Ulaanbaatar/MONTSAME/. Yesterday, January 5, Minister of Energy N.Tavinbekh visited some thermal power plants in Ulaanbaatar to check the operation, loads, and resources of the power plants during winter peak loads.

The renovation of the turbo generator №3 of TPP IV state-owned company has been completed and is ready for operation. As a result, the TPP IV capacity of generating power will increase by 110 MW.

Emphasizing their high responsibilities during the strict lockdown and the period of winter peak loads, the Minister of Energy assigned the TPP authorities to conduct timely disinfection and follow professional organizations' instructions.

Ulaanbaatar /MONTSAME/. Khan Bank has successfully concluded long-term financing agreements worth USD 24.8 million with the Covid-19 Emerging & Frontier Markets MSME Support Fund and BlueOrchard Microfinance Fund, investment funds managed by BlueOrchard, a leading Swiss-based impact investment management company, and German-based fund manager Frankfurt School Financial Services GmbH, just before the start of the new year.

The Bank has raised the necessary funds for supporting the long-term financing needs of its micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) clients during these challenging economic times being faced due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Obtaining these funds during such a challenging period for the wider global economy is a testament to the financial strength, stable growth, and good governance of the Bank, as well as the Bank’s long-term cooperation and trust established with these institutes” says in the press release of the Bank.

"BlueOrchard and Frankfurt School Financial Services GmbH have both provided financing to Khan Bank in the past, and mutual cooperation is further strengthened with these new financing agreements."

The metallurgical coal and infrastructure company plans to export up to 4 million tonnes of coking coal to China once its Ovoot Project in Mongolia comes into production.

Aspire Mining Ltd – Aspire Mining’s Mongolian project poised to benefit from China’s rumoured shift away from Australian coal. The company’s share price doubled last week after speculation about a Chinese ban on Australian coal. Aspire Mining Ltd is the only ASX-listed company to have coking coal assets in Mongolia and could be well-placed to benefit from recent speculation that China is shifting away from Australian coal. The company owns the world-class Ovoot Coking Coal Project, and while rumours around the Chinese sentiment focus on thermal coal, the company experienced a sharp share price bump last week as investors anticipated a complete coal ban.

Last Monday, the company sat at around 7.2 cents per share and after Chinese State Media alluded to restrictions on Australian coal and a refocus to prioritise imports from Mongolia, Russia and Indonesia, the share price doubled before levelling out at around 8.6 cents. China recently introduced tariffs on Australian goods including wine, barley and beef and the unofficial coal ban has only increased tensions between the two countries.

Coal market in Mongolia

Mongolian coking coal export volumes to China have been recovering from a border shutdown between the two countries earlier in the year. For the six months ended June 2020, China imported 7.2 million tonnes of coking coal from Mongolia (a 56% decline from the prior year) while imports from Australia rose 65% year-on-year to 24 million tonnes. However, for the balance of the second half of the year Mongolian coking coal exports are expected to revert to more normalised levels while Australian exports to China slow. In September 2020 Mongolia exported 3.9 million tonnes to China, which represented 58% of China’s coking coal exports. In contrast, Australia exported just 2 million tonnes to China that month.

The first news of curtailments to Australian coal imports was reported in October, placing Aspire in the perfect position to benefit from any increase in Mongolian exports going forward.

Ovoot Project development

The company is targeting early production of washed coking coal from a first-stage development of the Ovoot Project, known as the Ovoot Early Development Plan (OEDP). The start of development is linked to the completion of the Definitive Environmental Impact Assessment (DEIA), which has been impacted with access the site to commence the ground activities halted by the deferral of local community engagement meetings due to COVID-19 control measures. The OEDP and pre-feasibility study is focused on a truck and rail operation to deliver up to 4 million tonnes per annum to end markets in China and Russia.

September trial shipment

During the September quarter, a trial shipment of 3,300 tonnes of coking coal was moved by rail from an existing mine in Mongolia to the city of Ulanqab in China, which after beneficiation will be railed further to Tangshan and the Port of Caofeidian. This is an important target market for Ovoot coking coal as the company plans to truck coking coal from the mine site to access rail at the city of Erdenet.

Strong financial outlook

At the end of the September quarter, the company was fully cashed up, with a cash balance of A$38.5 million to fund the Ovoot Project development and no debt. This strong financial outlook is partially due to a $33.5 million placement in September 2019, which saw major shareholder Tserenpuntsag Tserendamba increase his holding to 51% and strategically reposition Aspire as a Mongolian led company. Notably, the placement price was 2.1 cents per share, and with a share consolidation of 10 to 1 in December 19– makes for a placement price the equivalent of 21 cents today which is substantially higher than the current share price.

Funding commitments through to production

In addition, financial support is secure with Tserenpuntsag supplying a letter of intent around provision of a corporate guarantee for up to $100 million to support future project financing for the OEDP and pro-rata equity contributions to maintain a 51% shareholding in Aspire alongside all shareholders to fund Ovoot into production. The company is confident that the development of the Ovoot Coking Coal Project will leave Aspire well placed to take advantage of any shift from China away from Australian coal.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday signed an executive order banning transactions with eight Chinese software applications, including Ant Group’s Alipay, the White House said, escalating tensions with Beijing before President-elect Joe Biden takes office this month.

Department with defining which transactions will be banned under the directive and targets Tencent Holdings Ltd’s QQ Wallet and WeChat Pay as well.

The move is aimed at curbing the threat to Americans posed by Chinese software applications, which have large user bases and access to sensitive data, a senior official told Reuters.

