The U.S. Agency for Trade and Development Collaborates with Mongolia to Develop Safe Direct Air Transport www.open.kg

As reported by MiddleAsianNews, the signing of a new agreement between USTDA and the Mongolian Civil Aviation Authority marks an important step towards organizing direct flights between the United States and Mongolia.

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency is actively working to strengthen America's position in the Indo-Pacific region by creating safe and reliable air routes between the two countries.

On February 5, 2026, USTDA signed an agreement to provide technical assistance to support the Mongolian Civil Aviation Authority (MCAA) in improving aviation safety regulation and oversight, which will allow Mongolia to strive for Category 1 (CAT 1) status from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. This will be an important step towards establishing direct flights between the two countries.

Achieving CAT 1 status will also simplify the export of rare earth elements and other critical minerals, enabling Mongolia to access international markets and create more resilient supply chains.

Thomas R. Hardy, Deputy Director of USTDA, noted: "Deepening cooperation in regulation and information sharing between the U.S. and Mongolia will allow for faster identification and mitigation of transnational threats. These efforts strengthen America's position in the Indo-Pacific region and provide long-term benefits to Mongolia, which seeks to modernize its aviation sector and develop international trade."

For the study, MCAA selected The Wicks Group Consulting, LLC (TWG), based in Washington. The working group will analyze current deficiencies, develop an action plan, and provide targeted training for MCAA staff to address violations of International Civil Aviation Organization standards. This will help attract funding for future investments in the aviation fleet and implement proven American solutions instead of subsidized alternatives from other countries.

Gankbold Gochoo, Deputy Minister of Road and Transport of Mongolia, stated: "Establishing direct air communication will create enormous opportunities for deepening socio-economic ties between Mongolia and the U.S. It will promote trade development and strengthen friendly relations between our countries. We greatly appreciate USTDA's support and its contribution to funding the technical assistance needed to address gaps in safety oversight and personnel training. This agreement is an important step towards establishing direct flights, which will allow us to leverage American expertise to enhance the effectiveness of civil aviation regulation in Mongolia."

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) is an independent federal agency established in 1961. It is responsible for assisting other countries in creating favorable conditions for trade and developing infrastructure that supports market economies. The Director and Deputy Director of the agency are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and work in coordination with the U.S. Secretary of State. USTDA's mission is to promote economic growth in developing countries and ensure access for American companies to their markets, ultimately creating new jobs in the U.S. The agency currently operates in 66 countries.

USTDA operates in a coordinated manner with other federal agencies, but unlike the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), it prioritizes projects that ensure the export of American goods and services. As a result, most USTDA projects are implemented in Latin America, Europe, and East Asia.

The agency is a key government entity for developing critical infrastructure in emerging markets, advancing the strategic interests of the U.S. and its partners, and creating opportunities for the implementation of proven American solutions. USTDA funds preliminary technical work that accelerates the implementation of infrastructure projects, helping to attract the necessary funding for their execution and the procurement of American products.

In 2025, the private sector of Mongolia attracted a total of $2.6 billion from international markets www.open.kg

In 2025, the private sector of Mongolia demonstrated outstanding results, completing 40 deals that attracted $2.6 billion from international investors. This financing covered 19 companies across various sectors, and the DealBook report answers important questions for global investors: who raised capital, who invested, what the capital was raised for, and how the deals were structured.

A Breakthrough Year for the Economy

In 2025, 19 companies in Mongolia successfully completed 40 deals, of which 32 were related to sustainable financing, with a total volume of $1.8 billion. In turn, $1.4 billion was obtained through loan operations, while $1.1 billion came from bond issuances. The remaining $21 million (1%) was raised through equity.

Key Facts:

40 completed deals

Total capital raised: $2.6 billion

19 Mongolian companies attracted foreign financing

Financing through 40 Deals

In 2025, 19 local companies executed 40 deals, of which 32 deals amounting to $1.8 billion were related to sustainable financing, while $1.4 billion was linked to loans and $1.1 billion to bonds. Only $21 million (1%) was raised through equity.
Major financing organizations: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) accounted for 34.6% of the total financing volume. EBRD allocated $346 million across 7 deals, while FMO invested $537 million in 5 deals.

Sector Analysis

Banking Sector: Seven banks in Mongolia attracted about $2.05 billion, confirming their role as the primary channel for international capital, aided by an improved sovereign credit rating and access to markets.

Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFIs): 8 NBFIs managed to attract $108 million, indicating growing investor interest in specialized and effective financial platforms.

Mining Sector: Mongolia issued bonds worth $350 million on the international market on behalf of a mining corporation.

Other Sectors: Financial technology, agriculture, and conglomerates collectively attracted $39 million, indicating an initial but growing diversification beyond traditional areas.

The Banking System Leads

In 2025, seven commercial banks, including M Bank and Bogd Bank, attracted $2 billion from international sources. KHAN Bank became the leader in lending volume with $515 million, followed by Trade Development Bank (TDB) with $460 million.

In Conclusion... In 2025, Mongolia reached a credit rating level of BB- (S&P) and B1 (Moody's), significantly contributing to attracting foreign investors. It is hoped that local companies will soon be able to conduct international IPOs and delight investors.

The IJF and Mongolia Sign for Four New Grand Slams www.ijf.org

As the Paris Grand Slam was drawing to a close, the future of the World Judo Tour was already being shaped. Marius Vizer, President of the International Judo Federation, and His Excellency Battulga Khaltmaa, President of the Mongolian Judo Association, signed the contract confirming the organisation of four additional grand slams in Ulaanbaatar in the coming years.

The renewal confirms Mongolia’s key role within international judo. The country has repeatedly proven itself not only as a land of champions but also as a host capable of delivering major events at the very highest standard. Each edition in the Mongolian capital has combined sporting excellence, enthusiastic crowds and outstanding organisation.

The announcement carries particular meaning this season. Ulaanbaatar will host the event that launches the Olympic qualification period for the Los Angeles Olympic Games. This milestone has been awaited for months by athletes and federations across the globe, marking the true beginning of the race towards the next Olympic Games. By extending the partnership, the IJF reinforces the confidence placed in Mongolia.

Mongolian judoka are recognised worldwide for their fighting spirit, their respect and consistency on the international stage. From grand slams to world championships and Olympic arenas, regularly they stand among the medal winners. Hosting the event at home offers young athletes there the chance to witness elite performance at close range. At the same time, visiting delegations experience a nation deeply attached to judo and its values of respect, courage and friendship.

The handshake between Presidents Vizer and Battulga symbolised shared trust and a common vision for the future. Mongolia will continue to welcome the world and the world will continue to discover Mongolia.

Russia’s Tuva Republic Weighs Up Logistics Connectivity With China and Mongolia www.russiaspivottoasia.com

Russia’s Tuva Republic has been examining the viability of the proposed Kyzyl-Kuragino railway line project, which would link Tuva with Krasnoyarsk Krai and the Russian railway network, with calculations as to how much freight such a route would attract via access to China and Mongolia. 

The railway is estimated at 412 kilometres in length and would provide easier export capability for Tuva’s coal mining sector, which currently produces about 10% of all Russian coal. However, balanced against this is the cost, estimated at exceeding ₽1 trillion (US$13 billion). For that to be viable, the proposed line needs to be sure it can provide consistent freight traffic involving Chinese and Mongolian transit.

The Tuvan government has stated that the line could provide access to 75 million tonnes of transit by 2050, in addition to East Range railway relief rather than purely coal. Russia’s eastern railway network is currently under stress and operating at close to 100% capacity. 

The project was originally conceived as a route for transporting Tuvan coal but is now being considered as part of the Central Eurasian Transport Corridor (CETC), a memorandum on the creation of which was signed in June 2025 at the SPIEF. The highway will provide direct access to the Northern Sea Route (Sevmorput) along the Yenisei and will become the “northern branch” of the Belt and Road initiative. However, without state participation and international contracts, it risks becoming an unfinished construction site. The project has had several starts and stops since it was first planned to begin in 2009.  

The viability model now rests on three powerful pillars following the geopolitical pivot to the east and critical capacity shortages on the BAM and Trans-Siberian railways. These include the resources of Tuva itself, the potential for redirecting freight flows from overloaded mainlines, and the transit potential within the CETC linking Asia and Europe.

Despite Tuva’s Elegest coal mine holding a dominant share in forecasts (up to 20 million tonnes by 2050), its current role in Russian exports is minimal. In 2024, Russia supplied 95 million tonnes of coal to China, with the bulk coming from other Russian regions—but not Tuva. The share of coal supplies from Tuva to China is estimated at about 650,000 tonnes per year and is unlikely to increase due to agreed China quotas.

