could work."

He said the idea of using a large box that would normally contain musical instruments "was the most logical one, particularly that around this time there were a lot of concerts in Japan".

But how would someone once so famous - now infamous - in Japan be able to get from his home in the capital to an airport and make his escape?

The plan was, said Mr Ghosn, to behave as normally as possible on the day. "It should be a normal day where I have a normal walk with normal clothes, normal attitude and all of a sudden, everything change."

Mr Ghosn would have to swap the suits he'd worn for years as a high profile executive in the global automotive sector for something a little more casual. Think jeans and trainers.

"You can imagine I had to go places where I never been, buy clothes I've never bought," he said. "All of this was part of how do you give yourself a maximum of chance of being successful and absolutely not drawing any attention to yourself."

'The moment'

From Tokyo, Mr Ghosn travelled by bullet train to Osaka where a private jet was waiting at the local airport to depart. But first, the box, which was waiting for Mr Ghosn at a nearby hotel.

"When you get in the box, you don't think about the past, you don't think about the future, you just think about the moment," he said.

"You're not afraid, you don't have any emotion except the huge concentration on 'this is your chance, you can't miss it. If you miss it, you're going to pay with your life, with the life of a hostage in Japan'."

Mr Ghosn was transported from the hotel to the airport by two men, father and son Michael and Peter Taylor who were posing as musicians.

In all, Mr Ghosn reckons he was in the box for around an hour and a half, though it felt like it lasted "one year and a half".

The private jet took off on time, and Mr Ghosn - now free from his confines - flew through the night, swapped planes in Turkey before landing in Beirut the next morning.

Lebanon does not have an extradition treaty with Japan so Mr Ghosn has been allowed to remain there.

However, Americans Michael Taylor and his son, Peter, have since been handed over by the US to Japan and now face three years in prison for helping Mr Ghosn to escape.

Also facing jail is Greg Kelly, Mr Ghosn's former colleague at Nissan, who remains under house arrest in Tokyo over allegations he helped his former boss disguise his earnings. Mr Kelly denies the charges.

What of the people who have been left behind in Japan?

Mr Ghosn said: "I've been told that the end of [Greg Kelly's] trial will be probably by the end of this year. And then God knows what's going to be the results of this trial for, as I said, a bogus reason."

He added: "I feel sorry for all the people who are victim of the hostage justice system in Japan, all of them."

This part-Lebanese, part-Brazilian citizen of the world is all of these things.

He lived more like a head of state than a head of industry. A company party at the Palace of Versailles, coincidentally - he says - on his 60th birthday, saw him hold court with waiting staff dressed in pre-revolutionary garb.

As simultaneous head of Renault and Nissan - he was a lightning rod of unease for some at both companies. Those at Nissan feared he would oversee a French coup of the traditional Japanese business he saved. And those at Renault disliked his shunning of the establishment and appearance in the pages of Paris society magazines.

Any global chief executive has to be sensitive to political nuance. The fact that Carlos Ghosn, after nearly 20 years at Nissan, was totally blindsided by his arrest in Tokyo suggests he had lost touch with the organisations he was trying to bring closer together.

His story has everything: hubris, corporate and global politics and an escape-caper worthy of a Hollywood film. He insists he is a man more sinned against than sinning and is working with lawyers to clear his name.

Until then, he remains a once-big-fish in a small pond, living in exile and under armed guard in Beirut for the foreseeable future.

This is not the ending he was expecting in this extraordinary drama.

The Chinese economy attracted over 607 billion yuan ($91 billion) in foreign direct investment (FDI), in the first half of 2021, which is a 33.9% increase year on year, the country’s Ministry of Commerce said on Wednesday.

According to its report, the Chinese service sector drew in the largest amount of foreign capital – some 482.77 billion yuan ($74.61 billion) – soaring 33.4% year on year.

The high-tech industry also saw a significant increase in foreign investment – by 39.4%. High-tech services attracted 42.7% more investments than in 2020, while the high-tech manufacturing industry’s appeal rose by 29.2%.

The document states that the volume of FDI coming from China’s key partners in the Belt and Road Initiative increased by 49.6%, while the intake from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was up by 50.7%.

The country’s cooperation with European countries yielded less, but still showed an increase of 10.3% year on year.

At the end of 2020, China attracted a total of $144.37 billion in foreign direct investments – 4.5% more than in 2019.