A U.S. Tencent spokeswoman did not immediately comment.

The order signed by Trump also names CamScanner, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate and WPS Office and says “the United States must take aggressive action against those who develop or control Chinese connected software applications to protect our national security.”

A U.S. official told Reuters that even though the order gave the Commerce Department 45 days to act the department plans to act before Jan. 20 when Trump leaves office to identify prohibited transactions.

Trump’s order says “by accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information.”

It added the data collection “would permit China to track the locations of federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of personal information.”

The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Another official said the order mirrors earlier Trump executive orders signed in August directing Commerce to block some transactions with WeChat and Chinese-owned Tiktok seeking to bar some transactions that have been blocked by U.S. courts.

Any new transactions prohibited by the Trump administration are likely to face similar court challenges as the Commerce Department did when it sought to block transactions with WeChat and TikTok. The Commerce orders would have effectively banned the Chinese app’s use in the United States and barred Apple Inc and Alphabet Inc’s app stores from offering them for download for new users.

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross said in a statement he supports Trump’s “commitment to protecting the privacy and security of Americans from threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.”

The latest action has been under debate within the administration for an extended period. Many administration officials are eager to cement the hardline U.S. position with China on a number of fronts before Trump leaves office.

Last month, the Commerce Department added dozens of Chinese companies, including the country’s top chipmaker SMIC and Chinese drone manufacturer SZ DJI Technology Co Ltd, to a trade blacklist.

Also last month the administration published a list of Chinese and Russian companies with alleged military ties that restrict them from buying a range of U.S. goods and technology.

In November, the administration put on hold an effort to blacklist Ant Group, the Chinese financial technology company affiliated with e-commerce giant Alibaba.

Reporting by Alexandra Alper and David Shepardson in WashingtonEditing by Leslie Adler, Matthew Lewis and David Gregorio

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

On December 30, 2020, the EU and China agreed to a landmark investment treaty to boost trade and investment between the two largest markets in the world after more than 13 years of hard negotiations. President Xi Jinping said that the deal would bring a “brighter future” in cooperation between China and European countries.

The EU-China deal could unlock Eurasian landmass connecting Beijing with Brussels through an economic corridor offered by Mongolia.

Although the first phase of this investment deal focuses on financial services and telecommunications the next level of EU-China treaty can cover transport and infrastructure issues.

Mongolia as an economic corridor and stabilizing factor between Russia and China

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalated, Russia and China looked into closer ties and started to work together on a multipolar system. Western economic sanctions on Russia prompted two countries to work even closer. And here comes how Mongolia can play its geostrategic position.

China's "Silk Road" program, now known as "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) around the world encompassed Mongolia and around 30 projects were proposed in the beginning.

By 2018, Mongolia refined its proposal into three components backed by studies of Mongolian researchers. Eastern provinces of Mongolia would focus on animal products and tourism as part of BRI. Central provinces would connect to the Chinese infrastructure and western provinces would develop tourism and cross-border trade.

Today Russia is doing a feasibility study to build a gas pipeline through Mongolia to the southern neighbor, which could generate $1 billion to Mongolia in transit fees. The construction of the highway connecting three countries could also benefit Mongolia’s economy tremendously.

Obviously, Mongolia is a small country compared to its two big neighbors. But it has become apparent to both countries that their cooperation would be meaningless if they don’t get active participation from Mongolia.

In 2014, President Elbegdorj initiated a trilateral summit in Dushanbe among three presidents, which has become an annual summit. Mongolia has had a strategic partnership with China since 2014 and the same level of relations with Russia since 2016, which was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2019.

Millennium Railway of Stability and Prosperity

Jack Weatherford wrote at length about the Pax Mongolica, which had a stabilizing effect on the Eurasian social, cultural, and economic life of people living in the 13th and 14th centuries.

Pax Mongolica helped to grow free trade and communications between Europe and China and Central Asia.

Similarly, I have proposed that a high-speed railway connecting Chinese northeastern coastal areas with Xinjiang, Central Asia, Russia and ultimately Europe through Mongolia could have a long lasting effect on trade, economic and cultural prosperity in the same way as Pax Mongolica.

The high-speed railway through Mongolian territory would be around 4,000 km. I call it “the Millennium Railway” that brings stability and prosperity to the region connecting Europe with Beijing through a hard infrastructure stretching 7,000-8,000km.

Its construction will be a mega project that can cover 3,700 km from eastern Mongolia to the western provinces at a speed of 340-400 km per hour.

It would be possible for a person in Dornod province to travel to Khovd within a day by not taking a plane at the cost of MNT 500k and saving 30-40% on a high-speed train. On top of that, connecting northeastern China with Uighurs could integrate the region into more developed and coastal areas of China.

Funding Millennium railway

People ask me how this mega project will be funded. According to the World Bank, it costs from $17m- $21m to construct one km of high-speed rail in China. Obviously, building a horizontal high-speed railway across Mongolia running from Harbin through Altai mountains to Xinjiang would require colossal investment and years of construction work.

But I would like to note that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has cash in hand and is well-positioned to look into financing megaprojects with long-term vision. Beijing has been expanding its high-speed railway network at phenomenal speed.

Also, Russia would need to have a stake in the project as it will be a joint Russian-Mongolian-Chinese vertical railway. Russia is already building the Moscow-Kazan high-speed 772km railway, to be completed by 2023, with an ambition to connect Moscow with Beijing in the future.

