In an era of Instagram tourism, some young people are searching for less curated travel experiences. So they’re flocking to the open spaces of this East Asian nation.

It was near midnight, in a storm, on a dirt road in the middle of Mongolia. Still, the river seemed manageable.

My cousin Cole Paullin and I were searching for a place to camp, and I was exhausted from a long day of fording streams in our rented four-by-four truck.

“Seems fine,” I said. “Go for it.”

Cole accelerated and the front tires plunged off an unseen embankment, slamming onto the rocks below. We were perched at a precarious angle, and the front half of the truck was submerged. Water intruded through a crack in the door, lapping onto my feet. I imagined our rental deposit draining downstream.

Drawn by the noise, two young men came over from a nearby tent camp. One waded toward the car into the waist-deep water with a message typed on Google Translate: “This is dangerous.” I was too embarrassed to be scared.

I lent him my rain jacket as he made some calls. Thankfully, there was cellular service. Within an hour, a man with a truck and a tow strap arrived. We reversed at full speed while he accelerated, extricating us from the river.

“That was Disneyland, dude,” said Cole, 27, channeling the slang of his native Los Angeles. “What a ride.”

Cole and I live on different continents — he’s in Philadelphia and I’m in London — but once a year, we convene somewhere new for an outdoors trip. This year, we decided to take a weeklong drive across Mongolia.

Over the past decade, millennials like me — those born between roughly 1981 and 1996 — have been seeking out remote places like Mongolia, while other tourists crowd Santorini, the Eiffel Tower and the Colosseum. It may be a reaction to a world that’s increasingly condensed into our phones, where the same few destinations pop up again and again on Instagram grids and travel blogs. What we have gained in accessibility, we have lost in serendipity.

The Mongolian government has been trying to capitalize on this desire for less curated travel. It has invested in a digital marketing campaign targeting people ages 23 to 40. It has also invited social media influencers to come to Mongolia and post videos of the country’s verdant valleys, Caribbean-blue lakes and orange sand dunes. According to a 2019 survey cited by Mongolia’s tourism ministry, 49 percent of visitors to the country were under 40.

Tour operators are catering to this growing interest, helping young people see the Golden Eagle Festival, an annual gathering of nomadic hunters — male and female — and their eagles; join the Mongol Rally, a driving odyssey across Europe and Asia; or ride in the Mongol Derby, a roughly 600-mile horse race.

“The world is getting smaller, and everyone’s looking for the new frontier,” said Sangjay Choegyal, a 36-year-old living in Bali who has visited Mongolia eight times. “The next place is Mongolia.”

The writer’s rented UAZ pickup truck with a rooftop tent on what is considered a good road near the town of Orgil.

A magnet for adventure seekers

When Cole and I arrived in Ulaanbaatar, the capital, in late July, the line for foreign arrivals crowded the new immigration hall at the airport.

Olivia Hankel, a 25-year-old woman from Oregon, had come to train for the Mongol Derby. Willie Freimuth, a 28-year-old paleontology student from North Carolina, had returned for a second year to study fossils. And Mr. Choegyal had flown in with friends for a road trip to the Orkhon Valley, a lush expanse of central Mongolia.

“When you talk about a trip to Mongolia, it always fills up pretty quick,” Mr. Choegyal said.

Last year, Mongolia had nearly 250,000 visitors, more than six times as many as the year before, when the country was emerging from pandemic isolation. The majority of those visitors were from nearby countries, including Russia, South Korea and Kazakhstan. But the number of visitors from Europe and the United States rose more than 500 percent between 2021 and 2022.

“I think you can have a much more interesting, transformative and engaging experience in a Mongolian outhouse than you can at the Taj Mahal,” said Tom Morgan, the founder of the Adventurists, a company that hosts extreme trips in the country. And, he advised, “It’s better not to plan.”

Erdene Zuu, likely Mongolia’s oldest surviving Buddhist monastery, is nestled in the Orkhon Valley, where Genghis Khan chose to locate Karakorum, the capital of his empire, in 1220.

The eaves and roof of a temple structure viewed from below. The bottom eaves are red with blue and green beams. The middle section has blue cylinders with green crescents between them. The top section has green cylinders and crescents. At the top, there is an image of a golden wheel on a circular blue background.

One of the buildings at Erdene Zuu Monastery in Karakorum.

A tent with four tires

Cole and I hadn’t planned much. We arrived with only our backpacks and a rental car booking from Sixt — one we weren’t sure was real. Sixt’s Mongolian offices operate by bank transfer, and before we arrived, we had sent more than $2,000 to their account. I worried it could be a scam.

We were relieved when we arrived at Sixt and found it had our booking. Then we got the bad news: A previous group had wrecked the S.U.V. we had requested. A 3,000-mile trip on the country’s many dirt tracks had destroyed the bottom of the car. The agent offered us a Russian-made UAZ pickup truck equipped with a rooftop tent. It didn’t have a stereo and the air-conditioning was a faint stream of hot air, but it was sturdy.

We were lucky to get it. Sixt was almost fully booked — as were other providers in the city.

“We sold out three times this season. So we added more dates,” Max Muench, 31, a co-founder of the travel company Follow the Tracks, said. His company, which started running tours last year, helps clients book cars and gives them tablets loaded with maps they can use to navigate while offline. “Especially now after Covid, people want to feel a sense of freedom again,” he said. “And they’re looking for it in the vast emptiness of Mongolia.”

A section of the off-road drive between Orgil and Murun. Outside the capital, the Mongolian countryside is largely open and populated by nomads.

Nomads guided by Google Maps

We soon discovered what that emptiness looked like.

Roughly half of the country’s more than 3.2 million people live in the overcrowded capital, a tangle of roads and new high-rises fraying in every direction. But around a quarter of Mongolia remains nomadic, living on the edgeless steppe in gers, round tents made of wood, tarp, and animal skins or fabric. They move with their herds as many as four times a year.

As we drove out of the city, guided by Google Maps, the sky stretched so wide the horizon seemed to curve. A herd of horses gnawed at the grass, swishing their tails at flies. We were seeking out the herd’s distant relatives as we aimed the truck toward Hustai National Park, a refuge for what the Smithsonian calls the last truly wild horses left in the world.