The true value of Tuva lies in non-commodity exports. Forecasts include 1.5 million tonnes of iron ore and about 3.8 million tonnes of non-ferrous and rare earth metals (REM) from the Ag-Sug, Karasug, and other deposits. There are additional projects in the pipeline, including the creation of metallurgical clusters in Shagonar and Kara-Khaak. These would allow ore processing into high-margin ferrous metals and high-purity oxides, providing additional freight flow and increasing the project’s economic stability.

However, the true value of the Kyzyl-Kuragino railway probably lies in becoming a “relief valve” for the Trans-Siberian and BAM railways. Against the backdrop of record trade growth with China and Southeast Asia, existing corridors are at capacity, and export goods from Central Russia and the Urals are having to queue for delivery schedules, delaying timeframes and diminishing export potential.

Redirectable trade flows to get usage into the Kyzyl-Kuragino railway include 15 to –33 million tonnes, comprising timber (up to 8 million tonnes) from the Krasnoyarsk region and the Irkutsk region, grain and food (up to 1.9 million tonnes) from Altai, ferrous metals, petroleum products, and industrial goods sent on from the Moscow region. Additionally, the corridor opens the possibility for exporting so-called “unexported” volumes—amounts that cannot be sent today due to Russian Railways’ capacity deficit: 5 million tonnes of peat from the Tomsk region and 1.4 million tonnes of pellets. In total, these volumes amount to 45.7 million tonnes by 2050.

Tuva map
The geopolitical positioning of the line as a “Siberian Suez” can also be justified by the potential for container transit. The corridor from Kyzyl-Kuragino and Mongolia to China would provide a saving of five days in delivery times. For the highly competitive container transport market between China, Russia, and Central Asia, a reduction in distance and time becomes a key competitive advantage capable of attracting up to 4.4 million tonnes of transit containers.

However, the Kyzyl-Kuragino railway project has remained unconvincing in its return on investment and its ability to attract Russian private equity. To date, the parties could not agree on the terms of participation and the volume of extracted resources, and they assessed the project risks as high.

Today, the construction period is estimated at about 10 years, and the cost of borrowing money is high (interest rates in Russia are currently 16%); private investors require state guarantees. That means that financing the railway may now be aimed at attracting foreign companies to the project, primarily from China and Mongolia. The high cost for building the route is because it requires the construction of a single-track non-electrified line with seven stations, 830 artificial structures, 180 bridges with a total length of 21.3 kilometers, seven tunnels with a total length of nearly 5 km, and the need to cross the Uyuk ridge—requiring a 2 km long tunnel at a depth of 200 meters.

Secondly, there is a logistics gap, as cargo from it will fall onto the overloaded leg of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which reduces efficiency. Investors fear their goods will get stuck in the “bottleneck” of the East Range, as happens with coal from other regions that also have a shorter leg to the ports.

Thirdly, there is a green risk element, in that coal consumption may decrease. This is why the project has proven so complicated, as it means that the railway project cannot be tied exclusively to commodity exports and requires diversification to handle REMs, metals, transit, industrial, and agricultural goods.

This in turn means that Moscow must act either as a co-investor or guarantee the freight flow by creating a transparent PPP model that minimises risks and ensures international coordination with China and Mongolia.

However, the potential remains tantalising. The economic significance of the railway for Tuva, which remains one of the few entities in Russia without a rail service, cannot be overstated. Tuvan integration into Russia’s unified transport field promises explosive economic growth, with some estimates suggesting that the overall socio-economic situation of Tuva would improve by at least 30% in the first year of the railway’s appearance.

Kyzyl-Kuragino could still be a critically important, albeit expensive, element of the Central Eurasian Transport Corridor, capable of generating up to 75 million tonnes of diversified cargo. However, the project’s economics are justified only if it is implemented as a strategic artery capable of relieving the East Range and providing a new transit route to Asia.

To ensure the trillion-ruble expense becomes an investment rather than a budget expenditure on an unfinished project, the ball has passed to the Russian state. To justify the project, the following needs to happen:

Guarantee the freight flow through a take-or-pay mechanism or other forms of PPP.
Actively attract foreign capital, primarily from China and Mongolia, to synchronise and finance international sections of the CETC.
Ensure the priority development of non-commodity freight flows—REMs, metals, containers—to hedge against “green” risk and the low competitiveness of the long coal leg.
Without clear contracts and international coordination, the 75 million tonnes transit potential will remain elusive, while the eastern section of Russia’s railways will remain a bottleneck. Finding a US$13 billion solution to connecting Siberia’s Tuva to China and Asia remains a challenge.