I can’t stress enough that China is really interested in expanding its BRI through various "economic corridors" connecting Beijing with Brussels. Mongolia geographically is the closest route for Beijing to reach the Western markets. Cross-country railway makes sense to Chinese, which was mentioned by my Chinese contacts in private many times.

I have also presented my idea to Mongolian key-decision makers, including the secretary of the National Security Council, members of the government, and the state-owned Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi coal miner (which is financing another vertical railway for commodity transports). They all took great interest in the Millennium high-speed railway concept as well.

The perils of the Chinese debt trap

Mongolia has a high debt level - close to 70% of GDP. The government is also massively spending on emergencies for its citizens and small businesses to relieve economic hardships due to Covid-19.

Getting more Chinese debt for building the Millennium high-speed railway could make Mongolia unable to serve its debt and endanger it into default. It is widely known that the Chinese have relatively high rates for its infrastructure loans (over 6%) on top of the fact that Chinese EximBank does not accept debt relief if a country can’t service its debt payments.

If Mongolia can’t repay China could pressure Ulaanbaatar to provide preferred access to coal (Tavan Tolgoi) and copper (Oyu Tolgoi, Erdenet) assets or to ask for support on Beijing’s policy over Inner Mongolia and Dalai Lama.

Therefore, Mongolia needs to manage the financing issues carefully so that national interests are not endangered. At the same, it should be noted that the Chinese decision-making process is not monolithic as it may seem to be. There are multiple competing interests by the provincial administrations, central government and party apparatus in Beijing, state-owned entities, and banks in financing and constructing large scale railway construction along with the BRI network. Understanding and leveraging in a smart way these relationships and interests is key in advancing high-speed railway projects across Mongolia.

In the end, I would like to bring here what Chinese Ambassador Chai Wenrui told me following President Battulga’s visit to Beijing earlier this year. President Xi Jinping was thrilled about President Battulga’s donation of 30,000 sheep for combatting the Covid pandemic.

According to the Ambassador, Xi Jinping thanked President Battulga almost 30 times while quoting Chinese word of wisdom: “If you have received a drop of beneficence from other people, you should return to them a fountain of beneficence”, with credit to Confucious.

China is the second-largest fast-growing economy in the world. Mongolia has the best relations with China today, which gives a great opportunity to leverage the Belt and Road Initiative and connect the rest of the world with China through such projects as the Millennium High-Speed Railway.

References:

Research of Mongolian scientists on “Mongolia-Russia-China economic corridor”, Ulaanbaatar, 2018

Pax Mongolica magazine, issue 2, UB, 2017

Professor Baysakh Jamsran is a Sc.D. and a former Director at the Institute of International Affairs of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences. He authored numerous academic books on Mongolian foreign policy and international relations and lectured Mongolian diplomats at the School of Foreign Service, the National University of Mongolia.

Hong Kong/Tokyo (CNN Business)Jack Ma's businesses are under enormous pressure right now. But the co-founder of China's most successful tech empire and legendary billionaire entrepreneur hasn't been heard from in months.

Ma hasn't made a public appearance or social media post since late October, just over a week before a much anticipated stock market listing of Alibaba's (BABA) financial affiliate, Ant Group, was blocked at the last minute by Chinese regulators.

Ant Group has gone from preparing the world's largest initial public offering to being ordered to overhaul large swaths of its business. Chinese regulators have criticized the company for edging out rivals from the market and hurting consumer rights.

Alibaba, meanwhile, has been probed in China for alleged monopolistic behavior. And the Wall Street Journal reported last week that Beijing was seeking to shrink Ma's empire and potentially take a larger stake in his businesses, citing Chinese officials and government advisers familiar with the matter.

Ma was even absent from the finale of an African talent show he created, according to the Financial Times. The newspaper reported that Ma was replaced as a judge during the November filming of the last episode of "Africa's Business Heroes," a television contest for entrepreneurs.

As recently as Oct. 12, Ma said he was looking forward to meeting the finalists during the online finale on Nov. 14.

Alibaba told CNN Business on Monday that Ma "had to miss the finale due to scheduling conflict." It declined further comment on his whereabouts.

Ma has kept a lower profile within China for some time now, said Duncan Clark, author of "Alibaba: The House that Jack Ma Built" and founder of investment advisory firm BDA China. He added that Beijing wants its narrative about the Ant Group IPO to dominate the public conversation — and that the company likely knows that it won't help to have any "diversity of opinion" on the issue.

"But certainly it's remarkable ... the silence is somewhat deafening," he added.

While Ma no longer holds executive or board level positions at either of the companies he co-founded — he stepped down as Alibaba's executive chairman in 2019 — he is still Alibaba's biggest individual shareholder with nearly 5% worth about $25 billion. Ant Group said in regulatory filings last year that Ma has "ultimate control" over the company, and his personal wealth was expected to balloon after the public offering.

He has also frequently made public appearances to talk about his philanthropic work, which he made a major focus after retiring from Alibaba. His most recent post on Chinese social media platform Weibo, dated Oct. 17, for example, featured remarks he made at an education forum in China. Ma has also been a high profile speaker at major international events such as the World Economic Forum.

It was Ma's last major appearance, though, that China tech observers suspect landed his business in hot water. At a conference in Shanghai in late October, Ma publicly criticized Chinese regulators for stifling innovation by being too risk averse.

"What we need is to build a healthy financial system, not systematic financial risks," he said. "To innovate without risks is to kill innovation. There's no innovation without risks in the world."

Days later, Chinese regulators summoned Ma and Ant Group executives to conduct what authorities called "regulatory interviews," and the IPO was pulled. Oanda market analyst Jeffrey Halley wrote at the time that the comments "clearly didn't resonate in the halls of power in Beijing."

