The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Mongolia and Japan entered into force in June 2016 and has been implemented since 2017. The Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MNCCI) intends to develop a recommendation on improving the Agreement's implementation and submit it to the relevant state authorities of the two countries. As part of this initiative, MNCCI organized a discussion on November 13, 2024, to resolve the challenges faced by businesses in implementing the EPA.

Under the Economic Partnership Agreement, Mongolia agreed to lower import customs tariffs on approximately 5,700 types of goods in 97 groups, while Japan committed to reducing tariffs on about 9,300 types of goods in 97 groups. Since the agreement entered into force in June 2016, Mongolia has exempted customs taxes on 59 percent of these imported goods (3,429 types) and Japan on 86 percent (8,000 types). However, statistical data indicates that Mongolia's export types and quantities have not significantly increased.

Ts. Tsend-Ayush, Executive Director of the Woolen Handicrafts Support Center NGO, said, “We have been exporting felt slippers to Japan for more than 10 years, but the trade has not been expanded. The main reason is the discrepancy in HS codes. Even though felt is exempted, felt slippers are not exempted as a product for shoes and footwear. If the code issue is resolved, the export of felt products to Japan can expand.”

Executive Director of the Association of Non-Mining Exporters Ch. Nergui emphasized, “There has been no significant progress in trade between the two countries. Though eight years have passed since the agreement was signed, Mongolia has been still exporting only a few types of goods, including wool and wool products that we used to export. The businesses of Mongolia and the MNCCI should critically examine the reasons for this stagnation. Considering the cultural differences between Mongolia and Japan, it would be more effective to export products specifically tailored to the Japanese market. Rather than promoting sea buckthorn's health benefits to a nation with millennia-old tea culture, it would be more appealing to develop tea products that align with Japanese culture while incorporating Mongolian elements."

The proposals made by the participants will be presented at a meeting of the Mongolia-Japan Joint Subcommittee on November 27, 2024, to discuss the implementation, improvement, and reduction of trade and tariff barriers of the Agreement.

Since the establishment of the Vietnam-Mongolia diplomatic ties on November 17, 1954, the traditional friendship between the two countries has been continuously strengthened and grown.

Mongolia was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and Vietnam was the first country in Southeast Asia with which Mongolia set up diplomatic ties.

Just one year after the establishment of the diplomatic relations, President Ho Chi Minh made his first visit to Mongolia in July 1955, part of his first overseas trip following the restoration of peace in North Vietnam.

President Ho Chi Minh’s visit and the subsequent Vietnam visit by Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in September 1959, were of great significance to the two peoples, laying the foundation for their traditional friendship.

On their path of national construction and development, the two countries have closely collaborated in many areas, offering each other wholehearted and selfless support.

The two countries’ high-ranking leaders have maintained regular mutual visits, contributing to consolidating political trust and enhancing the bilateral ties.

Vietnam and Mongolia have also maintained the political consultation mechanism at the deputy foreign minister level established in 2002, and the intergovernmental committee on economic-trade and scientific-technical cooperation.

They have cooperated closely and supported each other at regional and multilateral forums, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other regional organizations. This relationship is driven by their shared interests in peace, development, and stability.

The year 2024 marks a milestone in the relationship with the state visit to Mongolia by Party General Secretary and President To Lam (now Party General Secretary To Lam) on September 30 and October 1. This visit, which coincided with the 70th anniversary of the diplomatic relations, opened a new chapter in the traditional friendship.

During this visit, the high-ranking leaders of the two countries agreed to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership and continue to expand collaboration.

On this occasion, the leaders witnessed the signing of seven cooperation agreements between various ministries, agencies, and localities.

The economic, trade, and investment cooperation has made progress, with the two-way trade turnover increasing to USD 132 million in 2023 from only USD 41.4 million in 2017 and USD 85 million in 2022. In the first seven months of 2024, it reached USD 65.5 million. The two countries aim to raise the bilateral trade value to USD 200 million in the near future.

