Mongolia, rich in minerals especially copper and rare earths, but sandwiched between China and Russia, is making a pivotal shift toward a “third neighbor” – the United States. During a recent visit to Washington, Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai aimed to fortify U.S. ties concerning critical minerals and particularly to enhance cooperation in rare earth mining. Additionally, Mongolia and the U.S. brokered an “Open Skies” aviation agreement, intended to bolster direct trade.

Should these agreements be realized and rare earths air-shipped from Mongolia to the United States, what are the implications for China-U.S. strategic competition?

“Chokepoint” Strategy

The China-U.S. relationship has been the world’s most pivotal bilateral dynamic since the end of the Cold War. Recently, competition has taken precedence over cooperation between these two superpowers, with Beijing and Washington jockeying for advantage from trade and technology to control over critical mineral supply chains.

Global supply chains have evolved due to two intertwined factors: advancements in ICT and cross-border logistics, along with the reduction in institutional barriers facilitated by organizations like the WTO. As a result, supply chain management has become crucial for optimizing efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and uninterrupted capital and information flows for both businesses and national economies.

However, supply chains present a paradox: As they grow more complex, weaving in multilayered arrays of suppliers each chosen for their competitive advantages, they also become more vulnerable to external shocks. This includes natural disasters, pandemics, and unpredictable geopolitical shifts. Recent events like the China-U.S. tech war and the economic sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine highlight the fragility of today’s global supply chains.

In the context of a volatile geopolitical environment, certain chokepoints within supply chains are regarded as potential vulnerabilities. A “chokepoint” denotes a critical and irreplaceable component or link within a supply chain, susceptible to control by potentially adversarial entities. At its core, a chokepoint is characterized by a form of monopoly. While businesses may wield monopolies to achieve heightened economic gains, nations often cultivate them for political objectives. Beyond the establishment of monopolies to create strategic chokepoints, an alternative and more aggressive strategy also exists: targeting an opponent’s chokepoint to intentionally disrupt their crucial supply.

In the competition between the United States and China, both nations are employing chokepoint strategies. To start, the U.S. utilized its dominant position within semiconductor supply chains to exert extensive technological and geopolitical influence. This maneuver effectively curbs China’s progress in advanced chipmaking. China, in response, has implemented its own countermeasures, including export controls of critical metals. These reciprocal actions have transcended the realm of economic sanctions, signifying a broader form of economic warfare between the two powers.

In the midst of these various measures and countermeasures, China holds a wild card: its control over the separation and refinement of rare earths. Presently, China is the sole provider of a continuous, uninterrupted supply of high-energy permanent magnets suitable for high-temperature applications such as electric motors used in EVs.

The Geopolitics of Rare Earths

Rare earths play a crucial role in numerous modern technologies. Specifically, the rapid growth of renewable energy and related technologies, such as electric vehicles, wind and solar energy, spurred a 37 percent increase in rare earths demand in 2022, a trend expected to continue for at least the next five years. Yet, the supply chains for rare earths are mired in geopolitical vulnerability. Notably, China boasts the most substantial natural reserves of all 17 rare earth elements and has cultivated a unique ability to refine and separate each one.

Moreover, since 2012, China has intensified its efforts to move up the value chain. Notably, it has consolidated rare earth mining and processing under state-owned enterprises and established pivotal research centers. Despite commencing patent filings nearly two decades after the United States and Japan, China held more than 80 percent of all rare earth-related patents by 2020.

China is now the largest importer and exporter of rare earths, meaning it controls the bulk of rare earth processing including refinement, separation, and fabricating magnet materials. During the first half of 2023, China imported 90,920 tons of rare earth ores and metals, a substantial portion from the United States, and exported 26,236 tons of refined rare earths, primarily magnet materials. While theoretically feasible, decoupling from China’s rare earth supply chains would involve substantial costs and potentially disruptive supply chain stability.

