At the regular session of the Cabinet of Mongolia on November 13, 2024, Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources of Mongolia Tuvaan Tsevegdorj presented updates on the ongoing negotiations on the Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Railway Project.

During his working visit to the Republic of China in October 2024, Prime Minister of Mongolia Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai met with representatives from the “China Energy” Group, led by its Chairman of the Board of Directors. In response to Premier Oyun-Erdene’s request made at the meeting, the “China Energy” Group officially submitted its position to Tuvaan Tsevegdorj, Head of the Mongolian side of the Working Group, on October 28, 2024. The submission included several key proposals, including legal stability, guaranteed conditions for achieving mutual benefits, long-term trade agreements, and railway connectivity.

The Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Railway Project is ranked first among the 14 megaprojects outlined in the Mongolian Government’s Action Plan for 2024-2028. Certain amendments to the existing laws and regulations are required to ensure the successful implementation of the Project. In this regard, a Working Group is preparing to amend the relevant laws and regulations.

The successful implementation of the Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Project would create conditions for the realization of other railway projects, such as the Khangi-Mandal, Shiveekhuren-Sekhe, and Bichigt-Zuunkhatavch. Moreover, the Project could potentially increase Mongolia’s coal exports to 120 million tons and boost the country’s GDP per capita to USD 10 thousand.

A Working Group, headed by Deputy Prime Minister of Mongolia Dorjkhand Togmid, is responsible for developing a revised draft Law on Investment and submitting it to the Government of Mongolia and the State Great Khural of Mongolia.

The revised draft Law’s objectives are to achieve investment environment stability, foster investment, protect the rights and lawful interests of investors, enhance investment guarantees, and ensure greater access and efficiency in support and public services offered to investors.

The revised draft Law permits:

Enhance guarantees to investors, aligning with best international practices,

Establish a council or system for the protection of investors' rights and the resolution of complaints,

Secure the right to international arbitration procedures for settling disputes between investors and the State,

Entrust the protection and promotion of investments to all public organizations,

Regulate tax incentives within the confines of the General Law on Taxation,

Eliminate overlapping government inspections,

Simplify the process for issuing stabilization certificates and enable electronic issuance.

Upon implementation, this Law will provide a favorable investment environment that attracts foreign direct investment, encourages reinvestment, increases capital inflow, and creates conditions that ensure stable economic growth. By attracting foreign investment in priority economic sectors, the Law will expand manufacturing and infrastructure, increase exports of value-added goods, boost foreign trade, introduce advanced technology and expertise, enhance Mongolia's competitiveness through innovation, and create stable employment opportunities.

Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only shaped by recent geopolitical developments, but also by a long joint history. It is hard to imagine that either side will escape these historical shadows in the short term.

The largest landlocked country in the world and its 8 million inhabitants are sandwiched between Russia to the north and China to the south. This challenging location leaves Mongolia no choice but to treat both its neighbors well. It is for this reason that even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ulaanbaatar still maintains a close relationship with Moscow: Mongolia imports 95 percent of its oil and more than 20 percent of its electricity from Russia.

Meanwhile, its relationship with China is also essential, but riddled with tension. Modern Mongolia is split into two: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, established in 1947 and administered to this day by China; and Mongolia, or Outer Mongolia as China calls it, which is now an independent country. Despite historical land disputes, China is Mongolia’s biggest trade partner, buying 84 percent of its exports. In an effort to strengthen its relationship with Beijing, Mongolia joined the Belt and Road China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor program back in 2016.

Not only does Ulaanbaatar have to balance between China and Russia, but also between Russia-China on the one hand, and the West on the other. Mongolia, as a young democratic sovereign state, has devised a foreign policy that is not overly dependent on either China or Russia, which it officially calls the third neighbor policy. “Mongolia is landlocked, but not mindlocked,” the country’s prime minister, Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, told the United States last year. Thus, Japan, South Korea, the U.S. and even the European Union and NATO have become its cooperative partners.

This double balancing act adds to the complexity of Sino-Mongolian relations at a time when ideological divides are stark (reinforced by the war in Ukraine), and in the face of Beijing’s obstinacy and refusal to take clear sides. If Beijing still had the same mindset as it did during the Deng Xiaoping era after the late 1970s, China could have facilitated the smooth development of China-Mongolian relations. However, the opposite is true of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Its stubbornness has resulted in a bumpy diplomatic path.