Major Strategic Sector Projects to Be Implemented in Cooperation with World Bank www.montsame.mn

The World Bank, in cooperation with the Government of Mongolia, is successfully implementing transmission line projects aimed at ensuring energy security.
Looking ahead, it is essential to implement energy sector projects and infrastructure initiatives to ease congestion in the capital city through public-private partnerships, as these will serve as key drivers of economic growth. This was emphasized by First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Development Enkhbayar Jadamba during his meeting with Tae Hyun Lee, the World Bank’s Resident Representative in Mongolia.
According to the Ministry of Economy and Development, the two sides exchanged views on priority areas within Mongolia’s medium- and long-term development policies and agreed to ensure intersectoral coordination and to cooperate promptly at the technical level on specific projects.
During the meeting, the parties discussed reforms in strategic sectors that support economic growth, including energy, road transport, and infrastructure, as well as the policies and programs to be implemented in these areas. 
First Deputy Prime Minister Enkhbayar Jadamba underscored the importance of attracting private sector investment to successfully advance sector liberalization and proposed cooperating through innovative instruments, such as World Bank financial guarantees, to strengthen investor confidence and share risks.
World Bank Resident Representative Tae Hyun Lee reaffirmed the institution’s active cooperation with Mongolia in improving the energy sector, agriculture, information technology, and the investment environment, noting that the cooperation directions proposed by the First Deputy Prime Minister align with the strategic partnership between the two sides.
He also commended the establishment of the Investor Protection Center by the Ministry of Economy and Development and expressed support for policies aimed at improving the business environment and assisting investors.
As Mongolia’s construction and industrial activities continue to expand, leading to growing energy demand, the World Bank expressed its readiness to cooperate in supporting initiatives included in Mongolia’s Five-Year Basic Development Plan for 2026–2030.

Government Approves New Administrative Building at Ulaanbaatar International Airport www.montsame.mn

At its meeting on February 4, 2026, the Government approved amendments to the concession agreement for the management project of Ulaanbaatar’s new international airport, allowing for the construction of an additional administrative building and the expansion of the airport’s parking facilities.
The build–operate–transfer concession agreement for the management of Ulaanbaatar’s new international airport was signed on July 5, 2019, between the National Development Agency, representing the Government of Mongolia, and New Ulaanbaatar International Airport LLC. The concessionaire has submitted a proposal to construct an administrative building within the airport concession area and to expand the parking lot by an additional 250 spaces.
At present, all office space in the passenger terminal building has been fully leased.