Beyond just rare earths, China is the leading and most cost-effective supplier of many critical minerals vital for clean energy transition. Given the geopolitical and environmental risks tied to mining and processing minerals, concerns about rare earth supply security have intensified. Recognizing their potential vulnerability to Chinese restrictions, Western governments are actively seeking to level the playing field. This includes seeking to diversify mining sources and building facilities independent of China’s input.

In the face of geopolitical competition between the U.S.-led West and China, more nations, including Mongolia, are gravitating toward the democratic bloc to mitigate risks from China’s dominance in critical supply chains. Reacting to a series of export controls and technology sanctions on semiconductors imposed against it, China has felt compelled to employ reciprocal actions.

For example, Beijing, with precision and deliberation, initially curtailed exports of gallium and germanium – two rare metals integral to the manufacturing of several strategically significant products, including military weapons systems. This move came in the wake of China’s new Foreign Relations Law enacted on July 1, which asserts that the nation may employ countermeasures when facing external restrictions. Moreover, the recent introduction of China’s drone export control policy indicates a potential escalation in these tit-for-tat measures.

In light of China’s countermeasures, the Pentagon is investigating partnerships with U.S. and Canadian companies to recycle rare metals from waste and refine both gallium and germanium. Furthermore, the United States has declared limitations on American investments in China’s tech sector.

Given this backdrop, the Mongolian prime minister’s visit to Washington to discuss potential rare earth collaborations can be seen as bolstering the United States’ position, potentially tipping the balance of power in this geopolitical tug-of-war.

Can Mongolia’s Rare Earths Diplomacy Shift the Power Balance?

The potential rare earth partnership between the United States and Mongolia holds promise for mutual gains. For the U.S., the collaboration could serve to diversify its sources of rare earths. Meanwhile, Mongolia stands to benefit from expanded diplomatic ties and potential U.S. investments that could fuel its economic growth. However, as with any international relationship, the devil is in the details.

Several significant barriers cast shadows over the potential partnership. First, the economic viability of mining rare earths, which come in oxide concentrations ranging from 1 percent to 70 percent, is far from guaranteed. Uncertainties persist regarding the quality of Mongolia’s rare earth reserves and the requisite investment for extraction and processing.

Second, Mongolia may face domestic opposition to rare earths mining operations, which come with a heavy environmental cost. Across its entire value chain, this process consumes substantial energy and water resources while generating various wastes and pollutants, including toxic mining residues, wastewater laden with heavy metals, radioactive waste, and air pollutants such as carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide. China learned this lesson the hard way: Reports indicate that it could take anywhere from 50 to 100 years for the environment to fully recover in a county in Jiangxi Province where heavy rare earth deposits are rich. The estimated price tag for this restoration is approximately 38 billion yuan, equivalent to around $5.5 billion.

Third, the absence of critical infrastructure in Mongolia, including adequate roads for transporting heavy machinery and reliable electricity, compounds the challenges. Ironically, Mongolia’s best hope for addressing this situation is China. The two countries have agreed to cooperate on a variety of infrastructure projects, including cross-border railways, trade ports, and roads and highways.

Lastly, Mongolia’s landlocked status leaves it reliant on road transport to reach the nearest Chinese ports for global trade. While the “Open Skies” aviation agreement offers an alternative, the cost of air shipping minerals can easily negate any economic benefits. Additionally, the agreement’s implementation depends on the consent of either China or Russia, as their airspace must be crossed for flights to proceed.

Therefore, though bolstered ties between the United States and Mongolia could be disadvantageous for China geopolitically, Mongolia’s pivot seems more symbolic than rooted in economic pragmatism. The potential drawback of this shift is that it could jeopardize the existing cooperation between China and Mongolia. China remains the most significant destination for Mongolia’s mineral exports, including copper and coal. Should Mongolia decisively tilt toward the West, Mongolia’s exports could face constraints.

Conclusion

As China-U.S. tensions escalate, other countries often feel pressured to align with one of these superpowers. Smaller countries have less weight in shifting the China-U.S. dynamic than larger ones, and nevertheless their decisions reflect shared geopolitical anxieties. As pointed out by Oyun-Erdene, countries like his own could suffer greatly if superpower competition boiled over.