Push to restore an ancient language

The Mongolian authorities have decided to reintroduce an ancient script that has existed for more than 700 years, with the plan to fully revert to the use of the Mongolian script from 2025 onward. Over the years, Mongolia’s language policy has changed several times. In October 1945, with the support of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia’s population of 750,000 people voted in a referendum on independence from China, which resulted in 98.5 percent in favor. In January 1946, the Republic of China recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which was from then on known as Mongolia to the rest of the world. After independence, the Latin alphabet was introduced, but failed rapidly. As a protectorate of the Soviet Union, it was officially declared just a few months later, on January 1, 1946, that the Cyrillic alphabet would be used.

Since then, the norm has been to write Mongolian in the Cyrillic alphabet. But in recent years, with the growing sense of democracy and national self-esteem in the countries that were once ruled or controlled by the Soviet Union, countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and also now Mongolia, are emphasizing the restoration of their traditional languages, so that linguistic and cultural legacies can be better developed and preserved.

In China, the media are already cheering this as a good opportunity for China to show its soft power: The Inner Mongolia region still uses the traditional Mongolian script. On this basis, Beijing claims that China has become a haven for Mongolian traditions. Yet, it does not mention that Mao Zedong did not maintain the script with the noble goal of preserving Mongolian culture, but rather to fight against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, which did not share the same ideology at the time.

Facts & figures

Mongolians are aware that Beijing is not committed to preserving their culture. In Inner Mongolia, the CCP authorities are using various tactics to eliminate the teaching of the Mongolian language. So much so, in fact, that Mongolians in China are now worried that their grandchildren will no longer be able to communicate properly with their grandparents. To protect their traditions, some Inner Mongolians have sought refuge in (Outer) Mongolia.

Young people in Mongolia generally hold less critical attitudes toward China than their elder countryfolk, and accordingly the degree of their recognition of China is also a bit higher. While many do express skepticism of China, there is also a sense of pragmatism and a perception that Mongolia should learn from China’s rapid development and economic success.

Chinese efforts to undermine Mongolia’s Buddhist ties

In response to China’s policy, former Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia publicly called on all Mongolians to join in protecting and defending Mongolian culture: “Mongolian traditions cannot be preserved without the Mongolian language.” However, whether in Xinjiang or Tibet or Inner Mongolia (all autonomous regions of China), the CCP is deeply suspicious of resurgent ethnic and cultural awareness. It fears that closer ties across the border between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia will undermine its assimilation policy and control.

Mongolia’s long-standing Buddhist tradition is also a headache for Chinese authorities. China does not want Ulaanbaatar to have any contact with the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese government considers a separatist. Many suspect China of unduly interfering in Mongolian affairs to undermine the country’s Buddhist ties. This stems from China’s historical interference in Mongolia and Tibet’s search for the reincarnation of the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (the title given to the Mongolian Buddhist spiritual leader, akin to the Dalai Lama), who died in 1911.

This issue resurfaced when, in the first half of this year, local media in Mongolia revealed that the Mongolian General Intelligence Service arrested three prominent Mongolian temple lamas and a Chinese citizen on suspicion of spying for China. The allegation that Mongolian temple lamas were manipulated by the Chinese once again brought the issue of China’s interference in Mongolia’s spiritual practices into the center of public opinion.

To date, the Mongolian government has yet to find the Goldilocks zone in their approach to preserving traditions without angering the Chinese government.

Facts & figures

Timeline of China-Mongolia relations

12th-13th century – Mongol Empire formation: Genghis Khan united the Mongolian tribes and founded the Mongol Empire, significantly impacting China and its territories​.

1271 – Yuan Dynasty established: Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, established the Yuan Dynasty in China, marking the first time Mongolia ruled over all of China.

1368 – Fall of the Yuan Dynasty: The Yuan Dynasty collapsed, leading to the expulsion of the Mongols from China. The Ming Dynasty rose to power, and Mongolia was left divided among various factions​.

17th century – Qing Dynasty control: The Manchu-led Qing Dynasty began to exert control over Mongolia, which was formally incorporated into the Qing Empire by the mid-17th century.

1911 – Independence declaration: Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Mongolia declared independence in 1911. However, the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over Mongolia​.