Mongolia’s Crisis Is an Opportunity to Transform Its System www.jacobin.com

On paper, the Mongolian state is becoming richer, with record exports, higher budget revenues, and decent rates of growth. Yet in daily life, it feels absent. Six years after winter protests that fused discontent over air pollution and corruption into a single story about trust or the lack of it, that story has only thickened.
Since then, Mongolia has moved from outrage over theft of public resources to open constitutional crisis. In October of last year, parliament voted to remove Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojav barely four months into his term.
Three days later, the president vetoed the dismissal on constitutional grounds. Tsets, Mongolia’s constitutional court, deemed the president’s veto lawful, ruling that a parliamentary motion passed by the State Great Khural to dismiss the PM violated several procedural and constitutional principles.
If Western media outlets notice any of this, they tend to reach for the easy frame. Earlier in 2025, Britain’s Times ran a breathless piece about a “Putin-aligned” President who had supposedly orchestrated a coup of sorts against a US-educated reformist prime minister, Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai. That story missed the point.
Mongolians themselves didn’t read the crisis that way. They watched as food, fuel, and rent grew more expensive while politicians flaunted imported SUVs and designer-brand watches. They saw “anti-corruption” hearings that always seemed to stop just short of the people who designed the schemes.
If there was a coup, it didn’t take place over a single night in Ulaanbaatar. It was a much slower takeover, organized through coal contracts, logistics queues, and parliamentary lists.
From Party-State to Ponzi Investment Scheme
In theory, Mongolia is a parliamentary democracy with a democratic constitution, the separation of powers, and institutions that look very familiar to anyone raised on the liberal textbook: parliament, president, cabinet, anti-corruption agency, independent central bank. In practice, politics has settled into what many people now call nam–tör: a party-state hybrid where the ruling (MPP) controls most levers of power.
Mongolia has moved from outrage over theft of public resources to open constitutional crisis.
Getting onto the party list or into a key ministry is understood — quite openly at this point — as a form of höröngö oruulalt, an investment. You finance the campaign, you prove your loyalty, you tsunh barih (“carry the bag”) for a faction leader. In return, you gain access to procurement, licenses, appointments, a slice of a mega project. The formal rule book still exists: civil service law, budget law, procurement procedures. But next to it sits an unwritten code of factional obligations and side deals.
This is why so many Mongolians have stopped using the word “corruption” in the narrow sense. Corruption suggests a deviation from a basically sound system. What they see instead is a system where rent-seeking is the organizing principle and patron-client networks penetrate bureaucracies and political parties while fragmenting and undermining formal authority.
Cleaner Prices, Dirtier Deals
Nowhere does this manifest itself more starkly than when it comes to coal and related offtake agreements. In a typical offtake contract, a buyer agrees to purchase a specified amount of a future product (coal, in this instance) before it is produced. These contracts are extremely attractive for resource-rich developing countries like Mongolia, as it means guaranteed revenue streams.
However, recent revelations show that millions of tons of coal have been sold through these types of agreements to Chinese companies. These were opaque deals, mostly done with Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi (ETT) and signed with a small circle of traders and logistics firms. ETT is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) that manages the Tavan Tolgoi coal deposit, one of the world’s largest. It is a key contributor to the nation’s economy through its mining, exporting, and infrastructure projects.
After mass protests in winter 2022 over what people called the “coal theft,” the government scrambled to show it was cleaning up the sector. The solution looked simple enough: push exports through an open auction platform at the Mongolian Stock Exchange and let the market set transparent prices.
After mass protests in winter 2022 over what people called the ‘coal theft,’ the government scrambled to show it was cleaning up the mining sector.
To an extent, it worked. Prices on the exchange moved closer to what Chinese buyers actually pay at the border. A new Mining Products Exchange law was passed. Officials proudly presented this as a leap forward for transparency.
However, if you scratch the surface, most of the coal never touches that exchange. According to Zoljargal, a member of the Mongolian parliament, roughly four-fifths of coal still leaves the country via long-term offtake contracts.
The transparency-oriented auctions at MSE mostly receive the leftovers in terms of lower-grade coal with unpredictable volumes. The public sees a visible price, but the real bargain happens out of sight.
The Aggregator as Switchboard
Offtake contracts, especially those tied to infrastructure or prepayments, help preserve strategic discretion. One company, Bodi International, sits at the heart of many of these arrangements. When you look at a large batch of contracts related to Bodi International and ETT that was recently released to the public, you can start to see the picture.
Many politicians and experts claim that these deals through aggregators like Bodi allowed coal to be sold at undervalued prices, with intermediaries capturing some of the value on transport and resale. Some contracts include options to convert debt into equity stakes.
The public sees a visible price, but the real bargain happens out of sight.
If the state or SOE cannot fully deliver coal later, the lender can swap the unpaid amount for shares in the project company or infrastructure. This allows the buyer (offtaker) to gain stakes in infrastructures, effectively collateralizing the state’s assets.
Other SOEs and related clientelist networks compete to export as much coal as possible. The trend reached its apogee when one faction started lobbying for a railroad and another for a border port. It is a downward spiral that traps value.
Layer on top of this barter‑style financing of infrastructure deals repaid in coal, and we can start to see the main contours of the “coal theft” or “coal mafia.”
Clientelism as Infrastructural Power
During the COVID-19 pandemic, exports collapsed, and the difference between shipping first and waiting two weeks meant real gains in terms of cash and leverage. ETT’s delivery prioritization effectively handed faction leaders and clientelist networks leverage over the logistics queue.
Choosing which ton got through which border gate and when was the hardest form of currency. Reports confirm that border customs, military officials, and provincial administrators extracted rents or favored their cronies. Trucking firms tied to political elites thrived, while ordinary truckers and businesses had to wait with their vehicles standing still.
The state doesn’t disappear, but it fractures. Authority is still there, chopped up into tradable fragments.
Sociologists like Michael Mann talk about infrastructural power — the state’s ability to “get into” territory and everyday life through roads, rails, and electricity. In Mongolia, that power has been sliced up and rented out or, in other words, captured.