According to experts, the relationship has been growing and ample room remains for the two sides to expand their cooperation, especially in economy, trade, and agriculture. In the economic sphere, they should focus on areas of strength such as mining, steel production, and the import and export of agricultural products, processed foods, and livestock products.

Agriculture is also a promising area for cooperation, experts said, suggesting the two countries exchange technology, experience, and products in this field.

The two sides have signed a series of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to establish a legal framework for cooperation activities, including the MoU on economic and trade cooperation in 2021, one on agricultural cooperation in 2022, and another on sustainable rice trade cooperation in 2023.

Notably, during the Vietnam visit by Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh last year, the two countries inked an agreement on visa exemption for holders of diplomatic, official, and ordinary passports, facilitating travel and trade between the two countries’ people.

Strides have also been seen in collaboration in culture, tourism, education and people-to-people exchange.- (VNA/VLLF)

Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai was in China last week for a working visit centered around attending the 7th China International Import Expo. It was his third visit to China as prime minister, following trips in February 2022 and June 2023, but his first visit to Shanghai.

Oyun-Erdene’s latest visit to China aimed to promote his government’s digital transformation plan, covering areas such as 5G, intelligent transportation, and green energy; cultivating professional talent, and promoting technological innovation and economic modernization. The hope is that cooperation with China will promote the transformation of Mongolia’s high-tech industry.

However, China-Mongolia relations are not all smooth sailing at the moment. Although Oyun-Erdene is trying his best to improve relations between Mongolia and China, he will face many political challenges in the near future.

Before analyzing Oyun-Erdene’s visit to China, we should first review the trip to Ulaanbaatar made by China’s Vice President Han Zheng in September. After attending the 9th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, Han visited Mongolia for three days. Just days prior, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had also visited Mongolia. When Han met with Mongolian politicians, he put forward five suggestions for the development of China-Mongolia relations in the next stage, including deepening cooperation among China, Mongolia, and Russia.

Since then, the two countries have had frequent exchanges, including a prime minister-level China-Mongolia-Russia trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council of Heads of Government meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan. Two days after that, Liu Jianchao, the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department who is sometimes called “China’s shadow foreign minister,” met with Oyun-Erdene, who was passing through Beijing on his way back from the SCO meeting in Pakistan.

On the occasion of celebrating the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and China this year, Oyun-Erdene made his trip to Shanghai less than three weeks later. His latest visit seeks to strengthen the strong bilateral relationship between the two countries, especially on the economic front.

For 25 consecutive years, China has been Mongolia’s largest trading partner globally. In 2023, total trade with China was valued at $16.59 billion, contributing around 70 percent of Mongolia’s global trade. As of September 2024, the recorded total trade was $13.83 billion, according to statistics from China – on par to surpass last year’s total.

Oyun-Erdene’s latest trip to China had a decided focus on trade. The Mongolian prime minister took part in the opening ceremony of the China International Import Expo in Shanghai. The annual multi-sectoral event offers opportunities for expanding trade and economic relations with foreign partners and introducing national products to international markets. The opening ceremony of the international exhibition was also attended by China’s Premier Li Qiang, as well as the prime ministers of Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Uzbekistan.

In his speech at the CIIE opening on November 6, Oyun-Erdene said that Mongolia “actively participates in this expo as a platform to enhance economic ties with not only neighboring China but also with other countries.” He noted Mongolia’s economy was undergoing “three key transitions”: integrating AI, digital, and smart technologies; transitioning to “green development;” and a human resources transition “to plan for Mongolia’s future growth.” He emphasized the importance of strengthening cooperation between states in achieving these goals through the development of barrier-free trade, e-commerce, transport and logistics, as well as the introduction of advanced AI technologies.

On November 5, the day before the CIIE opening, Oyun-Erdene met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. In their meeting, the Mongolian delegation conveyed President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa’s greetings to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Xi reciprocated with warm wishes for Khurelsukh. Both sides acknowledged the strong strategic partnership between their nations, built upon the reliable and friendly relations between the two presidents. Notably, however, Xi has not visited Mongolia since 2014, despite hopes he would make a trip this year to celebrate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Trade and economic cooperation featured prominently in the discussions between Oyun-Erdene and Li. With trade between Mongolia and China totaling about $17 billion in 2023, both leaders expressed confidence in achieving their goal of raising this figure to $20 billion.