After nearly an hour on a dirt road, we pulled up to a small, dusty entrance gate. I asked the national park manager, Batzaya Batchuluun, if visitors ever had a hard time finding the place. “Most people come with a guide. But young people like you are starting to show up on their own,” he said. “They have phones. They get here eventually.”

Mongolia is surprisingly connected. Despite the long stretches between villages, we got cellular internet service on much of our drive (using a Mongolian SIM card). One day as I was watching camels in the desert, I was even able to do something absurd: Try my luck with Ticketmaster for Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour tickets. (Like so many others, I was disappointed.)

Chuluut Gorge, just off a paved highway, is a popular stop for Mongolians on road trips across the country. Many visitors enjoy a picnic near the gorge before continuing to Terkhiin Tsagaan Lake.

The Mongolian government has been working to expand online access to citizens and tourists. An estimated 84 percent of the country has access to the internet, and gers often have solar panels, keeping each family’s cellphones charged. The government has also been working to pave the roads from Ulaanbaatar to popular destinations.

All that development has allowed young travelers to roam the country more freely, bringing a different kind of nomad to the steppe. The day after our visit to the wild horses, as we explored Genghis Khan’s ancient capital, Karakorum, we met a group of European women, friends from college on a two-week road trip. They, too, chose to eschew a guide and navigate with their phones.

“We didn’t want a trip where everything is organized for you,” Maria Galí Reniu, a 31-year-old from Spain, said. Hanna Winkler, a 30-year-old from Austria, chimed in: “On our own, we can just pull off anywhere we decide is a nice camp spot.”

Inside the home of a woman from the Tsaatan community, a group of reindeer herders who follow their animals across the steppe near Russian Siberia, moving with the seasons.

A horse race and a hailstorm

Cole and I also pulled off where we liked. At night, we camped under the Milky Way, arching bright above our rooftop tent. During the day, we made lunch in golden canola fields or next to winding rivers. In Elsen Tasarkhai, a long stretch of sand known as the mini-Gobi Desert, we rode two-humped Bactrian camels.

Halfway through our trip, I persuaded Cole to detour to Tsenkher hot springs, a popular destination for Mongolians. Nearly an hour down a dirt road, we came across a crowd of children, bobbing on horses. Drawing closer, we saw they had numbers pinned to their shirts.

One girl and 41 boys, ages 8 and up, gathered for a race. The families used their cars and motorcycles to herd the horses to the starting line. Parents smiled and motioned for us to follow as they lined up their cars next to the horses. When the horses took off, we did too, speeding across the grass alongside the racers at nearly 50 miles per hour.

A boy competing in a horse race during the Naadam Festival, which brings nomadic families together every summer for races, archery and wrestling competitions. Spectators driving in vehicles alongside the racers can reach 50 miles per hour.

Just as the first horse crossed the finish line, it began to hail. What would have been a celebration turned into an exodus. Some of the riders crossed the finish line and then headed straight into the hills, braving pellets of ice.

As we drove on toward the hot springs, torrential rain overpowered the windshield wipers, and we began to slide. We passed Priuses, a favorite car in Mongolia, mired on the roadsides. Each time we forded a swollen river, the water rose closer to the cab, until we got stuck and it finally leaked in.

The storm had also flooded the hot springs. As we shivered in a tepid pool, one English-speaking boy commiserated: “Sorry you missed the hot water.”

Erdenesukh Tserendash, who goes by the nickname Umbaa, with his horses above Khuvsgul Lake. The writer and her cousin stayed with Umbaa’s family and joined him on a full-day horse ride.

Along came a spider

After days of slow, off-road driving, we finally arrived at sparkling blue Khuvsgul Lake — our final destination. We wanted to spend the night in a ger, so we called Erdenesukh Tserendash, a 43-year-old horse herder who goes by the nickname Umbaa. His number was on Facebook.

Umbaa, his wife and two sons welcomed us into one of his family’s tents, lit by bulbs hooked to car batteries. For dinner, the family served boiled sheep and horse meat on a communal tray with carrots and potatoes. After dinner, they cracked open the bones and sucked out the marrow, and before bed, we sipped tea with yak milk. As I lay there scrolling, in the light of my phone, I noticed something on my face and swatted. It was a spider the size of a quarter.

The next day, Umbaa took us on a full-day horse ride. We cantered across meadows of wildflowers, saw reindeer and climbed a mountain overlooking the lake, lazing in the sun for lunch, an idyllic finale to our journey.

Back in Ulaanbaatar, the wildflowers seemed far away as I stood with the Sixt agent and worried about the truck. Was there any damage from getting stuck in the river? The truck was so covered in mud and dust, it was hard to tell.

I thought back to the wrecked S.U.V. we were originally supposed to rent and braced myself to lose our deposit, more than $1,400. The agent waved away my fears. Everything was fine, he said. Getting stuck was just standard driving in Mongolia.

His shift was over, so he offered us a ride to the airport. We thought we had plenty of time to make it, but the grinding traffic in Ulaanbaatar almost made us miss our flight. It was one last reminder that in Mongolia, little goes as planned.

BY: Lauren Jackson is a writer for The Morning newsletter, based in London.

The Government of Mongolia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Mongolia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included prosecuting and convicting more traffickers and identifying more victims. The government also improved information sharing and coordination among ministries and with international partners and revised the law to provide legal assistance to adult and child trafficking victims. Courts increased court-ordered restitution to trafficking victims. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities investigated fewer trafficking cases and did not prosecute any alleged labor traffickers; courts did not convict a labor trafficker for the third consecutive year. For at least the 11th consecutive year, the government did not formally identify any male victims. Overlapping and at times conflicting criminal code articles complicated anti-trafficking judicial processes and continued to incentivize prosecutions and convictions under lesser charges.

PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:

Increase efforts to implement and train officials on Articles 12.3 and 13.1 of the criminal code to investigate and prosecute sex trafficking and forced labor crimes – including those detected through child labor inspections and hotlines and handled in partnership with law enforcement counterparts in common destination countries – rather than under alternative administrative or criminal provisions that prescribe lower penalties.

Review and amend anti-trafficking laws to eliminate conflicting or overlapping penalty provisions.

Fully implement SOPs for victim identification and referral to protective services and train government officials, including police, immigration officers, child rights officers, and labor authorities, on their use to protect men and boys, foreign workers, domestic and foreign nationals transiting major border crossing areas, domestic coal transport workers, women and children living in mining communities, and LGBTQI+ persons.