In the race against time to combat climate change, global unity rather than fragmentation is the need of the hour.

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Marina Yue Zhang

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney (UTS: ACRI). Marina is the author of three books, including “Demystifying China's Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order,” co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Barkhas Buyandavaa would rather be working anywhere else. Shirtless and covered in black dust, he is trying to fix his 42-wheeler truck by the roadside in the middle of the southern Govi steppe in eastern Mongolia.

“I know coal is bad, but I have no choice. This is the only way to earn a decent living,” said the independent trucker, who transports coking coal on contract for a mining company.

If he were working elsewhere, he would earn three to four times less than he does now.

“I am only working to save some money to go abroad, and then I will quit,” the 32-year-old said. “Most likely Europe.”

Since 1990, Mongolia has transformed from a Soviet Union-style communist state into a vibrant democracy, tripling its GDP per capita and reducing poverty by more than half, largely thanks to agriculture, livestock and mineral resources.

While the world is cutting down on coal – the most polluting fossil fuel and the single largest source of global carbon emissions – Mongolia is ramping up production.

Mongolia produced 32.3 million metric tonnes in 2021. Last year, it increased by 22%, catching up with its pre-COVID-19 levels, the World Bank said in April.

Coal provides more than 90% of land-locked Mongolia’s electricity demand, among the highest proportions in the world, according to energy research organization Ember. It also accounts for 30% of its exports.

Government officials have been vocal about their need to use “this window of opportunity … to be able to export as much coal as we can,” then-Deputy Mining Minister Batnairamdal Otgonshar said last year.

Even the country’s environment minister says the country needs coal for the next five to 10 years.

“As you know, due to the Ukraine-Russia war, the natural gas prices have increased … and even countries like Germany have gone back to the use of coal,” Bat-ulzii Bat-Erdene told RFA.

“Mongolia is completely dependent on coal for income and heating solutions in the winter. Fully phasing out coal is almost impossible in the near future.”

‘Mine-Golia’

Mongolia shares a 4,700 kilometer-long (nearly 3,000-mile) border with China, which is the world leader in renewable energy but burns more coal than the rest of the world combined. It consumed an all-time-high 4.5 billion metric tonnes of coal in 2022, and is set to burn more in 2023.

Customs data show that Mongolia’s coal exports jumped 135% to $6.5 billion in 2022 and 94% of that went to China.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping made clear in July that China would reduce emissions at its own pace and would not be influenced by external factors. It aims for emissions to peak in 2023 before slowing down to reach net zero by 2060.

In the meantime, Mongolia - dubbed “Mine-Golia” - is primed to meet a growing demand. The vast country has proven coal reserves of 33.27 billion metric tons - equivalent to about one-thousandth of annual production.

Some 5% of its landmass is covered by more than 2,700 valid mining licenses. It is one of the few countries in the world which still has large coal power projects in the pipeline.

According to various government and private business estimates, its exports could reach 70 million metric tons annually by 2025.

Mongolia plans to establish more round-the-clock border checkpoints and transportation links to China to facilitate more exports. It recently opened a 233-kilometer (145-mile) direct rail line from the Tavan Tolgoi mine to the Gashuun Sukhait border crossing to China’s Inner Mongolia region.

View from the open pit

Tens of thousands work at open pit mines in Tavan Tolgoi in southern Mongolia, one of the world’s largest coking and thermal coal deposits, with 7.5 billion metric tons of reserves.

Davaadorj Sandagdorj, a supervisor at a provincial government-owned mine there, said it provides critical employment for locals.

“We are not doing it out of choice but due to lack of it. Coal mining has helped us improve our situation,” said Davaadorj, whose parents were miners.

Despite being worried about the environment, “there aren’t many options available for us,” the 45-year-old said atop an open pit, where about 300 miners work.