A rail line or a border port like Gashuun Sukhait becomes not just a public utility but a bargaining chip. A power struggle ensues around which faction gets the lucrative bit to build, which firm gets priority access, or which official gets to hand out permits.
In this state of things, the state doesn’t disappear, but it fractures. Authority is still there, chopped up into tradable fragments.
Two Budgets, One Shadow
To “get things done,” the Mongolian government pushes delivery through a hundred or so SOEs like ETT that circumvent the bureaucracy. Offtake contracts pledge future coal deliveries in exchange for upfront cash. Infrastructure loans are backed not by general tax revenues but by specific streams of export earnings.
There are escrow accounts abroad where export proceeds sit before they are swept (or not) into the national treasury. Oil-exporting countries often have dual fiscal systems that feature substantial distortions between their resource and nonresource tax regimes, and Mongolia is no exception to this rule.
Citizens sense that the budget is growing, yet crucial services are still undelivered.
In public finance terms, this reallocates power away from the budget, producing parallel fiscal structures. The formal one looks normal, rule‑bound, and slow, while the informal one seems flexible, politicized, and largely off the books.
When global prices spike, the second set of channels becomes very tempting. You can borrow against tomorrow’s coal to cover today’s political needs. You can fund that new railway or engage in “populist” cash transfers just before an election without going through a messy, contested budget process.
The promise of long-term revenues etched in offtake contracts can make unaccountable governments persevere by promising spoils to clientelist factions, expanding the state budget, and effectively buying votes. Citizens sense that the budget is growing, yet crucial services are still undelivered.
Every new scandal proves the unfortunate state of things. Political scientists refer to this as the erosion of output legitimacy that derives from a polity’s capacity to solve collective problems. Citizens would say the state no longer makes any moral sense.
Slow Violence, Not Sudden Collapse
This is where the idea of slow violence helps. Rob Nixon’s concept refers to gradual, often invisible harm that unfolds over the course of years, wrought by pollution, climate change, and resource depletion.
In Mongolia, the coal economy has created exactly this sort of damage: dust and diesel in border towns, fragile ecosystems around mines, and the deaths of people from coal burning. As Nixon notes, environmental devastation often happens on “time scales that exceed human perception,” making it hard for communities to rally against diffuse, long-term threats.
The violence is political and emotional as well as ecological. The state promises universal education but crams classrooms with fifty children because schools are the last in line for wage increases. Anti-corruption hearings are broadcast throughout the country, but investigations routinely stall when they get too close to the inner circle.
Laws change, cabinets shift, and new anti-corruption bodies appear, yet the basic pattern remains the same.
People stop believing in the possibility of fairness long before they stop voting. Crucially, the victims of slow violence are often poor and marginalized, lacking influence in Ulaanbaatar’s halls of power.
On the ground, citizens experience this not as a democratic consolidation but as a strange kind of institutional gaslighting. Everything is “reforming,” everything is being “strengthened,” yet nothing quite works. The gust remained the same: weakening the presidency here, strengthening a prime-ministerial system there, always making sure the dominant party and related factions could consolidate.
Laws change, cabinets shift, and new anti-corruption bodies appear, yet the basic pattern remains the same. “If justice were applied consistently tomorrow,” people joke, “there would be no one left in politics.”
Protests as Democratic Memory
Despite all this, people haven’t gone quiet. In 2019, Ulaanbaatar saw the winter protests over suffocating smog and unending scandals. In 2022, younger protesters camped out again, demanding answers on coal theft. Over the last two years, further demonstrations erupted around the latest government reshuffles, the lavish spending of political circles, and coal theft.
Critics dismissed these protests as either the product of manipulation by some rival faction or as the product of naive idealism on the part of some young slackers. Both dismissive perspectives miss the core function of such protests.
Each protest, even when it fails or succeeds to change the personnel at the top, acts as a kind of democratic memory. It reminds everyone that the point of having a state at all is to deliver public goods and basic fairness. It keeps alive the expectation that something better is possible and that institutions could be inclusive rather than extractive.
Elite Brokerage Amid Global Uncertainty
Under these conditions, Mongolia’s political economy functions through elite brokerage. This is a system in which those with political power act as intermediaries between national wealth and global markets, skimming rents at each step.
Such brokerage is not limited to coal. In the copper sector, Mongolia’s Erdenet mine was previously involved in scandals where trading companies received sweetheart deals for copper concentrate, allowing the diversion of profits.
The state behaves like a brokerage house, instead of being a regulator and shareholder ensuring maximum public benefit.
Even the giant Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine, operated by Rio Tinto, saw disputes over cost overruns that Mongolian observers suspect benefited contractors connected to the elite. In all these cases, the state behaves like a brokerage house, instead of being a regulator and shareholder ensuring maximum public benefit.
This state of affairs obviously has grave implications for democracy and development in Mongolia. In the June 2024 parliamentary elections, the opposition galvanized “anger over corruption and the state of the economy,” making significant gains in the legislature. Voter turnout remained high at nearly 70 percent, indicating that Mongolians have not become apathetic. Clearly, the electorate connected the dots between unchecked one-party rule, corruption, and the erosion of democratic accountability.
Hollowing Out Democracy
All these threads tie back to a worrisome trajectory that Peter Mair outlined more than a decade ago: the hollowing out of democracy. This has happened not through the outright abolition of elections but by a gradual erosion of their substance.
Mongolia’s situation exemplifies what happens when a resource-rich economy’s development model centers on extraction without “inclusive” institutions. However, it is easy, from a distance, to say that Mongolia just needs to strengthen its institutions. While intuitively this sounds right, it doesn’t get us very far. The harder question is always: Which institutions, in what order, and strengthened against whom?
Sustained pressures for reform will only last if people can see something actually shifting. That is the cruel paradox at the heart of slow violence: not only does it damage lungs, it also erodes patience. Year after year of scandals with no real consequences conditions people to expect nothing.
In that void, many ills arise: conspiracy theories, nationalist groups, and online, troll-based politicization among others. Yet the current crisis creates an opportunity for the masses to step into the void and demand a new voice. Whether ordinary Mongolians can successfully take advantage of this opportunity will define the nation’s journey toward genuine accountability and democracy.
By
Sanchir Jargalsaikhan