Improve coordination and information-sharing among anti-trafficking agencies, including police, prosecutors, and social services.

Amend relevant laws to ensure victims have access to protection services regardless of whether officials initiate formal criminal proceedings against the alleged traffickers.

Enact policies to fully institutionalize, make permanent, and allocate resources for the anti-trafficking Multidisciplinary Task Force (MDTF) by codifying it in the Law on Child Protection or formalizing it through regulations.

Amend Articles 16.1 and 16.4 of the criminal code to increase prescribed penalties such that they are in line with penalties for other child trafficking crimes.

Amend Article 8 of the Labor Law to align its definitions with preexisting anti-trafficking laws, including by eliminating exemptions for compulsory labor in basic landscaping and cleaning.

Allocate increased funding to support and expand both government and NGO-run shelters and other forms of victim assistance, including for male and LGBTQI+ victims.

Strengthen efforts to monitor the working conditions of foreign workers in Mongolia and screen them for labor trafficking indicators, including by increasing funding, resources, and training for labor inspectors and allowing them to conduct unannounced inspections.

PROSECUTION

The government slightly increased law enforcement efforts. Article 13.1 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking; it prescribed penalties of two to eight years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and five to 12 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Other provisions of the criminal code additionally criminalized some forms of labor and sex trafficking. Article 13.13 separately criminalized forced labor and prescribed fines, community service, probation, and/or one to five years’ imprisonment. Article 12.3 of the criminal code criminalized sexual exploitation offenses, including some forms of sex trafficking; penalties ranged from two to eight years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving individuals older than the age of 14, and 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for those involving children younger than the age of 14. As in prior years, authorities sometimes prosecuted trafficking crimes under statutes carrying lesser penalties. Articles 16.1 and 16.4 criminalized “inducing a child to the committing of a crime” and “forcing a child into begging,” respectively; they both prescribed penalties of a travel ban for one to five years or one to five years’ imprisonment. In previous years, some prosecutors reportedly charged child forced begging cases as misdemeanors, rather than as more serious offenses. Observers noted complex case initiation and referral procedures, restrictions on contact between anti-trafficking police and prosecutors, judicial officials’ general unfamiliarity with anti-trafficking laws, rapid turnover of investigators, and criminal code articles with overlapping and often conflicting definitions and penalty provisions at times hindered investigations and prosecutions.

The government initiated 12 sex trafficking and child sex trafficking investigations involving at least 20 alleged perpetrators (compared with 45 investigations involving 51 alleged perpetrators in 2021. The government did not report if any investigations resulted from police raids on saunas, massage parlors, hotels, karaoke bars, and other venues suspected of facilitating commercial sex (seven investigations resulting from raids in 2021). The government reported police monitoring of sex solicitation on social media led to 52 investigations; however, these cases were grouped with other pornography cases and it was unclear how many occurred on social media (23 investigations in 2021). Authorities initiated a new investigation into a case of alleged forced child labor in hazardous work, which may have amounted to labor trafficking; the case involved at least one alleged perpetrator and one child victim (compared with two forced labor investigations in 2021). Authorities investigated an additional 52 cases of unspecified forms of exploitation, some of which may have amounted to trafficking, involving 37 alleged perpetrators (compared with 41 cases and 51 perpetrators in 2021). Authorities initiated prosecution of 50 defendants for alleged sex trafficking crimes, including 10 defendants under Article 12.3, 19 defendants under 12.6, and 21 under Article 13.1 (compared with 22 in 2021, including four under Article 12.3, eight under Article 12.6, and 10 under Article 13.1). In addition, the Prosecutor General’s Office reported prosecuting 24 defendants under Articles 16.8 and 16.9 (“Advertising and dissemination of pornography or prostitution, inducement to a child” and “Advertising and dissemination of pornography or prostitution involving a child”), which carried lesser penalties; authorities did not provide sufficient detail to ascertain whether these cases featured trafficking elements according to international definitional standards. The government did not report how many proceedings initiated in previous reporting periods remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period (compared with 19 ongoing proceedings reported in the previous year). There were no prosecutions of an alleged forced labor crime under Article 13.13 (compared with one prosecution in 2021). Courts convicted 35 individuals for trafficking-related crimes in 2022 – an increase from 27 in 2021. Courts convicted 22 individuals under anti-trafficking articles, including 13 under Article 12.3 and 9 under Article 13.1, compared to three and 10, respectively, in 2021; they did not convict any labor traffickers for the third consecutive year (three in 2019). Courts also convicted 13 individuals under Articles 16.8 and 16.9; authorities did not provide sufficient detail to ascertain whether these cases featured trafficking elements according to international definitional standards. Courts reportedly sentenced 13 traffickers to terms ranging from three to five years’ imprisonment under Article 12.3; 16 traffickers were released on bail and one trafficker sentenced to up to three years’ imprisonment under Article 12.6; nine traffickers to terms ranging from one to eight years’ imprisonment under Article 13.1; and five traffickers to terms ranging from six months to three years’ imprisonment, four traffickers to fines, and four traffickers to community service under Articles 16.8 and 16.9 (compared with sentencing three traffickers to terms ranging from three to eight years’ imprisonment under Article 12.3; 10 traffickers to terms ranging from six months to 20 years’ imprisonment under Article 13.1; and four traffickers to terms ranging from six months to five years’ imprisonment under Articles 16.8 and 16.9 in 2021). Courts ordered a total of 22.46 million Mongolian tugrik (MNT) ($6,520) as restitution payments to 34 victims as part of sentencing under Articles 12.3, 13.1, and 16.8 (compared with 3.6 million MNT, or $1,050, under unspecified articles to three victims in 2021). In 2022, courts changed at least three cases initially investigated and prosecuted under Article 13.1 to prosecutions under Article 12.3, which imposed lower sentences for perpetrators once convicted under these lesser charges and frequently resulted in imprisonment in lower security prisons; in these three cases, courts sentenced four traffickers to three to five years‘ imprisonment and six traffickers to one to three years‘ imprisonment in low security prisons, and three traffickers to three to five years’ imprisonment in high security prisons. There were unverified allegations of police complicity in trafficking crimes leading to an investigation that remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In prior years, officials who facilitated or abetted forced labor crimes received administrative sanctions in lieu of criminal penalties.