Last year, a huge anti-corruption demonstration in the capital Ulaanbaatar forced the government to act against a state-owned coal company that operates in Tavan Tolgoi. High-ranking officials were allegedly implicated in illegal coal smuggling to China.

The opposition Hun party estimated the potential revenue loss to be around 40 trillion Mongolian tugriks (US$13 billion).

Experts say mining is one of the main reasons for water, soil and air pollution and degradation in Mongolia, directly impacting herders and their livelihood in the steppe, a semi-arid grassland.

A case study from two mining sites published in April found higher rates of soil erosion in the vicinity of the mines and adjoining industrial areas.

Hard life on the road

Barkhas, the contract driver, mostly drives on unpaved desert roads, rutted from the tires of heavy trucks that can carry up to 100 tons of coal at a time. He drives for weeks at a time. The heavy loads and road conditions mean his top speed is only 60 kilometers per hour (35 mph).

“This is a hard life. The worst thing is for the truck to break down in the middle of the desert,” he said, adding he is worried about losing his job.

“If coal exports stop, tens of thousands of people will lose their livelihood,” he said. “There isn’t enough work in the city, especially for the kind of money we earn.”

Another truck driver ferrying coal from Tavan Tolgoi to the border said he would choose work that was less damaging to the environment, if he had a choice.

“At this point, most youths have only two options: mining or going to South Korea to do manual labor,” he said. “We are of course worried about the environmental mess. This is a beautiful land, but it’s ugly now.”

However, the main threat to his country is actually from China, the 57-year-old said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to his transport company’s policy against speaking to the media.

“China is too powerful, he said. “They want to buy everything as cheap as possible.”

He acknowledged that there is little Mongolia can do about that.

“They are playing with us and our salaries are dependent on China.”

Edited by Josh Lipes and Mat Pennington.

On Monday, annual inflation in Mongolia was 9.2 percent in July 2023, the National Statistical Committee announced.

It is noted that the inflation rate was directly affected by the increase in prices for food products, soft drinks and mineral water by 14.4 percent, for housing services, water, electricity, gas and other fuels by 5.5 percent, and for medicines and medical services by 7.6 percent.

According to the Central Bank of Mongolia, annual inflation in the country reached 10.6 percent in June 2023. This figure fell to 10.4 percent in Ulaanbaatar, where more than half of the country’s population lives.

The Central Bank predicts that Mongolia’s GDP will grow by 5 percent by the end of 2023.

In the last week of June, Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene went to Beijing. He met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People and came away with a raft of agreements deepening economic and trade ties with his southern neighbor. But around the same time, Mongolian officials in the capital Ulaanbaatar met with Jose Fernandez, the U.S. undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, and signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on cultivating a supply chain of critical minerals and rare earth elements — resources that are key to the world’s clean energy transition and plentiful in Mongolia.

The interactions then offered a snapshot of the delicate dance played by Oyun-Erdene, whose landlocked country of some 3.4 million people remains in many ways beholden to its huge neighbors China and Russia, but whose democratically elected government is steadily working to diversify its economy and expand its ties to other powers in the region, including Japan, South Korea and the West.

Oyun-Erdene was in Washington last week, participating in meetings at the White House with Vice President Harris and separate sessions with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The Harvard-trained reformist had discussions on cooperation regarding minerals, including copper, and signed an “Open Skies” civil aviation agreement with the United States.

“Mongolia is developing its ‘third’ neighbor policy and it is very important to maintain balance in our foreign relations,” Oyun-Erdene told me during an interview in the Mongolian Embassy in Washington last week, stressing that he saw the United States as “one of the most important ‘third’ neighbors” his nation could have.

China and Russia draw closer, but how close?

But Mongolia’s leader also was clear-eyed about the complexities of his country’s position. Mongolia is heavily dependent on its imports of electricity, fuel and many other goods from Russia and China. It’s hoping to develop new infrastructure deals with Beijing that would better link the Mongolian economy to transit routes and ports through China. Long within Moscow’s orbit, Mongolia’s fledgling democracy emerged in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, but many bonds remain. Mongolia abstained on a U.N. General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year.