While Oyun-Erdene was in China, the two sides signed eight cooperation documents, including a loan agreement for the Erdeneburen hydropower plant in Mongolia’s western region and an agreement on joint construction of the Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod cross-border railway. Both are high priority projects for Mongolia that have been stalled for years. Additionally, Oyun-Erdene and Li explored cooperation in other sectors, including green energy, telecommunications, mining, agriculture, IT, education, tourism, and cultural exchanges. Oyun-Erdene noted that cooperation between Mongolia and China should be expanded as a model to other countries.

While in Shanghai and Zhejiang, the Mongolia delegation met with Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng and Wang Hao, deputy secretary of the CCP’s Zhejiang Provincial Committee and governor of Zhejiang province. Mongolia’s delegations also met with executives from prominent Chinese companies like China Energy Group, Alibaba Group, and Huawei, one of the leading companies in technology research and development.

In particular the Mongolian government has agreed to cooperate with Huawei in making its digital transition, including learning new technology practices, building smart cities, and training young professionals in the digital energy and other technology sectors. The two parties established a joint working group – to headed by the minister of Digital development, innovation, and communications – to cooperate in the areas of 5G systems, smart transport, smart traffic, and green energy.

Curiously, Oyun-Erdene brought along nine government ministers (including three deputy prime ministers) and over 10 members of the State Great Khural, Mongolia’s parliament, during his visit to China. It seems that Oyun-Erdene went to Shanghai with half of the Mongolian government personnel, a rare scene.

The Chinese cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou certainly are attractive destinations for Mongolian businesses engaged in international trade, but that itself doesn’t explain why Oyun-Erdene brought along so many domestic politicians – including the leaders of every political party represented in the State Great Khural. There were other reasons behind the large delegation.

First, this indicates Mongolia’s political sincerity. After the parliamentary election in late June of this year, the ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) saw the size of its majority shrink. In acknowledgement of the change, Oyun-Erdene, who is chairman of the MPP, issued an invitation to the other political parties holding seats, hoping to form a coalition government. On July 8, the MPP and the two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Party and the Hun Party, jointly signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to form a coalition government.

After forming a new national unity government, then, Oyun-Erdene is taking care to involve all the various political parties in relations with China. He must be conscious that the longevity of the newly formed coalition government depends on Mongolia’s economic health – and that, in turn, largely hinges on how Mongolia and China engage in economic and trade cooperation. In the recent past, Mongolia has been somewhat frustrated by border closures impacting China-Mongolia trade and a lack of progress on big-ticket cooperation projects. Overcoming these issues is a priority for the Mongolian government given the outsized importance of China in Mongolia’s trade.

In addition, Oyun-Erdene is carefully managing relationships with other parties in a bid to avoid domestic political struggles over the 2025 national government budget. Mongolia’s government budget plan for next year, including controversial topics like export revenue, public investment, and domestic social stability, has the potential to trigger a political crisis.

The domestic politics of Mongolia and the relationship between Mongolia and China will both continue to warrant close observation moving forward.

BY Sumiya Chuluunbaatar

Sumiya Chuluunbaatar is an economist and expert on international issues. Sumiya is currently working as a non-resident fellow at the Institute of International Studies, Mongolian Academy of Sciences.

Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh has proposed global efforts to promote sustainable rangelands, the presidential press office said on Wednesday.

Khurelsukh made the proposal at the ongoing 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan.

"At a time when climate change is accelerating due to both natural forces and human activities, negatively impacting sustainable development, livelihoods, and human well-being worldwide, it is crucial that we strengthen our political leadership, collective efforts, and actions," Khurelsukh said.

Mongolia made the proposal to address the adverse effects of climate change on countries that rely on traditional pastoralism, Khurelsukh said.

Mongolia has fully supported collective efforts of the international community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance carbon sinks, and reaffirmed its commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Paris Agreement, he added.