Authorities continued to categorize certain crimes as trafficking based on Mongolia’s more expansive legal definitions, culminating in law enforcement data that at times included cases involving child pornography, sexual extortion, and “organizing prostitution”; some of these cases also included trafficking elements in line with international definitional standards. In recent years, due to the misconception among many government officials that traffickers only exploit women and girls crossing borders, authorities rarely used Articles 12.3 or 13.1 to prosecute cases in which traffickers targeted male victims and instead used provisions with less stringent penalties. Civil society representatives reported various judicial entities often maintained conflicting or incomplete data on anti-trafficking case registration and history.

The National Police Agency (NPA) had an anti-trafficking police unit that investigated trafficking crimes under Criminal Code Articles 12.3, 13.1, and 15.3; a separate NPA cyber-crime division was assigned to investigate crimes under Articles 16.8 and 16.9. The Prosecutor General’s Office was primarily responsible for prosecuting traffickers and had a division assigned to specialize in supervising investigations of trafficking crimes and prosecuting trafficking cases. The police and prosecutors met to discuss complex trafficking cases in order to overcome legal barriers that delayed prosecutions.

The government continued organizing, facilitating, and providing funding and in-kind support for specialized training courses for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and immigration officials on trafficking. Observers continued to describe an acute need for additional training, resources, and dedicated personnel to properly handle trafficking cases. Mongolia maintained mutual legal assistance agreements with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Russia, Thailand, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Malaysia but did not provide data on their implementation.

PROTECTION

The government increased efforts to protect victims. According to available data, police identified 56 female victims, 49 women exploited in sex trafficking and seven girls exploited in child sex trafficking. This compared with identifying 45 female victims of unspecified forms of trafficking in 2021. The seven identified girl trafficking victims younger than the age of 18 marked a decrease in the identification of child victims for the second consecutive year (14 girls younger than the age of 18 identified in 2021 and 24 in 2020). Due to a lack of formal identification procedures, authorities likely detained and arrested some unidentified trafficking victims, particularly girl sex trafficking victims. NGOs indicated victim identification and referral procedures were vague, not sufficiently systematic, and often depended largely on the awareness and initiative of individual officers. In April 2022, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP) adopted new guidelines and procedures for victim identification and referral to services; social workers and child protection workers began using the procedures. NPA investigators continued to use a victim identification checklist; however, use of this checklist was sporadic, and the process did not include screening of vulnerable groups. Additionally, district and provincial police lacked training on the checklist and local police may not have identified and referred victims to NPA investigators. Police, social workers, and labor inspectors reportedly identified 317 cases of child labor in hazardous work during joint inspections (a significant increase from one case identified in 2021), some of which may have amounted to trafficking. The government reported directly providing or referring all the children to protection services. Neither the government nor the primary service provider NGO identified any male victims for the 11th consecutive year, despite continued NGO reports of trafficking of men and boys. Authorities did not report identifying any foreign victims.

Government officials lacked training on how to identify and refer to care child victims of forced labor. Authorities at times collected discrepant data based on conflicting definitions of trafficking according to overlapping criminal code provisions, which in turn created bureaucratic challenges to supporting survivors. Redirection of human and financial resources to the pandemic response and public unrest at times negatively affected the capacity of front-line officers to identify victims of trafficking, particularly among child victims of forced labor.

The government allocated 30 million MNT ($8,710) to fund NGOs to provide shelter, psycho-social and medical care, and legal assistance. Authorities reported referring 19 child trafficking victims to government and NGO-run shelter services (compared with three children referred to government shelter services in 2021). NGOs continued to provide the vast majority of Mongolia’s limited victim services, in some cases with government assistance. NGOs reported assisting 45 sex trafficking and child sex trafficking victims, including 28 women and 17 girls. Civil society contacts expressed concern Mongolia’s complex referral system could have re-traumatized some victims due to the requirement they repeatedly recount their abuses at various stages. There were two NGO-run trafficking-specific shelters. The government operated 34 low-capacity temporary shelters and one-stop service centers for women and child victims of domestic and sexual abuse, including one NPA-operated shelter for victims of sexual violence and one temporary shelter operated by the Family, Child, and Youth Development Agency (FCYDA) for children, both of which could provide temporary shelter for trafficking victims. Authorities referred some victims from government-run shelters to NGO shelters for longer-term services. NGOs also operated two shelters for women and children escaping prostitution or sex trafficking; one of these shelters closed during the reporting period due to a security breach. There were no shelters for persons with disabilities, men, or the LGBTQI+ community. In practice, LGBTQI+ victims could receive shelter if they were minors, women, able to pass as cisgender women, and did not explicitly reveal their sexuality.

The Criminal Procedure and Law on Victim and Witness Protection provided protections for the physical security and privacy of victims and witnesses. The NPA anti-trafficking unit reported referring some trafficking victims to witness and victim protection services in 2022. Article 8.1 of the criminal procedural code included language that reportedly denied trafficking victims’ access to protective services until prosecutors had initiated cases against alleged traffickers, thereby potentially obstructing access to protective services for some victims. In prior years, some officials claimed victims could still access protection services regardless of whether relevant prosecutions had begun. Authorities did not provide victims with alternatives to speaking with law enforcement during investigations. Victims could provide testimony via video or written statements and could obtain employment and move freely within Mongolia, or leave the country pending trial proceedings; the government did not report any victims receiving these services during the reporting period. The government revised the Law on Legal Assistance to provide legal assistance to indigent and child trafficking victims. Article 15 of the anti-trafficking law entitled victims to compensation from traffickers, but officials and NGOs stated inconsistencies between the criminal code and the civil code made this provision impossible to fully implement. Mongolia’s Immigration Agency, the General Authority for Border Protection, and the Consular Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared responsibility for handling cases involving Mongolian trafficking victims abroad. The latter maintained a fund to assist Mongolian victims, but it was only available in cases involving organized crime syndicates or “grave harm” – a distinction that was unclear in application. In 2022, authorities partnered with NGOs to repatriate 12 Mongolian victims from Burma, compared with two Mongolian victims repatriated from Malaysia in 2021. Authorities did not repatriate any foreign victims in 2022 (at least one victim each to Fiji, the Philippines, and Burma in 2021).