Speaking beneath a portrait of Genghis Khan, the famed medieval Mongol conqueror, Oyun-Erdene extolled his nation’s parliamentary democracy and commitment to political values shared with the United States. But he cautioned against the ideological hawkishness that’s taken hold of U.S. Congress, with many lawmakers pushing for more of a direct confrontation with China.

“If there will be a new Cold War, it will be very different and difficult from the first one we had,” Oyun-Erdene told me, pointing to the dangers posed by conflict in a world shaped by rapidly advancing new technologies, including artificial intelligence. He said that while China’s “development path” and values differ greatly from that of the United States, the two global powers have a shared stake in many global challenges, including collective action on climate change.

The Mongolian prime minister also stressed that neither Russia nor China were a threat to his country, despite particularly pronounced anti-Beijing sentiment among his compatriots. “We have two immediate neighbors and we are different in government system and in some values,” he said. “But those two neighbors understand our development path chosen by the people of Mongolia, and they do have respect for our development path even though we differ from their systems.”

Despite reforms, mining for EV metals in Congo exacts steep cost on workers

But Mongolia is keen to broaden its horizons. Oyun-Erdene touted his government’s efforts to overcome a difficult political environment, which the U.S. ambassador in Ulaanbaatar described in January as “capricious, non-transparent, unpredictable,” adding that “corrupt application of laws and regulations make Mongolia unattractive for investors and challenging for importers and exporters.”

An aggressive anti-corruption crackdown is underway. Meanwhile, new constitutional reforms expanded the legislature and reshaped elections along a mixed system of proportional representation seen in countries like Germany and New Zealand. These measures, Oyun-Erdene told me, would help improve governance and transparency, especially surrounding the lucrative mining industry. “In the past, we did have some mistakes,” he said, but “now we are improving the investment environment.”

The potential could be huge, given Mongolia’s rich bequest of minerals — including copper and uranium — and rare earths. “Demand for critical minerals including rare earth elements, lithium and cobalt are expected to surge by as much as 600 per cent over the coming decade,” noted the Financial Times. “Demand for copper is forecast to double to about 50 million tons annually by 2035. And if the world is to reach net zero emissions by 2050, annual investment in nuclear energy will also have to triple to about $125 billion over the coming five years, according to the [International Energy Agency].”

Oyun-Erdene sees his nation’s gross domestic product potentially tripling by the end of the next decade. The most significant illustration of its prospects may be the mammoth Oyu Tolgoi copper mine, which sits amid the vast Gobi Desert and is run by multinational conglomerate Rio Tinto with a minority stake controlled by the Mongolian government. The mine is positioned above one of the world’s largest reserves of copper and gold deposits and started underground production in March after years of wrangling between the company and Ulaanbaatar.

This surge in output is a start, but further efforts to curb graft and improve transparency and significant investment in infrastructure need to follow. Oyun-Erdene speaks hopefully of his nation’s resource blessing enabling the development of more high-end sectors of the supply chain; he has pitched Mongolia to Tesla chief executive Elon Musk for its ability both to contribute to the manufacture of electric vehicles as well as ventures into space.

“Mongolia should not just be a mining country. We have great potentials in other sectors, too,” Oyun-Erdene said. “There is a phrase that I like to say: ‘Mongolia is landlocked but not mind-locked.’”

By Ishaan Tharoor

Ishaan Tharoor is a foreign affairs columnist at The Washington Post, where he authors the Today's WorldView newsletter and column. In 2021, he won the Arthur Ross Media Award in Commentary from the American Academy of Diplomacy. He previously was a senior editor and correspondent at Time magazine, based first in Hong Kong and later in New York

In the first week of September, Pope Francis will be on a visit to Mongolia, a country sandwiched between Russia and China. It will be the first time that a pope sets foot on Mongol land. And, this papal visit will be full of geopolitical significance.