In a Cabinet meeting today, Ts.Baatarkhuu, the Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Communications, announced significant decisions to enhance Mongolia's cyber security and address cyber crime threats.

The Minister emphasized the importance of establishing a comprehensive system for cybersecurity across all organizations with critical information infrastructure, beyond addressing isolated cases like the recent cyber issues faced by Intermed Hospital. Mongolia currently ranks 103rd on the United Nations Cybersecurity Index, receiving commendations in legal criteria but struggling with technical capabilities and international cooperation.

In order to address these gaps, the Cabinet has decided that organizations storing critical data will now be required to employ dedicated cyber security specialists. The Minister also confirmed that nine servers from Intermed Hospital were hacked recently, and restoration efforts are ongoing.

At today’s parliamentary session, discussions continued on amendments to the Nuclear Energy Law. The initial reading took place last week, and yesterday, the Standing Committee on Security and Foreign Policy reviewed the proposed changes. MP Ts. Davaasuren put forward a proposal to set a 9% royalty (known as AMNAT) on projects involving the extraction and processing of radioactive minerals.

Most committee members supported this suggestion. However, Minister of Industry and Minerals Ts. Tuvaan warned that if a 9% royalty is enforced, negotiations on the Investment Agreement with France's Orano Group could be halted. The agreement would establish the legal framework needed to operate the Mongolian-French joint Zuuvch-Ovoo uranium project.

Former Prime Minister S. Bayar criticized the proposal on Twitter, warning, "Hiding poor intentions and personal interests behind patriotic phrases like ‘Don’t betray your country’ is a familiar tactic. This Ts. Davaasuren has pushed through support for a ‘9% royalty’ that doesn’t exist in global uranium practice. Remember, fellow Mongolians, with this, foreign investment will stop. Later, Davaasuren will likely say, ‘I did this for our people.’ This was also the case with Oyu Tolgoi, do you recall what was said then?"

MP P. Sainzorig stated that the global average royalty for uranium mining is 3-5%, whereas Mongolia’s rate could reach 14%, and even up to 19% if prices increase, equating to discouraging investment in the country. He emphasized that a working group should provide a clear answer on this issue.

Finance Minister B. Javkhlan clarified that 65% of the AMNAT collected would go to the Future Heritage Fund, with 35% allocated to the Local Development Fund, which could significantly boost local development if the project succeeds.

MP B. Purevdorj noted that the global average AMNAT for uranium is around 5.5%, with Kazakhstan, which has the largest uranium reserves, applying a 6% rate, while Australia, Canada, and Nigeria each set 5%, and Uzbekistan sets 8%.

The draft law classifies royalties on radioactive mineral resources based on market prices, ranging from $0 to $130, with rates set at 0-9%. Three types of AMNAT have been defined: base, incremental, and special, with incremental rates applying only if the market price exceeds $50 per pound.

Translated by ChatGPT

The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Mongolia. Committee Experts commended Mongolia for its commitment to abolishing the death penalty, while raising questions on the State’s interrogation rooms and extradition agreements.

Huawen Liu, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee commended Mongolia for its commitment to abolishing the death penalty by ratifying and upholding the obligations under the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Naoko Maeda, Vice-Chairperson and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee welcomed the efforts of the State party to ensure interrogation rooms had closed-circuit televisions and video and audio equipment to ensure that interrogations were recorded; and that recordings were kept for at least six months. What was the State party’s strategy to ensure that equipment for recording interrogation was available throughout the country? Mr. Liu also asked if the State party could respond to reports that video recordings of interrogations, in practice, were deleted after 14 days.

Ms. Maeda also asked what kinds of elements were considered as risks of torture in extradition agreements. How was the right to appeal to courts against deportation, extradition or expulsion orders guaranteed? Could Mongolia inform of any extradition agreements concluded with other States parties?

The delegation said the police department had equipped 849 interrogation rooms to comply with the standards required, including for lighting and ventilation. Surveillance records were required to be kept for three to six months. The State was currently reviewing this process, with the aim to keep surveillance videos from between six months to one year. There was a clear need to increase the number of interrogation rooms.

