Mongolia confirmed 585 new COVID-19 infections over the past 24 hours, raising its national caseload to 47,033, the country's health ministry said Thursday.

One of the latest confirmed cases was imported from abroad, and the remaining ones were local infections, the ministry said in a statement.

In the past day, the country's COVID-19 death toll rose by nine to 205, while the number of recoveries grew by 1,548 to 37,281, said the ministry.

The country launched a mass COVID-19 vaccination campaign in late February, aiming to cover at least 60 percent of its population of 3.3 million.

A total of more than 1,712,500 Mongolians have so far received their first dose and over 634,600 have got both jabs.

Deforestation remains an acute problem across much of the world, but far from everywhere.

From Canada to Mongolia forests have regrown here and there in large patches covering an overall area the size of France, according to a new analysis by Trillion Trees, a joint venture between World Wildlife Fund (WWF), BirdLife International and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).

One particular success story of regeneration involves Brazil’s Atlantic Forest, which is a hotspot of biodiversity with several endangered species of plants and animals that are found nowhere else on Earth. In this new century as much as 4.2 million hectares of forest has regrown there, adding an area the size of the Netherlands to local forests.

The regeneration has been thanks to “a combination of planned projects to restore the forest, more responsible industry practices and other factors, including migration trends toward cities,” says Trillion Trees, which has been mapping forest regeneration worldwide.

That does not mean, however, that forests in Brazil, including the Atlantic Forest, are out of the woods, so to speak. “Such is the extent of historic deforestation that the area of this unique forest still needs to more than double from currently 12% of its original extent to 30% in order to reach what scientists believe is a minimal threshold for its lasting conservation,” WWF explains.

Other forests elsewhere that have experienced large-scale regrowth include boreal forests in Mongolia’s northern wilderness where some 1.2 million hectares of trees have grown back in 20 years. There too regeneration has been due largely to ongoing conservation efforts.

Other regeneration global hotspots include boreal forests of Canada and biodiverse forests in Central Africa. In all, newly grown forests around the world could store the equivalent of 5.9 gigatons of CO2, which is more than the annual emissions of the United States, according to the nonprofit.

Yet even as some forests are growing back, others are being thinned and felled. Thus, the need for forest restoration and conservation projects is as acute as ever.

“Deforestation is at the center of our climate crisis, and we must do everything we can to halt it,” says Josefina Braña Varela, vice president and deputy lead for forests at WWF. “In addition, the restoration of our natural forests will play an essential role in preserving these critical ecosystems,” the expert adds.

“The [new] analysis provides a positive outlook for natural regeneration — but this growth doesn’t happen without careful planning, increased investment and strong policies in place that lead to an increase in forest cover,” she says.

On May 12, Prime Minister L.Oyun-Erdene became acquainted with the construction of the Darkhan hide and leather complex being built in Khongor soum, Darkhan-Uul aimag.

The construction project was launched on 18 hectares of land in 2018, with plans to establish 13 factories and plants that have the annual capacity to process 10 million pieces of hides, 10,000 tons of wool, and 1,000 tons of cashmere. By putting the complex into operation, about 7,500 job opportunities are estimated to be created.

As of today, the construction of the wool processing factory is at 86 percent, with substation at 95 percent, wastewater treatment plant at 80 percent, interior heating system at 50 percent, 3.9 km exterior heating system at 70 percent, foundation of the large cattle hides processing factory at 18 percent.

The Government has recently announced 100 projects of high priority. One of the projects is this particular complex that will process livestock commodities for the export of value-added products. Noting that the establishment of the complex will be comprehensively supported by the government, the Prime Minister highlighted that the time has come for Mongolia to diversify the livestock sector and export value-added products.

Binance P2P has now added new payment methods for buying and selling crypto with Mongolian Tugrik (MNT). This allows users to trade cryptocurrencies with fiat via the following new payment methods:

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SuperUp

Mongol Chat

Users can add these payment methods through Account > Payment Methods > P2P Payment Methods. Please refer to the user guide for further details.

Please note that these payment methods are supported as options of fiat transactions between users, and Binance does not establish any business relationships with the entities listed above.

Disclaimer: Your use of the Binance P2P services and all information and other content (including that of third parties) included in or accessible from the Binance P2P services is at your sole risk. Our only responsibility is to handle your payment transaction. All payments are final upon completion unless otherwise required by law. Binance P2P platform has neither the rights nor the obligations to resolve any disputes arising from a completed payment. Neither Binance P2P platform nor merchants shall be responsible for your loss in a completed payment.