1921 – Soviet-backed revolution: The Mongolian Revolution led to Soviet support in establishing the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, making it a Soviet satellite state and further distancing it from China​.

1945 – Recognition of independence: In January 1946, the Republic of China officially recognized Mongolia’s independence, following a plebiscite held in October 1945 where the majority voted for independence​.

1990 – Transition to democracy: During the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia underwent a democratic revolution, leading to a multi-party system and increased independence from both Russian and Chinese influences​.

Trouble with the Power of Siberia II

Another sticking point in Sino-Mongolian relations is the Power of Siberia II project. Since its inception in 2006, the project has been the subject of intense discussions between Russia, Mongolia and China. The total length of the proposed pipeline is about 6,700 kilometers, of which only about 2,700 kilometers are in Russia and more than 950 kilometers are in Mongolia. It is designed to deliver 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia to northeastern China. In February 2023, Gazprom preliminarily determined the route of the pipeline, according to which it will pass through Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Buryatia.

Russia has its own calculations for such a design. The Power of Siberia II project and its proposed Mongolian branch, “Union Vostok,” promise not only to significantly increase gas supply capacity between the countries, but also to solve a serious problem in some regions of Mongolia and above all in Russia – the so-called “dark skies,” especially during the winter months. At the height of winter, residents of large cities in Russia’s southern Siberia suffer from severe toxic fumes emanating from the use of coal or wood for heating. In such cases, gasification can be a good alternative.

The key issue hindering the implementation of the Power of Siberia II project is that China is not yet happy with the price Russia is demanding for its natural gas – and it is not in a hurry, figuring it will not need the gas in the immediate future. Of course, there are other factors as well, such as Beijing’s pursuit of energy diversification. At the time of price negotiations, China wanted to obtain the feedstock at $60 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is almost five times lower than the current price of gas sold through the Power of Siberia I project ($260 per 1,000 cubic meters). This is, of course, unfavorable to Moscow, which wants to maintain high prices for its exports and therefore opposes China’s terms.

Beijing has been using delay and silence to force Moscow’s hand, refusing to sign the tripartite agreement to start construction. Ulaanbaatar, which had been very interested in the project, decided not to include it in its four-year national plan in August this year, seeing that the prospects for the pipeline are still shaky.

This move made Russian President Vladimir Putin nervous enough to travel to Mongolia in early September this year. He discussed with Ulaanbaatar how to work together to make headway on the pipeline – though of course he knows that the main partner he has to convince is China, not Mongolia.

Putin and Khurelsukh in Ulanbaataar

Beijing is now using Russian experts on China, such as Alexey Maslov, to try to convince President Putin to kick Mongolia off the project. By scapegoating Ulaanbaatar for the project’s failure to launch, Beijing is trying to deflect the blame for its own role in slowing the project down. After all, it was the CCP who advocated that the project be extended from Central Asia to China.

However, Moscow understands that once the pipeline goes through Central Asia, not only could the gasification of many parts of Russia become a problem due to supply shortages, but China will be better able to use Central Asia’s multiple channels of oil and gas to put more pressure on Russia in price negotiations. Not to mention, Kazakhstan also wants to use the project to its advantage.

Politically unreliable

Within China, Mongolia has been portrayed as a politically unreliable transit country for several years. Beijing sees its third neighbor policy as a form of cooperation with the West.

As early as the mid-2000s, consultations have been held between the Chinese, Mongolian and Russian foreign ministries. For the past decade, trilateral meetings between the deputy foreign ministers’ have been held annually. Topics discussed include medium- and long-term planning for the construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, agreements on road and rail transportation between the three countries, disaster prevention and control, and mutual assistance in epidemics. Mongolia also holds joint military exercises with its two neighbors.

Striving for balance, Mongolia became the first observer state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but even with the organization’s rapid expansion, it did not become a full member out of concern that this would restrict its room for maneuver. In recent years, China and Russia have used various means to urge Mongolia to become a full member. Beijing has not been as patient as Moscow on this issue. The Chinese government has even hinted this year to Mongolia that if it does not become a member of the SCO, Beijing will abandon the trilateral summits.

Scenarios

The development of both Sino-Mongolian and Russo-Mongolian relations will depend on how skillfully Mongolia manages diplomacy on the one hand, and sticks to its democratic principles on the other.