The delegation also said Mongolia had concluded several multilateral and bilateral extradition agreements. Sixteen agreements had been concluded on bilateral cases. The State took into account the risk of torture when coming to a final decision of extradition. During 2024, five extradition requests had been received from foreign countries. One request was denied. Mongolia had put forward 16 requests to other countries, of which six were satisfied and the rest were denied or remained without any answer.

Introducing the report, N. Myagmar, State Secretary, Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs and head of the delegation, said Mongolia had achieved several major milestones since the report was submitted. The Law on the National Human Rights Commission had been revised in line with the Paris Principles to ensure the Commission’s independent status, sufficient financial resources and to ensure it could act efficiently to resolve complaints of torture, and to establish the National Preventive Mechanism. The rule on the conditions of detention facilities addressed hot and cold water supply, sewerage systems, natural light, ventilation, sanitary and hygiene and essential infrastructure required to sustain a healthy and safe environment for detainees.

In closing remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for engaging in the dialogue with a constructive spirit. The Committee had a follow-up procedure, which aimed to continue to facilitate a dialogue between Mongolia and the Committee.

In his closing remarks, Mr. Myagmar said the Committee’s recommendations had great importance and would serve to ensure the fulfilment of Mongolia commitments within the framework of the Convention.

The delegation of Mongolia consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Protection; the Independent Authority against Corruption; the General Prosecutors Office; the General Executive Agency of Court Decision; the National Police Agency; the General Intelligence Agency; the Immigration Agency; and the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Mongolia at the end of its eighty-first session on 22 November. Those and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage. Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

The Committee will next meet in public on Thursday, 14 November to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Report

The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Mongolia (CAT/C/MNG/3).

At the regular session of the Cabinet of Mongolia on November 13, 2024, Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources of Mongolia Tuvaan Tsevegdorj presented updates on the ongoing negotiations on the Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Railway Project.

During his working visit to the Republic of China in October 2024, Prime Minister of Mongolia Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai met with representatives from the “China Energy” Group, led by its Chairman of the Board of Directors. In response to Premier Oyun-Erdene’s request made at the meeting, the “China Energy” Group officially submitted its position to Tuvaan Tsevegdorj, Head of the Mongolian side of the Working Group, on October 28, 2024. The submission included several key proposals, including legal stability, guaranteed conditions for achieving mutual benefits, long-term trade agreements, and railway connectivity.

The Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Railway Project is ranked first among the 14 megaprojects outlined in the Mongolian Government’s Action Plan for 2024-2028. Certain amendments to the existing laws and regulations are required to ensure the successful implementation of the Project. In this regard, a Working Group is preparing to amend the relevant laws and regulations.

The successful implementation of the Gashuunsukhait-Gantsmod Cross-Border Project would create conditions for the realization of other railway projects, such as the Khangi-Mandal, Shiveekhuren-Sekhe, and Bichigt-Zuunkhatavch. Moreover, the Project could potentially increase Mongolia’s coal exports to 120 million tons and boost the country’s GDP per capita to USD 10 thousand.

A Working Group, headed by Deputy Prime Minister of Mongolia Dorjkhand Togmid, is responsible for developing a revised draft Law on Investment and submitting it to the Government of Mongolia and the State Great Khural of Mongolia.

The revised draft Law’s objectives are to achieve investment environment stability, foster investment, protect the rights and lawful interests of investors, enhance investment guarantees, and ensure greater access and efficiency in support and public services offered to investors.

The revised draft Law permits:

Enhance guarantees to investors, aligning with best international practices,

Establish a council or system for the protection of investors' rights and the resolution of complaints,

Secure the right to international arbitration procedures for settling disputes between investors and the State,

Entrust the protection and promotion of investments to all public organizations,

Regulate tax incentives within the confines of the General Law on Taxation,

Eliminate overlapping government inspections,

Simplify the process for issuing stabilization certificates and enable electronic issuance.