Rio Tinto’s Mongolian copper project could face a further $US1 billion ($1.28 billion) of cost blowouts on the back of the coronavirus delays, as brinksmanship with the Mongolian government extends to the supply of power to the project.

The cost and schedule for an underground expansion of the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine has already blown out by $US1.45 billion and 22 months, and the Rio subsidiary in charge of the mine hinted on Thursday that the pandemic was likely to add to those blowouts.

Turquoise Hill Resources, which is 50.79 per cent owned by Rio, said the accuracy range on the existing $US6.75 billion cost estimate had been expanded and the ultimate cost could be up to 15 per cent higher.

Previously, the accuracy range had suggested a maximum of 10 per cent above $US6.75 billion.

The project would cost $US7.76 billion if the 15 per cent range was fully utilised.

While the accuracy range also implies there is potential for the cost to be lower than $US6.75 billion, Turquoise Hill was clear that the risk was to the upside given delays to multiple aspects of the project.

Most importantly, a crucial mining move called the “undercut”, which triggers the controlled collapse of rock within the mining zone, appears increasingly unlikely to go ahead on schedule.

Rio executive Arnaud Soirat wrote a letter to the Mongolian government on Christmas Eve, when he was still Rio’s copper boss, saying the undercut decision would occur in May so long as the government gave Rio clarity on a number of geological and financial issues.

Rio and Turquoise Hill now talk about the undercut decision occurring in “mid 2021” and Turquoise Hill noted on Thursday that the Mongolian government had not yet clarified the matters sought by Rio before going ahead with the undercut.

“The exact timing of the undercut is under increasing pressure principally due to our understanding of the rapidly evolving recent COVID-19 impacts,” said Turquoise Hill on Thursday.

“It is critical to ensure that, once commenced, the undercut and drawpoint construction continues unimpeded.

“Any significant delay to the undercut would have a materially adverse impact on schedule as well as the timing and quantum of underground capital expenditure and would materially adversely impact the timing of achieving first sustainable production.”

While the undercut effectively triggers the start of the mining process, Turquoise Hill said delays were also hitting the digging of shafts that are crucial to ensuring extraction can continue from the first mining zone into the second and third zones.

Asked last week whether a delay to the undercut would see Oyu Tolgoi put on care and maintenance at the expense of jobs, Rio chief executive Jakob Stausholm said he had not given up hope of proceeding in the next few months.

“The situation right now in Mongolia with COVID is difficult,” he said on the sidelines of Rio’s annual shareholder meeting in Perth on May 6.

“Our discussions in Mongolia is affected both on COVID and on the fact there is a presidential election a month from now, but I am optimistic that things will come together and we at the right time can take an undercut decision.”

The $US1.45 billion cost blowouts announced last year had a huge impact on Turquoise Hill, as it meant the company did not have enough money to complete the project.

Turquoise Hill’s plan to raise extra cash through debt and financial instruments strained relations with Rio, which wanted Turquoise Hill to conduct a multi-billion dollar equity raising.

The two companies only patched up their differences and agreed on a funding plan in April, but that agreement will be undermined if a further round of cost and schedule blowouts is announced on the back of the pandemic and frayed relations with the Mongolian government.

Turquoise Hill’s funding challenge has been helped by a surge in copper prices to record highs this year, meaning it is making more money than expected from the small open pit mine that already exists at Oyu Tolgoi.

But the tailwinds from commodity prices have been offset by geotechnical problems in the pit, which forced Turquoise Hill to downgrade copper and gold production guidance on Thursday.

The supply of power to Oyu Tolgoi is becoming an increasingly important topic given the Mongolian government’s demand for the mine to eventually be fed by a local generator.

Oyu Tolgoi currently sources its power from across the international border in China and Rio wanted permission to extend its contracts by March 1 to ensure stable power supply until the Mongolian government completes construction of a coal-fired power station about 150 kilometres away at the Tavan Tolgoi coalfields.

Permission to extend the Chinese power contract was not granted by the Mongolian government, which now wants the Oyu Tolgoi partners to sign up to a contract for future power supply from Tavan Tolgoi before it allows an extension of the Chinese power deal.

The power play is just one of a myriad of unresolved issues between Rio, Turquoise Hill and the Mongolian government, all of which are coming to a head prior to presidential elections in the developing nation next month.

by Peter Ker

Mongolian broadcaster Central Television has commissioned two seasons of a local version of gameshow format 5 Gold Rings.