Authorities charged sex trafficking victims with commercial sex offences committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Observers noted some victims did not self-report or testify due to fear they could face prosecution. Mongolian law did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries in which they could face retribution or hardship.

PREVENTION

The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The government did not have a NAP; the government’s most recent NAP ended in 2021. The National Sub-Council, which had directed the previous NAP, met once during 2022. The MDTF, comprising 18 government and NGO representatives, adopted a Strategic Action Plan for 2022 to combat child trafficking. The MDTF met quarterly. In September, the MDTF assessed its progress on the Strategic Action Plan; the MDTF did not make the results available to the public. In 2022, the MDTF opened three child friendly spaces in police stations and provided guidelines for their use; conducted human trafficking monitoring at Mongolia’s international airport; and, in collaboration with NGOs and the Ministry of Education, trained teachers to prevent trafficking. Civil society observers continued to call on the government to issue policy guidance or enact legislation to make the MDTF a permanent entity. The government budgeted 227.8 million MNT ($66,170) to the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA) for anti-trafficking efforts for 2022; the National Sub-Council reported providing 30 million MNT ($8,710) to NGOs, 20 million MNT ($5,810) for awareness-raising activities, and 145.5 million MNT ($42,260) for purchasing equipment for the forensic institute (the government had previously budgeted 432 million MNT [$125,460] for implementation of the former National Anti-Trafficking Program’s activities, however, 96.4 million MNT [$28,000] of this was redirected to pandemic response expenses). In conjunction with international organizations and foreign donors, the government supported and participated in three research programs to inform its anti-trafficking coordination and assess prior efforts (compared with four studies in 2021); the final results of the assessments were not finalized at the end of the reporting period. The Prosecutor General’s Office also initiated two analytic studies on trafficking case prosecutions. Officials continued to disseminate a daily trafficking-themed public service announcement on social media and television, which included a Coordination Council for Crime Prevention-directed public awareness campaign on social media.

The government funded an NGO to maintain a hotline system; the NGO identified two victims through the hotline and referred them to services. FCYDA ran another 24-hour hotline that coordinated referrals to special welfare and protection, emergency response, and shelter services for child victims. The FCYDA hotline received 9,294 calls, including six calls on possible cases of child sex trafficking and 251 calls on cases of hazardous child labor, and the FCYDA reported referring 57 percent to child protection joint teams for services; some of these cases could have featured forced labor indicators. The government did not report if any of these calls led to police investigations.

The MLSP’s General Agency for Labor and Social Welfare had the authority to monitor labor agreements for foreign nationals working in Mongolia, as well as those for Mongolians working in countries that had bilateral work agreements with Mongolia. The government maintained such agreements with the ROK and Japan; observers noted authorities did not always sufficiently implement these agreements to prevent labor abuses, including trafficking. In October, the government dissolved the General Authority for Specialized Investigation (GASI) – which had the authority to inspect labor contracts, monitor compliance with the law for all workers in Mongolia, and conduct inspections of working conditions in Mongolian formal sector establishments – and amended the Law on State Inspection to reallocate all state inspectors from GASI to their respective sectoral ministries, similar to the system in place prior to 2004. Private sector and NGO inspectors, supervised by a new Internal Monitoring Agency, conducted inspections that did not fall under specific ministries. Observers stated the new inspection process might make oversight of the smaller units more difficult and assessed this change led to fewer formal labor inspections during 2022. NGOs noted funding and resources for the inspectors were too low to provide comprehensive oversight. The government reported conducting 39 formal child labor inspections and 1,835 preventative assessments during 2022 but did not report formally referring any child victims of forced labor cases for investigation. Labor laws gave inspectors “unrestricted access to legal entities, organizations, and workplaces which are subject to inspection without prior notice,” however, the law still required inspectors to give employers two days’ advance notification before conducting an inspection in some cases, raising concerns employers could conceal violations in the interim. The labor law contained a provision outlining inspections without prior notification, but the government did not report implementing it in 2022. Labor laws explicitly prohibited labor agents from charging workers recruitment fees, confiscating workers’ identity or travel documentation, switching their contracts without consent, or garnishing or withholding their wages as collateral; authorities did not report information on implementation of these provisions.

TRAFFICKING PROFILE:

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Mongolia, and they exploit victims from Mongolia abroad. Traffickers may also use Mongolia as a transit point to exploit foreign individuals in sex trafficking and forced labor in Russia and the PRC prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. From January 2020 to January 2023, the Mongolia-PRC border closed to passenger and pedestrian traffic due to pandemic-related mitigation polices; during this time, observers reported transnational trafficking decreased and domestic trafficking reportedly increased. As of March 2023, most restrictions on border travel have been lifted but volume remains limited. Most sex trafficking of Mongolian victims from rural and poor economic areas occurs in Ulaanbaatar, provincial centers, and border areas. A 2018 civil society survey found domestic violence drives the vast majority of Mongolian trafficking victims to seek and accept unsafe employment opportunities on which traffickers prey; this vulnerability reportedly increased as a result of state-ordered residential quarantines during the pandemic. During periods of pandemic-related business closures, clandestine sex trafficking in private residences reportedly increased, including through the use of blackmail on social media as a coercive method. Traffickers exploit women and girls in sex trafficking in Mongolian hotels, massage parlors, illegal brothels, bars, and karaoke clubs, as well as in outdoor urban areas, sometimes through the lack of enforcement of local police. Traffickers often utilize online platforms to lure, groom, or blackmail Mongolian children into domestic sex trafficking. LGBTQI+ individuals are vulnerable to trafficking amid widespread discrimination that often jeopardizes their employment status and complicates their access to justice. Transgender women in particular are at higher risk of sex trafficking due to pervasive social stigma barring them from employment in the formal sector. Mongolian communities experiencing widespread unemployment due to the pandemic – especially women and informal sector workers – were more vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor. Tourists from Japan and the ROK reportedly engaged in child sex tourism in Mongolia in prior years; some civil society groups believe this practice persists, however pandemic-related flight restrictions and public health requirements likely limited the number of tourists traveling to Mongolia for child sex tourism between January 2020 and January 2023.