Upon implementation, this Law will provide a favorable investment environment that attracts foreign direct investment, encourages reinvestment, increases capital inflow, and creates conditions that ensure stable economic growth. By attracting foreign investment in priority economic sectors, the Law will expand manufacturing and infrastructure, increase exports of value-added goods, boost foreign trade, introduce advanced technology and expertise, enhance Mongolia's competitiveness through innovation, and create stable employment opportunities.

Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only shaped by recent geopolitical developments, but also by a long joint history. It is hard to imagine that either side will escape these historical shadows in the short term.

The largest landlocked country in the world and its 8 million inhabitants are sandwiched between Russia to the north and China to the south. This challenging location leaves Mongolia no choice but to treat both its neighbors well. It is for this reason that even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ulaanbaatar still maintains a close relationship with Moscow: Mongolia imports 95 percent of its oil and more than 20 percent of its electricity from Russia.

Meanwhile, its relationship with China is also essential, but riddled with tension. Modern Mongolia is split into two: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, established in 1947 and administered to this day by China; and Mongolia, or Outer Mongolia as China calls it, which is now an independent country. Despite historical land disputes, China is Mongolia’s biggest trade partner, buying 84 percent of its exports. In an effort to strengthen its relationship with Beijing, Mongolia joined the Belt and Road China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor program back in 2016.

Not only does Ulaanbaatar have to balance between China and Russia, but also between Russia-China on the one hand, and the West on the other. Mongolia, as a young democratic sovereign state, has devised a foreign policy that is not overly dependent on either China or Russia, which it officially calls the third neighbor policy. “Mongolia is landlocked, but not mindlocked,” the country’s prime minister, Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, told the United States last year. Thus, Japan, South Korea, the U.S. and even the European Union and NATO have become its cooperative partners.

This double balancing act adds to the complexity of Sino-Mongolian relations at a time when ideological divides are stark (reinforced by the war in Ukraine), and in the face of Beijing’s obstinacy and refusal to take clear sides. If Beijing still had the same mindset as it did during the Deng Xiaoping era after the late 1970s, China could have facilitated the smooth development of China-Mongolian relations. However, the opposite is true of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Its stubbornness has resulted in a bumpy diplomatic path.

Push to restore an ancient language

The Mongolian authorities have decided to reintroduce an ancient script that has existed for more than 700 years, with the plan to fully revert to the use of the Mongolian script from 2025 onward. Over the years, Mongolia’s language policy has changed several times. In October 1945, with the support of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia’s population of 750,000 people voted in a referendum on independence from China, which resulted in 98.5 percent in favor. In January 1946, the Republic of China recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which was from then on known as Mongolia to the rest of the world. After independence, the Latin alphabet was introduced, but failed rapidly. As a protectorate of the Soviet Union, it was officially declared just a few months later, on January 1, 1946, that the Cyrillic alphabet would be used.

Since then, the norm has been to write Mongolian in the Cyrillic alphabet. But in recent years, with the growing sense of democracy and national self-esteem in the countries that were once ruled or controlled by the Soviet Union, countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and also now Mongolia, are emphasizing the restoration of their traditional languages, so that linguistic and cultural legacies can be better developed and preserved.

In China, the media are already cheering this as a good opportunity for China to show its soft power: The Inner Mongolia region still uses the traditional Mongolian script. On this basis, Beijing claims that China has become a haven for Mongolian traditions. Yet, it does not mention that Mao Zedong did not maintain the script with the noble goal of preserving Mongolian culture, but rather to fight against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, which did not share the same ideology at the time.

Facts & figures

Mongolians are aware that Beijing is not committed to preserving their culture. In Inner Mongolia, the CCP authorities are using various tactics to eliminate the teaching of the Mongolian language. So much so, in fact, that Mongolians in China are now worried that their grandchildren will no longer be able to communicate properly with their grandparents. To protect their traditions, some Inner Mongolians have sought refuge in (Outer) Mongolia.

Young people in Mongolia generally hold less critical attitudes toward China than their elder countryfolk, and accordingly the degree of their recognition of China is also a bit higher. While many do express skepticism of China, there is also a sense of pragmatism and a perception that Mongolia should learn from China’s rapid development and economic success.