It's not clear from official or company statements whether Ma has attended any meetings since then regarding the future of his businesses.

While Ma has been out of the spotlight, his companies have made clear that they are listening to Beijing. Ant said last week that it appreciated "guidance and help" from regulators after Beijing spoke publicly about its requirements for the company. And Alibaba pledged in late December to "actively cooperate" with antitrust investigators.

The potential threats to Ma's businesses aren't limited to China, either. Washington has been ratcheting up its campaign against Chinese businesses in recent weeks as the Trump administration draws to a close. And while Alibaba hasn't been specifically targeted, the company was name-checked by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo late last summer when he urged American companies to remove "untrusted" Chinese-owned technology from their digital networks.

Public opinion about Ma in China, meanwhile, has turned sour. Many of the replies to Ma's October Weibo post struck a particularly negative tone.

"Again it's about resources and brain mines," wrote one Weibo user, responding to Ma's use of those words to describe children in China and the need for a strong education system. "It is totally a line from a capitalist."

— Laura He and CNN's Beijing bureau contributed to this report.

On January 2, Ts. Oyungerel, a former member of Mongolia’s State Great Khural, announced that she will compete to be the Democratic Party’s candidate in the June 2021 presidential elections. She could possibly become the second-ever woman to run for Mongolia’s presidency following N. Udval’s unsuccessful bid in the 2013 elections.

Oyungerel, who turns 55 this year, obtained her first degree in economics in Sverdlovsk (known as Yekaterinburg today) in the Soviet Union in 1988, and further attended Moscow International Business School in 1993 for an MBA. She earned again a Master’s degree in International Policy Research at Stanford University in 2004. In 2011, she took part in the Eisenhower Fellowship Program, in which 60 to 70 global leaders are brought together for an intensive six-week program. She is also the author of the bestselling novel “The Green-eyed Lama,” set in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s.

Having been employed in various civil service posts during the 1990s and 2000s, she became an advisor on policies regarding human rights and citizen involvement to former President Ts. Elbegdorj in 2009, which cemented her reputation in the political field. In 2012, after two unsuccessful runs, she secured a seat in the State Great Khural.

Oyungerel has a reputation as a human rights activist and a leader of Mongolia’s Democratic Women’s Association. Not only does she touch upon some of the most crucial issues in society through her writings, but she continues to spearhead social wellness initiatives. Oyungerel has commenced a project to reinvent pit latrines in Ulaanbaatar’s ger districts using 17 different toilet-building technologies through Local Solutions Foundation, a non-governmental organization established in 2007. She emphasized that having squat toilets in a city as densely populated as Ulaanbaatar is unsanitary for the inhabitants and harmful to their health. Furthermore, heavily accumulated excrement is absorbed deep into groundwater, from which 1.5 million people get their drinking water.

When Oyungerel revealed her ambition to become the head of state, it left some in shock. Critics could not help involving her past and her family in the matter of her political career. There are two common – and preposterous – arguments as to why she cannot possibly run for the presidency. One is the claim that since she once worked for Elbegdorj, she must still be in his circle. (The former president has had a bad reputation since leaving office.) The second objection is that she is married to an American. Up to this day, the mere fact of a Mongolian woman getting married to a foreigner remains somewhat controversial. But beyond these objections, a number of Mongolian men and women find the idea of having a woman as the president quite disturbing.

It is too early to take her candidacy for granted in the upcoming presidential elections. First, Oyungerel will have to secure the Democratic Party nomination, which would require defeating incumbent President Kh. Battulga. Only then would she actually be able to run against against the Mongolian People’s Party’s pick, who is highly likely to be the current prime minister, U. Khurelsukh.

After 30 years of democracy, Mongolia continues to face trouble building good governance and developing a thriving economy. Still, is it one of the few democracies in the heart of Asia but is it ready to have a woman as the head of state?

BY:Manduul Bat-Orshikh is a senior at the School of International Relations and Public Administration of the National University of Mongolia.

Jan. 5 (Xinhua) -- A second death related to COVID-19 was reported in Mongolia, the country's National Center for Communicable Diseases (NCCD) said Tuesday.

"A 76-year-old Mongolian man, who was diagnosed with COVID-19 and suffered chronic heart failure, cardiac arrhythmia and chronic arterial occlusive disease of the lower extremities, died on Monday at the NCCD," Amarjargal Ambaselmaa, head of the surveillance department of the center, said at a daily press conference.

This is the second COVID-19 related death in the country after a same-age woman died last month.

Meanwhile, 22 more locally transmitted COVID-19 cases were recorded in the country in the last 24 hours, bringing its national caseload to 1,308, according to the official.

The Asian country has recorded 884 recoveries so far. Enditem

HONG KONG, Jan. 05, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- SouthGobi Resources Ltd. (Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”): SGQ, Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKEX”): 1878) (the "Company" or “SouthGobi”) today announces its financial and operating results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2020. All figures are in U.S. dollars (“USD”) unless otherwise stated.

Significant Events and Highlights

The Company’s significant events and highlights for the three months ended September 30, 2020 and the subsequent period up to January 4, 2021 are as follows:

Operating Results – The Company increased sales volume to 1.0 million tonnes for the third quarter of 2020 from 0.8 million tonnes for the third quarter of 2019. The average selling price of coal decreased from $35.0 per tonne in the third quarter of 2019 to $31.6 per tonne in the third quarter of 2020 as a result of a higher portion of sales made at the mine gate instead of transporting the coal to the Company’s Inner Mongolia subsidiary and selling to third party customers within China.