Certain: Mongolia keeps walking the tightrope

President Putin seems to have a better grasp of Mongolia than Xi Jinping, although Moscow and Beijing’s shared diplomatic displeasure with Mongolia’s third neighbor policy is obvious. Because of historical tensions with China, Ulaanbaatar prefers to be closer to Moscow, which is why President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh accepted the invitation from President Putin to attend last month’s BRICS summit, held in Kazan, Russia.

But that does not mean Beijing does not hold strong cards. Given China’s trade importance to Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar may well crack when under pressure from Beijing. Further, Mongolia is highly interested in developing its own minerals, especially rare earths, which have to be shipped to other (mainly Western) countries through Chinese ports. Currently, Ulaanbaatar does not seem to want to risk irking the Chinese, even for the sake of protecting its traditions or democratic principles.

Possible: Externalities force Mongolia’s neighbors to soften

Nevertheless, other scenarios cannot be excluded. Developments within China will also determine the dynamics of Sino-Mongolian relations. If the Chinese economy remains sluggish, then Beijing will need to soften its tone toward trade partners, including Mongolia. Similarly, if the war in Ukraine does not turn out to be favorable for President Putin, an isolated and beleaguered Kremlin will be forced to be more polite and tolerant toward Mongolia. This would give Mongolia more clout in its dealings with Beijing. In short, Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only determined by Ulaanbaatar itself, but also by external factors – which could play in its favor.

BY Junhua Zhang

is a senior associate at the EIAS.

Mongolia exports 6.09 million tonnes of iron ore over January-October, surging 28.46% from the previous year, showed the latest data from the Mongolian Customs General Administration (MCGA).

The export earnings increased by 36.30% on the year to $494 million during the same period, data showed.

China remained the unique destination of Mongolia iron ore exports in the first ten months of 2024.

MCGA didn't release the specific figure for October. Sxcoal calculated the exports at 632,200 tonnes based on the data published by the customs authority, up 25.62% year on year and 3.05% on the month, marking a two-month consecutive growth.

The value of iron ore exports amounted to $47.77 million, with the average price at $75.56/t, down $2.20/t from the year-ago level and $2.45/t from a month ago, calculations showed.

Over the past few decades, Mongolia's economy has transitioned from being primarily agricultural to one dominated by mining. In 2000, the mining sector represented just 5.4% of the country's economic structure; today, it accounts for 30%.

In recent years, the mining sector accounts for around 90% of total exports and 70% of foreign direct investment. Mongolia's heavy reliance on the mining sector leaves its economy highly vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity markets and external economic conditions. In 2015-2016, global commodity price declines, and in 2020, border closures due to the pandemic, plunged Mongolia's economy into turmoil.

Mongolia's main export products are copper and coal, accounting for 18% and 59% of total exports, respectively. Issues related to port caused Mongolia to miss out on the commodity supercycle boom of 2021 and 2022. Structural reforms in both political and port operations have stabilized export volumes, reaching historically high levels.

Copper ore and concentrate exports surged to an all-time high with an increase in average prices. China's imports of unwrought copper increased, driven by seasonal demand in China and an optimistic outlook for the industrial metal. Despite the decline in unit prices, coal exports have remained at a high level except for September.

To promote open and transparent trading of mining products and to establish a market-driven pricing environment, Mongolia began facilitating the trading of mining products through the Mongolian Stock Exchange at the start of 2023. In the first ten months of 2024, 19.4 million tonnes of coal were traded on the exchange, marking a twofold increase compared to the same period last year. Erdenes Tavantolgoi LLC, Energy Resource LLC and Tavantolgoi LC account for the majority of coal traded on the stock exchange. In October, the exchange traded 2.0 million tonnes of coal across 37 successful transactions, making it one of the most active months since the start of the year.

China's coal imports, which elevated in 2023, are expected to remain strong in 2024. The surge in import was largely influenced by price advantage against domestic coal. Over the past three years, Mongolian bituminous coal has supplied 25% of China's total bituminous coal demand and has been 40.6% cheaper than other major exporting countries.