Co-created by John de Mol and ITV Studios label Possessed, 5 Gold Rings sees contestants answer questions by placing gold rings onto an animated picture, displayed on a huge LED floor. The prize money per level gets higher, whereas the rings get smaller. ITV Studios distributes the format.

At its meeting on May 12, the Cabinet decided to give discounts on the imported seeds in the Agriculture Support Fund amid the pandemic. Specifically, a 30 percent discount will be given on wheat seeds, 50 percent discount on feed crop and potato seeds and agricultural films, and an 80 percent discount on seeds of field vegetables and greenhouse crops.

This year, crop seeds will be planted on 389 thousand hectares, of which wheat will be grown on 368 thousand hectares, potatoes on 18 thousand hectares, other vegetables on 10 thousand hectares, feed crops on 66 thousand hectares, oil plants on 40 thousand hectares and fruits and berries on 7,000 hectares.

Around 496 thousand tons of crops - 471 thousand tons of wheat, 222 thousand tons of potatoes, 116 thousand tons of other vegetables, 170 thousand tons of feed crops, 26 thousand tons of oil plants, and 3,000 tons of fruits and vegetables - will be harvested and 360 thousand hectares of farmland will be fallowed.

A total of 5,421 citizens were involved in immunization in the capital city yesterday, May 11. More specifically, 3,794 people received their first shots of COVID-19 vaccine while 1,627 people have gotten their second shots.

Since the vaccination rollout launched in February 2021, 94.8 percent of capital city citizens aged over 18 or 903,948 people have had the first dose of vaccine and 50.8 percent or 481,414 people have been fully vaccinated.

At the national level, 1,678,198 people or 81.2 percent have been vaccinated with the first dose of vaccine and 631,666 people or 30.6 percent with the second dose.

The Cabinet made the following decisions at its regular meeting on May 12.

-Imported tractors, combines, and other agricultural machinery, irrigation and greenhouse equipment, forestry and poultry farming equipment, fertilizers and plant protection products will be exempted from customs tax until January 1, 2022. The Cabinet approved a list of over 120 types of equipment and substances to be exempted from the tax.

-Imported and domestically sold tractors, combines and other agricultural machinery, irrigation and greenhouse equipment, forestry and poultry farming equipment, fertilizers and plant protection products will be exempted from value added tax until January 1, 2025. The Cabinet approved a list of over 120 types of equipment and substances to be exempted from the tax.

-Minister of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry Z.Mendsaikhan was ordered to look into making additions to the list of goods to be purchased from domestic enterprises that meet the quality and standard requirements and have verification of conformity. Government and local organizations were ordered to actively make purchases under the General Agreement and annually participate in the Patriotic Purchase-Domestic Production exhibition fair. Last year, 51 government and local organizations purchased products worth around MNT 326 billion from domestic producers. The amount equals 98 percent of the total cost of products included on the list.

-The Cabinet also decided to name the border military unit No. 0108 in Zamyn-Uud soum of Dornogobi aimag after Honored Scientific Worker, Academician, Doctor, Professor, Lieutenant General Sh.Arvai and the border military unit No. 0166 in Gurvantes soum of Umnugobi aimag after General M.Batkhuyag.

On June 9, presidential elections will take place in Mongolia for the eighth time since the democratic revolution in 1990. In the weeks leading up to the election, the political stakes have soared. Political polarization has been coupled with court rulings, presidential decrees, party splits, and mergers. All of this has put Mongolia’s rather institutionalized party system in an unprecedented state of instability which, if not checked, might lead to the unexpected collapse of democracy in the country.

Mongolia never had a president until the figure was introduced in the aftermath of the 1990 revolution. Even then, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat, former chairman of the presidium of the People’s Great Khural (as the Communist parliament was named) and first Mongolian president, was appointed by the parliament. It was only two years later that the new constitution, after long and hard discussions, decided to include a popularly elected head of state. Ochirbat was re-elected as president with 60 percent of the vote on June 6, 1993. We revisit here not only the problems popular presidential elections have posed for Mongolian politics in the past, but also the reasons why the current situation is not surprising.

Ever since the American-based Spanish scholar Juan Linz published his seminal article “The Perils of Presidentialism” (1990), academics have showcased the problems popular presidential elections might entail. In a recent policy paper published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, another Spanish scholar (one of this paper’s authors) – although this time U.K.-based – warns anew about the perils of popular presidential elections. Among other issues, the paper highlights how popular presidential elections might lead to party de-institutionalization, party system fragmentation, and polarization. Each can be observed in the case of contemporary Mongolia.