Financial Results – The Company recorded a gross profit of $10.9 million in the third quarter of 2020 compared to $12.8 million in the third quarter of 2019 while a $1.1 million net profit was recorded in the third quarter of 2020 compared to $2.1 million in the third quarter of 2019. The financial results were impacted by the reduced gross profit as a result of a lower average selling price achieved during the quarter.

Impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) Pandemic – The Company was informed that effective as of February 11, 2020, the Mongolian State Emergency Commission closed Mongolia’s southern border with China in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Accordingly, the Company suspended coal exports to China beginning as of February 11, 2020 as a result of the border closure.

On March 28, 2020, the Mongolian-Chinese border was re-opened for coal export on a trial basis, with a limit imposed on the total volume of coal that was permitted to be exported during this trial period. The Company has experienced a continuous improvement in the volume of coal exported to China since March 28, 2020. During the period between April to December 2020, an aggregate of 2.4 million tonnes of coal was exported by the Company from Mongolia to China, as compared to an aggregate of 2.6 million tonnes of coal during the same period in the 2019 calendar year.

The border closure had an adverse impact on the Company’s sales and cash flows in the first and second quarter of 2020. In order to mitigate the financial impact of the border closures and preserve its working capital, the Company temporarily ceased major mining operations (including coal mining), reduced production to only coal-blending activities and placed approximately half of its workforce on furlough from February 2020. Since August 2, 2020, the Company has resumed its mining operations, which includes mining, blending and washing of coal. As at December 31, 2020, SGS employed 237 employees at the Ovoot Tolgoi Mine site (December 31, 2019: 383 employees). The Company produced 1.5 million tonnes from August to December 2020, as compared to 2.3 million tonnes from August to December 2019. There were a few COVID-19 cases reported in Ulaanbaatar (being the capital city of Mongolia) on November 11, 2020. As a result, the Mongolian local authorities have taken certain precautionary steps to minimize further transmission and announced a lockdown of Ulaanbaatar effective as of November 12, 2020. Although the Company’s mining operations and the export of coal from Mongolia to China continues as of the date hereof, there can be no guarantee that the Company will be able to continue exporting coal to China, or the border crossings would not be the subject of additional closures as a result of COVID-19 in the future. The Company will continue to closely monitor the development of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact it has on coal exports to China and will react promptly to preserve the working capital of the Company.

In the event that the Company’s ability to export coal into the Chinese market becomes restricted or limited again as a result of any future restrictions which may be implemented at the Mongolian-Chinese border crossing, this is expected to have a material adverse effect on the business and operations of the Company and may negatively affect the price and volatility of the Common Shares and any investment in such shares could suffer a significant decline or total loss in value.

China Investment Corporation (“CIC”) Convertible Debenture (“CIC Convertible Debenture”) – On April 23, 2019, the Company executed a deferral agreement (the “2019 Deferral Agreement”) with CIC in relation to a deferral and revised repayment schedule in respect of (i) $41.8 million of outstanding cash and payment in kind interest (“PIK Interest”) and associated costs due and payable to CIC on November 19, 2018 (the “Outstanding Interest Payable”) under the CIC Convertible Debenture and a deferral agreement executed with CIC on June 12, 2017 (the “June 2017 Deferral Agreement”); and (ii) $27.9 million of cash and PIK Interest payments payable to CIC under the CIC Convertible Debenture from April 23, 2019 to and including May 19, 2020 (the “Deferral”). Pursuant to Section 501(c) of the TSX Company Manual, the 2019 Deferral Agreement was approved at the Company’s adjourned annual and special meeting of shareholders on June 13, 2019.

The key repayment terms of the 2019 Deferral Agreement are: (i) the Company agreed to pay a total of $14.3 million over eight instalments from November 2019 to June 2020; (ii) the Company agreed to pay the PIK Interest covered by the Deferral by way of cash payments, rather than the issuance of Common Shares; and (iii) the Company agreed to pay the remaining balance of $62.6 million on June 20, 2020. The Company agreed to pay a deferral fee at a rate of 6.4% per annum in consideration of the deferred amounts.

As a condition to agreeing to the Deferral, CIC required that the mutual co-operation agreement (the “Cooperation Agreement”) dated November 19, 2009 between SGS and CIC, be amended and restated (the “Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement”) to clarify the manner in which the service fee (the “Management Fee”) payable to CIC under the Cooperation Agreement is calculated, with effect as of January 1, 2017. Specifically, the Management Fee under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement is determined based on the net revenues realized by the Company and all of its subsidiaries derived from sales into China (rather than the net revenues realized by the Company and its Mongolian subsidiaries as currently contemplated under the Cooperation Agreement). As consideration for deferring payment of the additional Management Fee payable to CIC as a result of the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, the Company agreed to pay to CIC a deferral fee at the rate of 2.5% on the outstanding Management Fee. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, the Company agreed to pay CIC the total outstanding Management Fee and related accrued deferral fee of $4.2 million over six instalments from June 2019 to November 2019. The Company executed the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement with CIC on April 23, 2019.

Pursuant to their terms, both the 2019 Deferral Agreement and the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement became effective on June 13, 2019, being the date on which the 2019 Deferral Agreement was approved by shareholders at the Company’s adjourned annual and special meeting of shareholders.