Diplomatic relations between the Catholic Church and the Mongols have a pluri-secular history. The first encounter between the two occurred in the 13th century, long before most nation-states existed.

In 1289 Pope Nicholas IV sent a first legate, Italian Franciscan missionary Friar John of Montecorvino, to the Great Khan of the Yuan dynasty. At the time, the dynasty covered a transcontinental empire, which included all of China and parts of Eastern Europe.

Montecorvino was able to formalize relationships between the two superpowers and re-establish Christianity in the Far East. In 1336, we see Toghun Temor, the last emperor of Yuan dynasty, sending an embassy to Pope Benedict XII based in Avignon, France.

Unfortunately, a few years later, the Black Death came. Over a few months, millions died and the world was reshaped. Yet, the Mongols and the Catholic Church survived. They were deeply impacted but they never disappeared. They continued to evolve, and their testimony remains alive today.

In other words, Pope Francis in Mongolia is not an absolute beginning. It is a reconnection with centuries of intercultural exchanges, marked by breakthroughs and setbacks, but filled with resilience that may help to address the difficulties of contemporary world affairs.

"This nation stands at the center of long-term Asian interests"

In Mongolia and with the Mongols, Pope Francis is walking with a great civilization for the sake of the Mongols and the rest of the world.

Today, Mongols have lost most of their territories. Their northern lands have been colonized by the Russians and their southern steppes by the Chinese. In China, a gigantic Inner Mongolia province still exists, and some Chinese politicians do not hesitate to claim sovereignty over the whole of Mongolia.

In the rest of Central Asia, a handful of sovereign states emerged. They share a long history with the Mongols and remained influenced by cultural and political traditions coming from the Great Khan. Whatever happens to the Mongols resonates with the rest of the region.

In the eyes of the West, Mongolia might be at the periphery of contemporary trading roads and maritime exchanges, but this nation stands at the center of long-term Asian interests.

When the Soviets collapsed, Mongols soon embraced the ideal of self-determination and democracy. For decades, their new state worked hard to build national autonomy and was able to succeed in building economic growth and secure harmonious relationships with powerful neighbors. Mongolia was a model for other Central Asian states.

But 30 years after the collapse of the Soviets, doubts about democratic ideals are growing. Mongolian elites are facing a crisis of confidence. The economic boom of the 2000s is gone. Urban migration pushed half of the nation to lose its ancestral lifestyle. Corruption and authoritarian temptations are growing.

In this context, it is most likely that Pope Francis will act as he did in Kazakhstan. During his visit in 2022, he did not hesitate to sermon with Kazakh elites. His point was not to support one political system over another. His goal was to question the ultimate values that a nation wants to defend and serve.

Francis will certainly talk again about the need for an inclusive political system able to cherish every single life, support justice and peace for all, and nurture natural resources.

"The Chinese regime is reluctant to improve its relations with the Holy See"

Unfortunately, Mongolian lands have long been treated as a site of selfish extraction. Either by the Russians during the Soviet Era or by the Chinese and Australians after 1990, Mongol territories have long been vandalized and abused.

The multi-secular wisdom of the Mongols has been silenced by the egoist interests of a few. Vast pastoral lands have been turned into gigantic mines. In central Asia, the massive extraction of natural resources is at the center of deep political interests, international relations, and ecological catastrophes.

Pope Francis is well aware of how Central Asia is vital for the ecology of our world. After the Amazon, it is the second lung of the earth. When the sky of the Mongols is no longer blue anymore and their steppes no longer green, our planet is in danger. Pope Francis is naturally expected to talk about the ecological challenges that Mongolia is facing.

Like in Kazakhstan, papal concerns about Russia and China will also be an important part of the visit. In 2022, Francis tried to meet with Xi Jinping in Nur-Sultan but the Chinese leader was too busy to meet with him. The Chinese regime is reluctant to improve its relations with the Holy See.

Sino-Vatican relations are historically low. But if China does not come to Rome, Francis invites himself in Mongolia and knocks at the door. Francis never gives up!