The ongoing development of the mining industry in southern Mongolia continues to drive growing internal migration, intensifying trafficking vulnerabilities. Prior to the pandemic, this was especially the case along the PRC-Mongolia border, but stringent border restrictions severely limited movement across the border between January 2020 and January 2023. Truck drivers transporting coal across the PRC border in Omnogovi Province who do not own their trucks are vulnerable to labor traffickers due to an arrangement under which employers confiscate their passports as collateral for their vehicles. Prior to pandemic-related Mongolia-PRC border closures in January 2020, coal drivers often waited in truck lines with minimal sleep, heating, or access to basic needs for weeks or months at a time until they received permission to cross and make deliveries in the PRC, where PRC-national employers and customers imposed wage deductions for the delays; this loss of income reportedly made them further vulnerable to labor exploitation. The families of coal transporters who were delayed at the border, who were injured, or who died as a result of the poor working conditions may also be vulnerable to sex trafficking due to ensuing economic hardships. Traffickers exploit women and girls in sex trafficking in these truck lines, along the coal transport roads connecting mining sites to the PRC border, at nightlife establishments in mining towns, and, in previous years, at entertainment sites across the border in Inner Mongolia. Mining workers sometimes leave their children at home alone while on extended shift rotations, during which time the children are at elevated risk of sex trafficking. Sex trafficking and child forced labor also occur in connection with artisanal mining. Some men in predominantly ethnic Kazakh regions of western Mongolia subject local women and girls to abduction and forced marriage as part of a cultural practice known as Ala kachuu, or “grab and run”; some of these forced marriages may feature corollary sex trafficking or forced labor elements. Traffickers force some children to beg, steal, or work in other informal sectors of the Mongolian economy, such as horseracing, herding and animal husbandry, scavenging in garbage dumpsites, and construction. Some Mongolian families are complicit in exploiting children in sex trafficking and forced labor.

Traffickers exploit Mongolian men, women, and children in forced labor and sex trafficking in the PRC, ROK, Türkiye as well as other countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Officials believe Türkiye may be rising in prevalence as a destination country due to visa-free travel regimes, the availability of direct flights, and shifts in migration trends following the pandemic-related closure of the PRC border. Traffickers sometimes use drugs, fraudulent social networking, online job opportunities, or English language programs to lure Mongolian victims into sex trafficking abroad. Traffickers have forced Mongolian girls to work as contortionists – often under contractual agreements signed by their parents – primarily in Mongolia and Türkiye, and to a lesser extent in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Prior to the pandemic-related Mongolia-PRC border closure, Mongolian boys were at high risk of forced labor and sex trafficking under visa regimes that enable them to work indefinitely as horse jockeys and circus performers across the PRC border, provided they return with a chaperone once a month; this frequent facilitated transit also makes them more vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers compelled women and girls to work in domestic service and engage in commercial sex acts after entering into commercially brokered marriages with men from the PRC and, to a lesser extent, the ROK. PRC-based companies hired Mongolian men and boys to work at agricultural operations for compensation far below minimum wage and under ambiguous immigration status, placing them at high risk of trafficking. Some micro-lending institutions in the PRC reportedly retained Mongolians’ passports as a form of collateral, leaving them vulnerable to immigration status-related coercion.

While pandemic-related border closures greatly limited the presence of foreign workers, PRC national workers employed in Mongolia are vulnerable to trafficking as contract laborers in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, wholesale and retail trade, automobile maintenance, and mining. In prior years, some of them experienced contract switching when they entered the country, making them especially vulnerable to coercion due to ensuing immigration violations. When the border was open, some Russian and Ukrainian women entering Mongolia through PRC border crossings for short periods under visa-free regimes may have been sex trafficking victims. Observers report corruption among some Mongolian officials impedes the government’s anti-trafficking efforts.

FUJIFILM Corporation (President and CEO, Representative Director: Teiichi Goto) announces the upcoming opening of a new "NURA" health screening center focusing on cancer and lifestyle diseases screening in Mongolia.

The opening of the center follows the conclusion of a technology partnership contract between the Fujifilm subsidiary FUJIFILM DKH LLP, which operates three NURA centers in India, and Tavan Bogd Group, a Mongolian conglomerate. Under the partnership contract, the Tavan Bogd Group will open a NURA health screening center in Ulaanbaatar on September 17, 2023.

By expanding its health screening service business, Fujifilm aims to contribute toward the early detection of cancer and lifestyle diseases in emerging countries. The new NURA center in Mongolia will be the first center opened under a technology partnership contract.

Exterior of the new NURA

CT scan at NURA

In Mongolia, cancer and lifestyle diseases such as ischemic heart disease are leading causes of death*1. The number of patients dying or falling critically ill as a result of these diseases can be reduced through early disease detection followed by appropriate treatment and health guidance. However, health screening services in Mongolia are not as widely available as in Japan, which frequently makes it difficult to detect diseases in their early stages.

Fujifilm will share its expertise it has gained from operating NURA centers in India with the Tavan Bogd Group that has worked with Fujifilm in its photo imaging business since 1995. Fujifilm and the Tavan Bogd Group will work together to create an environment that supports the delivery of high-quality screening services in Mongolia and contribute to the early detection of cancer and lifestyle diseases in Mongolia. In addition, Fujifilm and the Tavan Bogd Group will work to promote the adoption of a health screening culture in Mongolia.

About "NURA" health screening center

Fujifilm has been providing health screening services in India, with three NURA centers in the cities of Bengaluru, Gurugram and Mumbai, which were opened in 2021, 2022, and 2023 respectively. NURA utilizes Fujifilm's medical devices including CT scan and mammography system, as well as medical IT system based on AI technology that are designed to support doctors carry out screening and tests for cancer and lifestyle diseases. The convenience of completing all checks in just about 120 minutes and hearing results directly from a doctor while viewing diagnostic images has been highly acclaimed, and NURA has already been used by about 12,000 people.

Fujifilm will continue to establish new NURA health screening centers in emerging countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, working where necessary in partnership with other companies where effective. Through NURA centers equipped with Fujifilm's medical devices and AI-based medical IT system that provides interpretation assistance to doctors, Fujifilm will continue to provide high-quality services to an increasing number of people, thereby contributing to advancement of global health and maintaining and promoting people's health.

*1 Source: “Global Health Estimates: Life expectancy and leading causes of death and disability” on WHO website.