The government of Mongolia expects coal prices to decline in 2025; however, due to China's new economic model, demand for steel is anticipated to remain steady, which should drive an increase in the physical volume of Mongolia's coal exports. It also plans to advance its port reform policy by digitizing port operations, increasing the volume of cross-border vehicle traffic, accelerating the development of cross-border railways, and enhancing the efficiency of the mining products exchange. The government projects coal exports to reach 83.3 million tonnes next year.

(By Tsogbadrah Naranmunkh, Ard Securites)

Mongolia's National Agency for Meteorology and Environmental Monitoring has issued a severe weather warning for the western regions of the country, forecasting strong winds and blizzards to begin on Tuesday.

The agency has specifically highlighted the provinces of Bayan-Ulgii and Khovd, where wind speeds are expected to exceed 24 meters per second. These powerful winds, coupled with heavy snow, are anticipated to significantly reduce visibility on the roads, creating hazardous conditions for travelers.

The agency warned that blizzards could disrupt transportation networks and make travel in the affected regions highly dangerous.

The unstable weather is expected to continue over the next few days, with conditions potentially worsening as the storms progress.

Authorities have urged the public to exercise caution, especially nomadic herders and drivers. Herders, who rely on moving livestock across vast, remote landscapes, are advised to closely monitor weather forecasts and prepare for rapid changes in conditions. Drivers in the affected areas are being strongly advised to avoid unnecessary travel during the storm's peak intensity.

Mongolia, known for its harsh continental climate, regularly experiences extreme weather patterns throughout the year. The Asian country, one of the last remaining nomadic societies in the world, is especially vulnerable to sudden and severe weather events. In addition to its already cold temperatures, Mongolia often faces erratic weather that can have devastating consequences on both its human and animal populations.

In a recent example of such risks, over 10 people, mostly nomadic herders, tragically lost their lives in the central province of Tuv and the eastern province of Sukhbaatar due to heavy snow and blizzards in November 2023.

The “Ulaanbaatar Railway Joint Stock Company” has successfully launched Starlink internet service on its passenger trains, providing seamless connectivity for travelers. Initially, the service was installed on 10 trains operating between Ulaanbaatar City and Zamiin-Uud, a major route connecting the capital to the southern border.

With the introduction of Starlink’s high-speed satellite internet, passengers can now enjoy uninterrupted internet access throughout their journey, even in remote areas with traditionally poor network coverage. This marks a significant upgrade in services, particularly benefiting passengers traveling long distances who often rely on a stable internet for work, communication, and entertainment.

The initiative aims to address the digital gap for passengers in rural and remote regions, ensuring they have access to high-speed internet during their travels. By providing reliable connectivity even between stations, the new service allows passengers to continue their activities without disruption, enhancing overall travel experience and productivity.

This move is part of broader efforts to modernize Mongolia’s rail services and enhance digital infrastructure across the nation, particularly in underserved areas.

Historically, the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area, located in the Gobi-Altai province, was designated as a national protected area in 1976.

The Gobi ecosystem here is home to an extraordinarily rare diversity of flora and fauna, recognized worldwide. Notably, in 1997, the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area was listed in UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme, preserving a desert ecosystem with minimal human impact. It is the habitat for rare animals found only in Mongolia, and some even globally scarce species such as the Gobi bear, wild Bactrian camels, Mongolian wild ass, Przewalski's horse, black-tailed gazelle, argali, and ibex.

As a result of the protection efforts, the Gobi bear population has risen to around 50, and there are now over 600 wild Bactrian camels. There are 37 species of animals here in critical need of conservation, including argali, ibex, manul, and snow leopards. These species are exceptionally sensitive to disturbances: for example, wild Bactrian camels will detect sound from 10-20 kilometers away and can run continuously for 60-70 kilometers to escape, joining other camel herds along the way. The Gobi bear is also highly cautious and avoids humans and other animals. Thus, opening a port in this area would disrupt the habitats and migration routes of these sensitive species, experts warn.

The Naransevstein Port was initially opened in the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area in 1992 but was soon closed due to its negative impacts. The opening drove endangered animals away, degrading their habitats, and illegal activities along the border surged. Yet now...

“THE NARANSEVSTEIN PORT WILL BE REVIVED”

The government’s 2024-2028 action plan includes a provision to reopen Naransevstein Port.

On August 12, 2024, the government submitted its 2024-2028 program to parliament was approved specifies plans to "Revive and reopen Naransevstein Port."