In connection with the 2019 Deferral Agreement, the Company also announced that it intends to discuss a potential debt restructuring plan with respect to amounts owing to CIC which is mutually beneficial to the Company and CIC; and to form a special committee comprised of independent directors to ensure that the interests of its minority shareholders are fairly considered in the negotiation and review of any such restructuring; however, there can be no assurance that a favorable outcome will be reached. As of the date hereof, there has not been any significant progress in relations to the restructuring plan.

On February 19, 2020, the Company and CIC entered into an agreement (the “2020 February Deferral Agreement”) pursuant to which CIC agreed to grant the Company a deferral of: (i) deferred cash interest and deferral fees of $1.3 million and $2.0 million (collectively, the “2020 February Deferral Amounts”) which were due and payable to CIC on January 19, 2020 and February 19, 2020, respectively, under the 2019 Deferral Agreement; and (ii) approximately $0.7 million of the Management Fee which was due and payable on February 14, 2020 to CIC under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement. The 2020 February Deferral Agreement became effective on March 10, 2020, being the date on which the Company obtained the requisite acceptance of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement from the TSX as required under applicable TSX rules.

The principal terms of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement are as follows:

Payment of the 2020 February Deferral Amounts will be deferred until June 20, 2020, while the Management Fee will be deferred until they are repaid by the Company.

As consideration for the deferral of these amounts, the Company agreed to pay CIC: (i) a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the 2020 February Deferral Amounts, commencing on the date on which each such 2020 February Deferral Amounts would otherwise have been due and payable under the 2019 Deferral Agreement; and (ii) a deferral fee equal to 2.5% per annum on the Management Fee, commencing on the date on which the Management Fee would otherwise have been due and payable under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement.

The Company agreed to provide CIC with monthly updates regarding its operational and financial affairs.

As the Company anticipated prior to agreeing to the 2020 February Deferral Agreement that a deferral was likely required in respect of the monthly payments due and payable in the period between April 2020 and June 2020 under the 2019 Deferral Agreement and Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, the Company and CIC agreed to discuss in good faith a deferral of these payments on a monthly basis as they become due.

The Company agreed to comply with all of its obligations under the 2019 Deferral Agreement and the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, as amended by the 2020 February Deferral Agreement.

The Company and CIC agreed that nothing in the 2020 February Deferral Agreement prejudices CIC’s rights to pursue any of its remedies at any time pursuant to the 2019 Deferral Agreement and Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, respectively.

On March 10, 2020, the Company agreed with CIC (the “2020 March Deferral Agreement”) that the $2.0 million of deferred cash interest and deferral fees which were due and payable to CIC on March 19, 2020 under the 2019 Deferral Agreement (the “2020 March Deferral Amount”) will be deferred until June 20, 2020. The terms of the 2020 March Deferral Agreement are substantially the same as the terms of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement, including that the Company agreed to pay CIC a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the 2020 March Deferral Amount, commencing on March 19, 2020. The 2020 March Deferral Agreement became effective on March 25, 2020, being the date on which the Company obtained the requisite acceptance of the 2020 March Deferral Agreement from the TSX as required under applicable TSX rules.

On April 10, 2020, the Company agreed with CIC (the “2020 April Deferral Agreement”) that the $2.0 million of deferred cash interest and deferral fees which were due and payable to CIC on April 19, 2020 under the 2019 Deferral Agreement (the “2020 April Deferral Amount”) will be deferred until June 20, 2020. The terms of the 2020 April Deferral Agreement are substantially the same as the terms of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement, including that the Company agreed to pay CIC a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the 2020 April Deferral Amount, commencing on April 19, 2020. The 2020 April Deferral Agreement became effective on April 29, 2020, being the date on which the Company obtained the requisite acceptance of the 2020 April Deferral Agreement from the TSX as required under applicable TSX rules.

On May 8, 2020, the Company agreed with CIC (the “2020 May Deferral Agreement”) that the deferred cash interest and deferral fees of $2.0 million which were due and payable to CIC on May 19, 2020 under the 2019 Deferral Agreement; and approximately $0.2 million of Management Fees which were due and payable on May 15, 2020 to CIC under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement (collectively, the “2020 May Deferral Amount”) will be deferred until June 20, 2020. The terms of the 2020 May Deferral Agreement are substantially the same as the terms of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement, including that the Company agreed to pay CIC a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the deferred cash interest and deferral fees commencing on May 19, 2020 and a deferral fee equal to 2.5% per annum on the deferred Management Fees commencing on May 15, 2020. The 2020 May Deferral Agreement became effective on June 8, 2020, being the date on which the Company obtained the requisite acceptance of the 2020 May Deferral Agreement from the TSX as required under applicable TSX rules.

On June 19, 2020, the Company agreed with CIC (the “2020 June Deferral Agreement”) that the deferred cash interest and deferral fees in the aggregate amount of approximately $74.0 million (the “2020 June Deferral Amount”) which were due and payable to CIC on June 19, 2020 under the 2019 Deferral Agreement and the prior deferral agreements entered into during the period between February to May 2020 will be deferred until September 14, 2020. The terms of the 2020 June Deferral Agreement are substantially the same as the terms of the 2020 February Deferral Agreement, including that the Company agreed to pay CIC a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the 2020 June Deferral Amount commencing on June 19, 2020. The 2020 June Deferral Agreement became effective on July 17, 2020, being the date on which the Company obtained the requisite acceptance of the 2020 June Deferral Agreement from the TSX as required under applicable TSX rules.