Mongolia’s nomadic culture has deep historical roots. Even those who are not familiar with modern Mongolia will recognize the name Chinggis Khaan (also spelled Genghis Khan) and the Mongol Empire. Today, however, as Mongolia strives to modernize, its nomadic history and activities require international protection so that the younger generation continues to understand their own roots.

In recognition of the 20th anniversary of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Mongolia organized the World Festival of Nomadic Culture in the Taij Khairkhan Valley last month. The festival attracted over 1,100 modern nomads, local artists, and craftsmen from 21 provinces of Mongolia. International representatives from China, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Hungary made the festival more vibrant and international.

Moreover, during the multi-day festival, UNESCO, the Institute for Central Asian Studies, the International Training Center for Intangible Cultural Heritage for the Asia-Pacific, and other organizations joined a consultative meeting for the adoption of the “Nomadic Living Heritage Safeguarding Declaration.”

Since the 1990s, Mongolia’s modernization process has posed a challenge to traditional nomadic lifestyles. As the younger generation continues to seek urban and technology-dependent lifestyles, nomadic aspirations were left to the very few – mostly of interest to historians, anthropologists, and archaeologists.

At the same time, Mongolia has established a system to preserve what is nomadic and culturally linked with the Mongol civilization with the help of UNESCO.

Since 2003, Mongolia has registered cultural artifacts and activities that are closely tied to the country’s nomadic history. Morin khuur, a horse-headed fiddle; biyelgee, a folk dance; and historic epic stories known as tuuli have all been registered on UNESCO’s List of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

Celebrations of nomadic culture play a crucial role in Mongolia’s effort to develop and modernize while preserving its history intact. Moreover, there an economic incentives to preserving Mongolian traditional culture. Alicia Campi, a leading Mongolian studies scholar, said that Mongols “have promoted the marketing value of these traditions to domestic and foreign audiences.”

UNESCO programs not only help Mongolia preserve cultural traditions that are closely linked to Mongol identity, but they also serve immediate protection for the environment. Given the close connection between nomadic culture and the environment, conservation is a particularly crucial step in preserving Mongolian traditions.

Government-protected mountains, ovoos, and lakes such as Burkhan Khaldun, Altan Ovoo, Orkhon Valley, and Uvs Lake Basin are protected as intangible heritage sites, a status that also grants them environmental protection. As Mongolia’s economy is heavily dependent on mining activities, the protection of these culturally and historically significant sites is a strategic move on the part of policymakers. Such preservation also marks an important milestone for Mongolia’s environmentalists, whose largest concerns directly connect to bad mining practices.

But there is much more to be done. According to the International Union of Conservation for Nature, “A total of 852 rivers, 1181 lakes and 2277 springs [in Mongolia] have gone dry because of irresponsible use of the land and natural resources. These impacts are likely to be further exacerbated by proposed new water transfer projects that are being built to supply water to mining operations.”

As Mongolia becomes more and more modernized and internationally recognized, cross-cultural activities and trends will branch out from the country’s nomadic roots. But as Mongolia continues to build a sense of national identity on its nomadic history, annual festivities and cultural activities that incorporate nomadic elements are deemed necessary – whether it’s for a domestic or foreign audience.

Hence, events like the World Festival of Nomadic Culture showcase Mongolia’s centuries-old nomadic culture to a very modernized audience. The exhibits of traditional arts and crafts, the gathering of local artists, and the practice of activities listed in the Intangible Cultural Heritage are both culturally and economically relevant.

In contrast to the many countries in the world with a historical memory based on settled civilization, nomadic traditions are often lost. Cultural elements that have shaped the history of many once-nomadic countries have been forgotten. From a cultural perspective, this explains the significance of Mongolia’s annual holidays and festivals such as Naadam, Tsagaan Sar, and the World Festival of Nomadic Culture.

This summer, Mongolia saw an increasing flow of tourists, especially during the summer Naadam festival in July, followed by the 100th anniversary of individual provinces. The current administration’s strategy, to combine Mongolia’s nomadic history with the tourism sector is both culturally and economically linked. In the next two years, Mongolia hopes to attract up to 1 million tourists per year.

GUEST AUTHOR

Bolor Lkhaajav

Bolor Lkhaajav is a researcher specializing in Mongolia, China, Russia, Japan, East Asia, and the Americas. She holds an M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies from the University of San Francisco.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved a $150 million loan to improve the efficiency and safety of road transport in Mongolia.

The Regional Road Development and Maintenance Project (Phase 3) will improve state road network sections between aimag (province) capitals in Western Mongolia focusing on Altai (Gobi-Altai) to Uliastai (Zavkhan) and Khovd (Khovd) to Ulaangom (Uvs) to enhance local and regional connectivity.

“The Western region particularly suffers from slow growth because of its remoteness from the country’s political and economic centers, and unpaved state roads connecting aimag capitals,” said ADB Senior Transport Specialist Nicolas Dei Castelli. “Aside from improving road conditions, the project will strengthen sustainable and climate-resilient road maintenance practices, and road safety.”

Land transport and development of a road network are challenging in Mongolia because of long distances and severe weather. Poor road conditions, especially in the rural areas, restrict access to markets, education, and services which worsens poverty and inequality. In addition, out of Mongolia’s 111,943-kilometer (km) road network, only 10,242 km are paved. The road network is vulnerable to extreme weather events such as flooding and landslides, which make roads and bridges impassable for long periods.

The project will support Mongolia in its effort to promote inclusive economic growth by providing all-weather road access, reducing transport costs, and increasing access to services and economic opportunities for residents and businesses in the Western region. It also aims to strengthen road safety, maintenance, and climate resilience through upgrading sections of the state road network and improving road asset management and road safety.

The project’s total cost is $158 million, with $8 million in counterpart financing from the government. It is expected to be completed in 2029.

ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 68 members—49 from the region.

Secretary (East) in Ministry of External Affairs Saurabh Kumar, who is on a visit to Mongolia, had productive discussion with Mongolian Minister of Education and Science L. Enkh-Amgalan in Ulaanbaatar yesterday.

They discussed bilateral projects and cooperation in areas of education, IT, skilling and capacity building. They also witnessed the signing of contract for the construction of India-Mongolia Friendship Secondary School.