Party System Fragmentation

Presidential office, even in countries like Mongolia where the position does not entail many real powers, constitutes the highest aspiration of many politicians. The idea of becoming head of state becomes an obsession for ambitious politicians who, in the case of losing office or not winning nomination, might decide to create their own parties with which they can bid again for the highest office. This, for example, is what happened after the 2009 presidential election, when the then incumbent president and Mongolia People’s Party (MPP) candidate, Enkhbayar Nambar, lost to the Democratic Party candidate. Nambar blamed his loss on MPP leaders and decided to establish a new party, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), with other members of parliament originally from the MPP. Interestingly enough, these two parties will be merging again before a presidential election next month.

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Party De-institutionalization: Factionalism

Given the zero-sum logic the popular election of a president entails, presidential elections tend to present an extremely personalistic character which, in turn, tends to lead to organizational splits and the formation of new, weaker political parties. This is especially the case in countries where, like Mongolia, parties are already extremely factionalized. The formation of MPRP in 2010 and the current internal disputes within the Democratic Party (DP) are clear examples of factions generating instability within parties.

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The DP’s present troubles were mainly triggered by President Battulga Khaltmaa’s attempt to get the party’s nomination for the upcoming presidential elections. This led to a split in the party between those supporting Khaltmaa’s aspirations and those standing behind former DP Chairman Erdene Sodnomzundui.

It is important to understand that, contrary to most semi-presidential countries in the world, in Mongolia only parliamentary parties can nominate candidates in presidential elections. This poses a problem, especially when incumbents who have lost grip on their own party because of the obligation to resign their membership when elected, want to run for re-election. The DP case clearly illustrates the extent to which presidential elections might be a curse for Mongolian political parties. As former Minister of Justice Temuujin Khishigdemberel once put it, “parties suffer the most when their candidate is elected president.”

The split within the DP, Mongolia’s main opposition party, forced the Supreme Court to reject the petition of its two factions, which held party primaries simultaneously, to register their respective leaders as leader of the party and potentially a presidential candidate. This would have cleared the path for MPP to win the June presidential elections in the first round, if not for another important event, another outcome characteristic of semi-presidential regimes: polarization.

Polarization

Popular presidential elections might not just lead to an in increase in the level of electoral support for anti-establishment parties, but also foster political polarization. Because of the necessity of presidential candidates to appeal to voters beyond their own parties, presidential election campaigns in Mongolia have been characterized by negative campaigning, inimical competition, and populist discourse. There is no better example of this than Battulga’s 2017 campaign motto: “Mongolia will win.” To some it meant that his MPP rival, Enkhbold Miyegombo, was not a “pure” Mongolian. To others it meant that he was an agent of foreign powers or multinational corporations. Ideology and policies were left aside, leading to personal attacks among politicians and voter polarization.

The current situation characterized by MPP’s illegal banning by the president in response to a resolution of the Constitutional Court barring him from running in the forthcoming elections is another example of how popular presidential elections constitute a venue for polarization, more so than legislative elections.

Government Instability

Presidential elections can also lead to government instability and, ultimately, party system change and de-institutionalization. Khurelsukh Ukhanaa’s recent resignation is just the most recent example. Under the excuse of public demonstrations in Ulaanbaatar’s central square, despite MPP’s supermajority after the 2020 parliamentary elections, Khurelsukh became the first prime minister to resign, making his cabinet the shortest in the history of Mongolian democracy. Now it is clear that it was just a pretext, and that his intention was to run in the forthcoming presidential elections. There have been many other instances where cabinet changes where triggered by presidential elections or presidential power struggles within ruling parties. Former Prime Minister Altankhuyag Norov has continuously maintained that it was President Elbegdorj who orchestrated his removal from office, even though they were both from the same party, the DP.

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The timing of presidential elections, just one year apart from parliamentary polls, has been also an important factor behind the country’s political turmoil, as newly formed governments always need to adjust to results in the presidential contest. If Khurelshukh loses, the current Luvsannamsrai cabinet, formed at the end of January, is expected to change again.

Conclusion

Scholars have shown that the popular election of a country’s head of state can be a peril for its democracy. By increasing fragmentation, weakening political parties, hindering party system institutionalization, increasing government instability, and promoting polarization, popular presidential elections perhaps should be avoided, especially in new democracies. As explained above, the current political situation seems to confirm these fears, showing that – barely one year after a constitutional reform was passed – an important opportunity to introduce the type of checks and balances characteristic of parliamentary regimes proposed by Mongolian experts was missed.

By Bat-Orgil Altankhuyag and Fernando Casal Bértoa