Chinese efforts to undermine Mongolia’s Buddhist ties

In response to China’s policy, former Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia publicly called on all Mongolians to join in protecting and defending Mongolian culture: “Mongolian traditions cannot be preserved without the Mongolian language.” However, whether in Xinjiang or Tibet or Inner Mongolia (all autonomous regions of China), the CCP is deeply suspicious of resurgent ethnic and cultural awareness. It fears that closer ties across the border between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia will undermine its assimilation policy and control.

Mongolia’s long-standing Buddhist tradition is also a headache for Chinese authorities. China does not want Ulaanbaatar to have any contact with the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese government considers a separatist. Many suspect China of unduly interfering in Mongolian affairs to undermine the country’s Buddhist ties. This stems from China’s historical interference in Mongolia and Tibet’s search for the reincarnation of the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (the title given to the Mongolian Buddhist spiritual leader, akin to the Dalai Lama), who died in 1911.

This issue resurfaced when, in the first half of this year, local media in Mongolia revealed that the Mongolian General Intelligence Service arrested three prominent Mongolian temple lamas and a Chinese citizen on suspicion of spying for China. The allegation that Mongolian temple lamas were manipulated by the Chinese once again brought the issue of China’s interference in Mongolia’s spiritual practices into the center of public opinion.

To date, the Mongolian government has yet to find the Goldilocks zone in their approach to preserving traditions without angering the Chinese government.

Facts & figures

Timeline of China-Mongolia relations

12th-13th century – Mongol Empire formation: Genghis Khan united the Mongolian tribes and founded the Mongol Empire, significantly impacting China and its territories​.

1271 – Yuan Dynasty established: Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, established the Yuan Dynasty in China, marking the first time Mongolia ruled over all of China.

1368 – Fall of the Yuan Dynasty: The Yuan Dynasty collapsed, leading to the expulsion of the Mongols from China. The Ming Dynasty rose to power, and Mongolia was left divided among various factions​.

17th century – Qing Dynasty control: The Manchu-led Qing Dynasty began to exert control over Mongolia, which was formally incorporated into the Qing Empire by the mid-17th century.

1911 – Independence declaration: Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Mongolia declared independence in 1911. However, the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over Mongolia​.

1921 – Soviet-backed revolution: The Mongolian Revolution led to Soviet support in establishing the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, making it a Soviet satellite state and further distancing it from China​.

1945 – Recognition of independence: In January 1946, the Republic of China officially recognized Mongolia’s independence, following a plebiscite held in October 1945 where the majority voted for independence​.

1990 – Transition to democracy: During the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia underwent a democratic revolution, leading to a multi-party system and increased independence from both Russian and Chinese influences​.

Trouble with the Power of Siberia II

Another sticking point in Sino-Mongolian relations is the Power of Siberia II project. Since its inception in 2006, the project has been the subject of intense discussions between Russia, Mongolia and China. The total length of the proposed pipeline is about 6,700 kilometers, of which only about 2,700 kilometers are in Russia and more than 950 kilometers are in Mongolia. It is designed to deliver 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia to northeastern China. In February 2023, Gazprom preliminarily determined the route of the pipeline, according to which it will pass through Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Buryatia.

Russia has its own calculations for such a design. The Power of Siberia II project and its proposed Mongolian branch, “Union Vostok,” promise not only to significantly increase gas supply capacity between the countries, but also to solve a serious problem in some regions of Mongolia and above all in Russia – the so-called “dark skies,” especially during the winter months. At the height of winter, residents of large cities in Russia’s southern Siberia suffer from severe toxic fumes emanating from the use of coal or wood for heating. In such cases, gasification can be a good alternative.

The key issue hindering the implementation of the Power of Siberia II project is that China is not yet happy with the price Russia is demanding for its natural gas – and it is not in a hurry, figuring it will not need the gas in the immediate future. Of course, there are other factors as well, such as Beijing’s pursuit of energy diversification. At the time of price negotiations, China wanted to obtain the feedstock at $60 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is almost five times lower than the current price of gas sold through the Power of Siberia I project ($260 per 1,000 cubic meters). This is, of course, unfavorable to Moscow, which wants to maintain high prices for its exports and therefore opposes China’s terms.