On November 19, 2020, the Company and CIC entered into an agreement (the “2020 November Deferral Agreement”) pursuant to which CIC agreed to grant the Company a deferral of: (i) deferred cash interest and deferral fees of approximately $75.2 million which were due and payable to CIC on or before September 14, 2020, under the 2020 June Deferral Agreement; (ii) semi-annual cash interest payments in the aggregate amount of $16.0 million payable to CIC on November 19, 2020 and May 19, 2021; (iii) $4.0 million worth of PIK Interest shares (“2020 November PIK Interest”) issuable to CIC on November 19, 2020 under the CIC Convertible Debenture; and (iv) the Management Fee which payable to CIC on November 14, 2020, February 14, 2021, May 15, 2021, August 14, 2021 and November 14, 2021 under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement (collectively, the “2020 November Deferral Amounts”). The effectiveness of the 2020 November Deferral Agreement and the respective covenants, agreements and obligations of each party under the 2020 November Deferral Agreement are subject to the Company obtaining the requisite approval of the 2020 November Deferral Agreement from the Company’s shareholders in accordance with applicable TSX rules. On October 29, 2020, the Company obtained an order from the British Columbia Securities Commission (“BCSC”), the Company’s principal securities regulator in Canada, which partially revoked the CTO (as defined below) to, amongst other things, permit the Company to execute the 2020 November Deferral Agreement.

The principal terms of the 2020 November Deferral Agreement are as follows:

Payment of the 2020 November Deferral Amounts will be deferred until August 31, 2023.

CIC agreed to waive its rights arising from any default or event of default under the CIC Convertible Debenture as a result of trading in the Common Shares being halted on the TSX beginning as of June 19, 2020 and suspended on the HKEX beginning as of August 17, 2020, in each case for a period of more than five trading days.

As consideration for the deferral of the 2020 November Deferral Amounts, the Company agreed to pay CIC: (i) a deferral fee equal to 6.4% per annum on the 2020 November Deferral Amounts payable under the CIC Convertible Debenture and the 2020 June Deferral Agreement, commencing on the date on which each such 2020 November Deferral Amount would otherwise have been due and payable under the CIC Convertible Debenture or the 2020 June Deferral Agreement, as applicable; and (ii) a deferral fee equal to 2.5% per annum on the 2020 November Deferral Amounts payable under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, commencing on the date on which the Management Fee would otherwise have been due and payable under the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement.

The 2020 November Deferral Agreement does not contemplate a fixed repayment schedule for the 2020 November Deferral Amounts and related deferral fees. Instead, the Company and CIC would agree to assess in good faith the Company’s financial condition and working capital position on a monthly basis and determine the amount, if any, of the 2020 November Deferral Amounts and related deferral fees that the Company is able to repay under the CIC Convertible Debenture, the 2020 June Deferral Agreement or the Amended and Restated Cooperation Agreement, having regard to the working capital requirements of the Company’s operations and business at such time and with the view of ensuring that the Company’s operations and business would not be materially prejudiced as a result of any repayment.

Commencing as of November 19, 2020 and until such time as the November 2020 PIK Interest is fully repaid, CIC reserves the right to require the Company to pay and satisfy the amount of the November 2020 PIK Interest, either in full or in part, by way of issuing and delivering PIK interest shares in accordance with the CIC Convertible Debenture provided that, on the date of issuance of such shares, the Common Shares are listed and trading on at least one stock exchange.

If at any time before the 2020 November Deferral Amounts and related deferral fees are fully repaid, the Company proposes to appoint, replace or terminate one or more of its Chief Executive Officer, its Chief Financial Officer or any other senior executive(s) in charge of its principal business function or its principal subsidiary, then the Company must first consult with, and obtain written consent from CIC prior to effecting such appointment, replacement or termination.

Until such time as the 2020 November Deferral Agreement is approved by the Company’s shareholders and the deferral and waiver thereunder in favour of the Company become effective, the Company remains in default under the CIC Convertible Debenture and 2020 June Deferral Agreement and CIC may declare the amounts owing thereunder immediately due and payable, and may take steps to enforce payment thereof, which would have a material adverse effect on the business and operations of the Company and could negatively affect the price and volatility of the Common Shares and any investment in such shares could suffer a significant decline or total loss in value.

Cease Trade Order and Halt Trading on TSX – On June 19, 2020, the BCSC issued a general “failure to file” cease trade order (“CTO”), to prohibit the trading by any person of any securities of the Company in Canada. Trading in the Common Shares on the TSX was halted as a result of the CTO. The CTO was issued as of result of the Company’s failure to file: (i) its annual consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2019 and the accompanying Management’s Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (“MD&A”); (ii) its Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2019; and (iii) its condensed consolidated interim financial statements for the three-month period ended March 31, 2020 and accompanying Management’s Discussion & Analysis, in each case prior to the filing deadline of June 15, 2020.

The CTO will remain in effect until such time as the Company makes a successful application to the BCSC to have the CTO revoked. While the Company is taking such actions as it considers necessary in order to remedy its filing defaults as soon as possible, there can be no assurance that the Company will have the CTO lifted in a timely manner or at all. For so long as the CTO remains in effect, it will have a significant adverse impact on the liquidity of the Common Shares and shareholders may suffer a significant decline or total loss in value of its investment in the Common Shares as a result.

Suspension of Trading on HKEX – At the request of the Company, trading in the shares of the Company on the HKEX was suspended with effect as of August 17, 2020 pending the publication of the audited annual results of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2019.