Similarly, Russia will be on the agenda. The war in Ukraine and the madness of Vladimir Putin cannot be ignored. This is a threat for the entire humankind. If papal calls for peace and justice are difficult to listen to, Pope Francis will not stop explaining them. Violence cannot be the solution.

With the Mongols who built a unique civilization, interconnected continents, and gathered centuries of wisdom, Pope Francis will invite all to not let the difficulties of our time overwhelm us. The ecological tragedies and political mistakes of the past should be a lesson for today.

BY: Michel Chambon

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official editorial position of UCA News.

As of August 8, "Erdenes Tavantolgoi" JSC has sold 15 million tons of coal. The company reported that this figure is the highest sales in the company's history.

Last year, 11.5 million tons of coal were sold. Actually, the amount of coal that was sold during the whole year is fulfilled in half a year.

"Erdenes Tavantolgoi" JSC has paid MNT 1.5 trillion in taxes, payments, and fees to the state and local budgets in the first 8 months of this year.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has appointed Shannon Cowlin as its new Country Director for Mongolia. Ms. Cowlin will oversee ADB’s operations in Mongolia, including the implementation of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2021–2024 to help the country continue to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and lay resilient foundations for inclusive and sustainable growth.

“ADB’s operations in Mongolia focus on three strategic priorities: inclusive social development and economic opportunity; climate-resilient infrastructure; and sustainable, green, and climate-conscious development,” said Ms. Cowlin. “I am looking forward to working with the government and other key partners in supporting these priority areas.”

Ms. Cowlin has over 24 years of professional experience, including more than 10 years in ADB. She has been leading energy and multidisciplinary climate change dialogue and projects. She has been based out of Mongolia Resident Mission since September 2021. A national of the United States (US), Ms. Cowlin holds a master’s degree in environmental health sciences and a bachelor’s degree in environmental engineering sciences from the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. Prior to joining ADB, she was a manager at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in the United States where she led US–India and South Asia regional energy collaboration on behalf of various US government and multilateral agencies.

Mongolia has been a member of ADB since 1991. To date, ADB has committed 357 public sector loans, grants, and technical assistance totaling $3.7 billion to Mongolia. ADB’s assistance is aligned with Mongolia’s New Recovery Policy and Vision-2050.

ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 68 members—49 from the region.

Source: ADB

XII International Congress of Mongolists is to be held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, from August 9 to 14, 2023. The Congress is co-organized by the Office of the President of Mongolia, the Ministry of Education and Science, and the International Association for Mongol Studies. The central theme of the Congress is "Pax Mongolica and Historical Experience."

XII International Congress of Mongolists will have six sections:

Prehistory and History of Mongolia and the Mongols

Current Situation and Historical Development of Mongolian Language and Literature

Mongolian Society, Economy, Politics, and Legislation

Mongolia’s Relations with the Outside World

Mongolian Culture: Tradition and Innovation

Young Mongolists Conference

The organizers emphasized that the sections would examine the distinctive aspects of history, tradition, language, literature, society, economy, politics, relations with the outside world, and civilization of nomads.

The opening ceremony will be held at the State Palace on August 10, 2023. Mongolists with a Doctorate or higher degree are allowed to participate in the Congress.

The Congress will feature presentations from 307 Mongolists from over 20 countries, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, Great Britain, Kazakhstan, Canada, the Russian Federation, Poland, Türkiye, Hungary, Germany, China, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, the Czech Republic, Australia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Norway, Italy, and Denmark. Invitations to the Congress were sent to over 650 Mongolists from 36 countries between April 24 and May 15.

In addition to the main sections, the Congress will also host activities to support the young generation of Mongolists. This includes a conference for doctoral researchers, where 59 young Mongolists will present their work.

Academician S. Chuluun, Secretary-General of the International Association for Mongol Studies, said that the International Congress of Mongolists is the major conference that has been held every five years since 1959. On average 400 scholars from 30 countries participate in the Congress. The Congress is well recognized in the world for its number of participants, the breadth of its research, and its regularity.