Mr Kumar also met State Secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia N. Ankhbayar. They reviewed bilateral relations, took stock of Indian projects, and exchanged views to further strengthen India-Mongolia Strategic Partnership.

Discussions covered cooperation in areas including development partnership, education, IT, hydrocarbons, renewable energy, security and defence, connectivity, minerals and capacity building.

Russia's aggression and China's turbulence cast shadows over Mongolia, scaring away investors wary of geopolitical risk. But behind the uncertainty lies massive opportunity in minerals, tourism, and beyond. The question is, can Mongolia implement the reforms needed to capitalize on its potential while navigating a complex region?

18 months into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war shows no signs of abating. While the Ukrainian Armed Forces conduct a counteroffensive against Russian defensive lines, Moscow remains embroiled in internal conflict as Putin seeks to reassert his strength following an armed mutiny in June.

Meanwhile, all is not well in China. Numerous headlines (including here in Mongolia Weekly) speak of an economic downturn and structural malaise. A real estate market crisis, high youth unemployment, high debt levels in local government, and demographic challenges were recently summarised by US President Joe Biden as a ‘ticking time bomb’. In the eyes of China watchers, these challenges have been mounting for a number of years and are now beginning to manifest openly.

When faced with these sorts of challenges, autocrats can tend towards diversionary foreign policy – they engage in external conflicts to distract their populations from internal problems. As Russia weakens, Putin has become more belligerent; as China weakens, Xi Jinping may take the same approach.

This bears great risks for Mongolia. A small nation between two unstable powers is in a precarious position. In the short term, the country’s newly-elevated geopolitical risk profile is lowering foreign direct investment. In the long term, this may make Mongolia poorer as it walks a geopolitical tightrope.

Risk aversion

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, a number of foreign companies (though notably not all) began to divest themselves of their Russian assets. One of the most famous was McDonalds, which had entered Russia to great fanfare in 1990 and made an equally poignant exit in May 2022.

The financial consequences were significant. The Financial Times estimated a loss of 100 billion euros across 600 European multinationals; Renault, as an example, lost 2.2 billion euros. But energy firms were the most affected. BP was estimated to lose 22 billion euros on exiting Russia. Similarly, Shell lost $4.2 billion in assets, including $1.6 billion on its stake in the Sakhalin-2 project after it was nationalised by the Russian government, though it may still receive a payout following Moscow’s sale of the asset.

Geopolitical risk is clearly a major consideration and potentially the source of great losses, even for some of the world’s largest companies. And for foreign investors, Mongolia’s geopolitical risk profile has undoubtedly increased following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

One business executive told Mongolia Weekly that instability in Russia and China made Mongolia’s position ‘far worse’ for attracting capital: “10 years ago Shell might have entered Mongolia – now there’s no chance. Would Rio Tinto open Oyu Tolgoi if it was discovered now? I think that’s a 50/50.”

These risks are only compounded by the long-standing difficulty of doing business in Mongolia, from an anti-investor tax environment, opaque approval processes and investment laws to coal-smuggling.

Consequently, the Mongolian government faces an up-hill battle to attract foreign capital. Whilst Ulaanbaatar can’t alter the trajectories of Moscow or Beijing, it can (with enough political willpower) alter its own trajectory, which means engaging in meaningful reforms to improve the ease of doing business.

Opportunities investing in Mongolia

Whilst its neighbours undoubtedly present Mongolia with significant challenges, there is also an opportunity to build on the Third Neighbour policy and leverage Mongolia’s unique strategic circumstances.

Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai’s recent visit to the United States is a good example of this. A joint statement released after meeting US Vice President Kamala Harris promised greater economic and security cooperation, as well as development assistance. An economic roadmap heralds cooperation across a range of different sectors, including digital literacy, aviation and more, which could diversify Mongolia’s economy (particularly through inbound tourism). Critical minerals have been a key area of focus in recent MOUs between Mongolia and a diverse group of third neighbours, ranging from the US, Korea and European countries.

Security cooperation is also increasingly critical, and is a vital communication avenue for Mongolia into Washington and beyond.

Yet the agreements signed in the US and with others will still require Mongolia to engage in the kind of meaningful reforms necessary to off-set its geopolitical risk, including transparency in approval processes and investment laws. To truly navigate the challenges posed by its neighbours, the country will have to demonstrate that it can strike a different path and learn from the leading mining jurisdictions.

What are top 20 mining jurisdictions in the world?

According to Fraser’s Investment Attractiveness Index:

Nevada (USA)

Western Australia (Australia)

Saskatchewan (Canada)

Newfoundland & Labrador (Canada)

Colorado (USA)

Northern Territory (Australia)

Arizona (USA)

Quebec (Canada)

South Australia (Australia)

Botswana

Alaska (USA)

Ontario (Canada)

Queensland (Australia)

Manitoba (Canada)

British Columbia (Canada)

Morocco

Utah (USA)

Montana (USA)

San Juan (Argentina)

Yukon (Canada)

While Mongolia has a relatively low corporate tax rate of 25%, its mining royalties and value-added tax policies result in a high overall effective tax rate (ETR) for mining projects. Specifically, the ETR reaches approximately 60% for copper and 47% for gold, positioning Mongolia among the highest tax regimes globally for mining. An independent report by Richard Schodde, funded by the Australian government, underlines the importance of an optimal tax structure.

A 100% tax rate stifles mine development, whereas a 0% rate leads to prolific mining but negligible government revenue. Mongolia must find the right balance to attract mining investment without forfeiting fiscal income.

By Ewen Levick | Melbourne

On September 8, 2023, Foreign Minister of Mongolia Battsetseg Batmunkh attended a celebratory event hosted by the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Mongolia, commemorating the 75th founding anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. During the Event, the Foreign Minister extended her congratulations and best wishes.

Foreign Minister Battsetseg emphasized that this year marks the 75th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the 35th anniversary of the visit of North Korean Leader Kim Il Sung to Mongolia. She also expressed Mongolia's commitment to steadily develop further the traditional friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries.

Member of the State Great Khural and Chairman of the Mongolia-North Korea Friendship Group in the State Great Khural P. Anujin, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Mongolia E. Odbayar, Education, Science, and Technology Policy Advisor to the President of Mongolia Ch. Lodoiravsal, political and social figures, diplomats, and representatives of friendship associations and non-governmental organizations were present at the celebratory Event.