On September 2, 2020, the Company received a letter from the HKEX setting out the following resumption guidance for the resumption of trading in the Common Shares on the HKEX (the “Resumption Guidance”): (i) publish all outstanding financial results and address any audit modifications; (ii) inform the market of all material information for the Company’s shareholders and investors to appraise its position; and (iii) announce quarterly updates on the Company’s developments under Rules 13.24A of the HKEX’s Listing Rules, including, amongst other relevant matters, its business operations, its resumption plan and the progress of implementation.

On September 30, 2020, the Company was notified by the HKEX of the following additional condition which must be satisfied in order for trading in the Common Shares on the HKEX to resume: resolve issues arising from the CTO and/or the TSX Delisting Review (as defined below), or take steps to the satisfaction of the HKEX that the Company will be eligible for a primary listing on the HKEX.

On December 8, 2020, the Company was notified by the HKEX of the following additional condition which must be satisfied in order for trading in the Common Shares on the HKEX to resume: demonstrate compliance with Rule 13.24 of the HKEX listing rules which requires that an issuer carry out a business with a sufficient level of operations and assets of sufficient value to support its operations to warrant the continued listing of the issuer's securities.

If the Company fails to remedy the issues causing its trading suspension, fully comply with the Listing Rules to the HKEX’s satisfaction and resume trading in its shares on the HKEX by February 16, 2022, the HKEX’s Listing Division will recommend to the HKEX’s Listing Committee that it proceed with the cancellation of the Company’s HKEX listing. Under Rules 6.01 and 6.10 of the Listing Rules, the HKEX also has the right to impose a shorter specific remedial period, where appropriate.

TSX Delisting Review – On September 11, 2020, the TSX notified the Company that it is reviewing the eligibility for continued listing of the Common Shares on the TSX pursuant to the TSX’s Remedial Review Process (“TSX Delisting Review”). On December 16, 2020, the TSX accepted the Company’s request for a 60 day extension of the TSX Delisting Review process and the Company has been granted until February 16, 2021 to remedy the following delisting criteria, as well as any other delisting criteria that become applicable during the Remedial Review Process: (i) financial condition and/or operating results; (ii) adequate working capital and appropriate capital structure; and (iii) disclosure issues (collectively, the “Delisting Criteria”).

The TSX Continued Listing Committee has scheduled a meeting to be held on February 11, 2021 to consider whether or not to suspend trading in and delist the Common Shares on the TSX. If the Company fails to demonstrate to the TSX that it has remedied the Delisting Criteria on or before February 16, 2021, the Common Shares will be delisted from the TSX 30 days from such date.

Changes in Directors

Mr. Xiaoxiao Li: Mr. Li resigned as a non-executive director on November 13, 2020.

Ms. Ka Lee Ku: Ms. Ku was appointed as a non-executive director on December 9, 2020.

Going Concern – Several adverse conditions and material uncertainties relating to the Company cast significant doubt upon the going concern assumption which includes the deficiencies in assets and working capital.

See section “Liquidity and Capital Resources” of this press release for details.

Ulaanbaatar /MONTSAME/ According to an open budget survey (OBS) conducted by the International Budget Partnership, Mongolia ranked 41st out of 117 countries with transparency score of 56. Mongolia’s transparency score of 56 in the OBS 2019 is moderately higher than its score (46) in 2017. In OBS 2019, the global average transparency score is only 45 out of 100.

Mongolia has increased the availability of budget information by publishing the Year-End Report online and the Pre-Budget Statement online in a timely manner. However, Mongolia has decreased the availability of budget information by reducing the information provided in the Enacted Budget.

Furthermore, transparency alone is insufficient for improving governance. Inclusive public participation is crucial for realizing the positive outcomes associated with greater budget transparency. Mongolia has a public participation score of 15 (out of 100).

Recommendations

Mongolia's Ministry of Finance has established e-consultations during budget implementation but, to further strengthen public participation in the budget process, should also prioritize the following actions:

Pilot mechanisms to engage the public during budget formulation.

Actively engage with vulnerable and underrepresented communities, directly or through civil society organizations representing them.

Mongolia's State Great Khural has established submissions related to the approval of the annual budget, but should also prioritize the following actions:

Allow any member of the public or any civil society organization to testify during its hearings on the budget proposal prior to its approval.

Allow members of the public or civil society organizations to testify during its hearings on the Audit Report.

Mongolia's National Audit Office has established mechanisms to assist the supreme audit institution in developing its audit program. To improve public participation in the budget process it should:

Establish formal mechanisms for the public to contribute to relevant audit investigations.

The OBS also examines the role that legislatures and supreme audit institutions (SAIs) play in the budget process and the extent to which they provide oversight; each country is scored on a scale from 0 to 100 based on 18 equally weighted indicators. The legislature and supreme audit institution in Mongolia, together, provide adequate oversight during the budget process, with a composite oversight score of 80 (out of 100).

Recommendations

Mongolia's State Great Khural provides adequate oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle and limited oversight during the implementation stage. To further improve oversight, the following actions should be prioritized:

A legislative committee should examine in-year budget implementation and publish reports with their findings online.

In practice, ensure the legislature is consulted before the executive shifts funds specified in the Enacted Budget between administrative units during the budget year.

To strengthen independence and improve audit oversight by the Mongolia National Audit Office, the following actions are recommended:

Ensure audit processes are reviewed by an independent agency.

The Open Budget Survey (OBS) is the world’s only independent, comparative and fact-based research instrument that uses internationally accepted criteria to assess public access to central government budget information; formal opportunities for the public to participate in the national budget process; and the role of budget oversight institutions such as the legislature and auditor in the budget process. The survey helps local civil society assess and confer with their government on the reporting and use of public funds.

source: internationalbudget.org