Beijing has been using delay and silence to force Moscow’s hand, refusing to sign the tripartite agreement to start construction. Ulaanbaatar, which had been very interested in the project, decided not to include it in its four-year national plan in August this year, seeing that the prospects for the pipeline are still shaky.

This move made Russian President Vladimir Putin nervous enough to travel to Mongolia in early September this year. He discussed with Ulaanbaatar how to work together to make headway on the pipeline – though of course he knows that the main partner he has to convince is China, not Mongolia.

Putin and Khurelsukh in Ulanbaataar

Beijing is now using Russian experts on China, such as Alexey Maslov, to try to convince President Putin to kick Mongolia off the project. By scapegoating Ulaanbaatar for the project’s failure to launch, Beijing is trying to deflect the blame for its own role in slowing the project down. After all, it was the CCP who advocated that the project be extended from Central Asia to China.

However, Moscow understands that once the pipeline goes through Central Asia, not only could the gasification of many parts of Russia become a problem due to supply shortages, but China will be better able to use Central Asia’s multiple channels of oil and gas to put more pressure on Russia in price negotiations. Not to mention, Kazakhstan also wants to use the project to its advantage.

Politically unreliable

Within China, Mongolia has been portrayed as a politically unreliable transit country for several years. Beijing sees its third neighbor policy as a form of cooperation with the West.

As early as the mid-2000s, consultations have been held between the Chinese, Mongolian and Russian foreign ministries. For the past decade, trilateral meetings between the deputy foreign ministers’ have been held annually. Topics discussed include medium- and long-term planning for the construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, agreements on road and rail transportation between the three countries, disaster prevention and control, and mutual assistance in epidemics. Mongolia also holds joint military exercises with its two neighbors.

Striving for balance, Mongolia became the first observer state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but even with the organization’s rapid expansion, it did not become a full member out of concern that this would restrict its room for maneuver. In recent years, China and Russia have used various means to urge Mongolia to become a full member. Beijing has not been as patient as Moscow on this issue. The Chinese government has even hinted this year to Mongolia that if it does not become a member of the SCO, Beijing will abandon the trilateral summits.

Scenarios

The development of both Sino-Mongolian and Russo-Mongolian relations will depend on how skillfully Mongolia manages diplomacy on the one hand, and sticks to its democratic principles on the other.

Certain: Mongolia keeps walking the tightrope

President Putin seems to have a better grasp of Mongolia than Xi Jinping, although Moscow and Beijing’s shared diplomatic displeasure with Mongolia’s third neighbor policy is obvious. Because of historical tensions with China, Ulaanbaatar prefers to be closer to Moscow, which is why President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh accepted the invitation from President Putin to attend last month’s BRICS summit, held in Kazan, Russia.

But that does not mean Beijing does not hold strong cards. Given China’s trade importance to Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar may well crack when under pressure from Beijing. Further, Mongolia is highly interested in developing its own minerals, especially rare earths, which have to be shipped to other (mainly Western) countries through Chinese ports. Currently, Ulaanbaatar does not seem to want to risk irking the Chinese, even for the sake of protecting its traditions or democratic principles.

Possible: Externalities force Mongolia’s neighbors to soften

Nevertheless, other scenarios cannot be excluded. Developments within China will also determine the dynamics of Sino-Mongolian relations. If the Chinese economy remains sluggish, then Beijing will need to soften its tone toward trade partners, including Mongolia. Similarly, if the war in Ukraine does not turn out to be favorable for President Putin, an isolated and beleaguered Kremlin will be forced to be more polite and tolerant toward Mongolia. This would give Mongolia more clout in its dealings with Beijing. In short, Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only determined by Ulaanbaatar itself, but also by external factors – which could play in its favor.

BY Junhua Zhang

is a senior associate at the EIAS.