Experts’ Concerns: In 2008, the "Comprehensive Development Policy of Gobi-Altai Province" proposed exploiting the Taliin Meltes gold deposit with estimated reserves of 200-300 tons as a means to accelerate regional development. While past governments, including those of S. Bayar, N. Altankhuyag, and Ch. Saikhanbileg, tried to include this deposit in economic plans to address national economic difficulties, they met strong opposition. In 2009, environmental advocates and local residents resisted a joint government decision under S. Bayar to remove Khatansuudal (a copper and iron deposit) and Taliin Meltes (a gold deposit) from special protection.

The copper and iron deposit, Khatan Suudal and gold deposit Taliin Meltes are located in Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area

The copper and iron deposit, Khatan Suudal and gold deposit Taliin Meltes are located in Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area

Mongolia currently has 13 border ports spanning 4,709 kilometers, including two in Gobi-Altai: the Burgastai and Shiveekhuren ports. The renewed focus on Naransevstein port, located in a protected area with vulnerable wildlife, raises questions.

Environmental organizations and experts argue that it is impossible to build a road through the protected area to open this port. Burgastai Port connects with Altai City through Bugat, Tugrug, and Sharga soums, providing a more direct route to the Chinese border and further to Europe. The insistence on building a road through a delicate ecosystem at Naransuvstain suggests a potential interest in extracting the area’s mineral resources.

The route to Altai City via Burgastai or Shiveekhuren ports is much shorter than via Naransevstein. Advocates of Naransevstein argue it is the only border crossing directly connecting to Gansu Province in China, central China, rather than Xinjiang (Burgastai Port) or Inner Mongolia (Shiveekhuren Port).

Furthermore, former Gobi-Altai governor and parliament member O. Amgalanbaatar states that they plan to build a road corridor to protect wildlife migration. However, experts contend that this corridor would instead restrict the animals’ migration and compress their habitats.

The phrase “reviving and reopening Naransevstein Port” poses a serious risk to the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area and its endangered species.

Reopening the port would contravene the following laws:

Mongolian Constitution:

Article 1.2: “…Democracy, justice, freedom, equality, national unity, and respect for the law shall form the basis of state activity…”

Article 10.2: “…Mongolia shall fulfill its obligations under international treaties…”

Article 70.1: “…Laws, decrees, decisions of state bodies, and activities of citizens must comply with the Constitution…”

International Conventions:

Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(d): “…Promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats, and the maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings…”

At the invitation of Minister of Culture, Sports, Tourism, and Youth of Mongolia Nomin Chinbat, Joan Laporta, President of FC Barcelona, arrived in Mongolia on November 12, 2024. FC Barcelona, a renowned professional football club based in Barcelona, Spain, holds a 124-year history, 27 La Liga titles, five Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League trophies, and five Super Cup titles.

Minister Nomin Chinbat and President of FC Barcelona Joan Laporta held an official meeting to discuss joint efforts between FC Barcelona’s experts and the Mongolian Football Federation to foster the activities of the “Official FC Barcelona Soccer Academy of Mongolia,” refine the skills of young football players, and introduce training methods in Mongolia.

Moreover, in order to advance future cooperation, the two sides discussed the possibility of promoting Mongolia globally by collaborating with FC Barcelona under the National Brand “Go Mongolia.”

World Leaders Climate Action Summit commenced in Baku, the Republic of Azerbaijan on November 12, 2024.

Upon his arrival at the Baku Stadium, President of Mongolia Khurelsukh Ukhnaa was greeted by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.

World Leaders Climate Action Summit, which is taking place during the UN Climate Change Conference COP29, aims to accelerate the progress of the fight against climate change, strengthen the unity of the parties, and expedite the actions for the commitments to achieve zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The Summit also seeks to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, support activities for combating and adapting to climate change, raise funds, and particularly define a new joint financing goal to meet the growing needs of developing countries.

Azerbaijan, the chair of COP29, called on developed countries to make notable progress in doubling financing for climate change adaptation by 2025, prioritizing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, adaptation to climate change, mitigating and building resilience, promoting sustainable practices, and implementing policies and initiatives to transition to a low-carbon economy.

President of Mongolia Khurelsukh will address the Summit on November 12, 2024, to express Mongolia's position on climate change, combating desertification, and mitigating global warming, and present the policies and actions implemented at the national level.