Mongolia's central bank buys 1.9 tonnes of gold in January www.xinhuanet.com

Mongolia's central bank bought 1.9 tonnes of gold from legal entities and individuals in January 2026, up 50.2 percent year on year.
As of January, the Bank of Mongolia's average gold purchase price stood at 539,587.33 Mongolian tugriks (about 151.3 U.S. dollars) per gram, the bank said in a statement on Thursday.
Purchasing gold is one of the key ways for the central bank to ensure the country's economic stability by consistently increasing foreign currency reserves.
According to the central bank, Mongolia's foreign exchange reserves hit a record high of 7 billion U.S. dollars by the end of 2025.

Team Mongolia is gearing up to be the most fashionably warm at the 2026 Winter Olympics. Here's why www.creators.yahoo.com

Erdene Raises $28.7 Million to Accelerate Mongolian Copper-Gold Expansion www.tipranks.com

Erdene Resources ( ERD -8.61% ▼ ) has issued an update.
Erdene Resource Development Corp. has closed a bought deal private placement of 3.23 million common shares at $8.90 per share, raising gross proceeds of approximately $28.7 million, including full exercise of the underwriters’ option. The funds will be used to accelerate development across the Khundii Minerals District, notably advancing the Khuvyn Khar copper discovery and the Zuun Mod molybdenum-copper deposit, as well as supporting exploration, technical studies, target evaluation, and general corporate purposes, while production ramps up at the Bayan Khundii Gold Mine. The financing, conducted under Canada’s listed issuer financing exemption and still subject to final TSX approval, strengthens Erdene’s capital position and supports its strategy to grow its operations and land holdings in a highly prospective mineral region, although insider participation in the offering triggered related-party transaction rules that the company addressed through available exemptions.
The most recent analyst rating on ERD -8.61% ▼ stock is a Hold with a C$8.50 price target. To see the full list of analyst forecasts on Erdene Resources stock, see the TSE:ERD Stock Forecast page.
Spark’s Take on TSE:ERD Stock
According to Spark, TipRanks’ AI Analyst, TSE:ERD is a Neutral.
The score is held back primarily by weak financial performance: no revenue, widening losses, and continued negative operating/free cash flow despite a low-leverage balance sheet. Technicals provide a meaningful offset with price above key moving averages and positive MACD/RSI momentum. Valuation remains a risk signal because the negative P/E reflects ongoing losses and there is no dividend yield support.
To see Spark’s full report on TSE:ERD stock, click here.
More about Erdene Resources
Erdene Resource Development Corp. is a Canada-based resource company producing gold from the high-grade, low-cost Bayan Khundii Gold Mine in Mongolia. The company holds a portfolio of precious and base metal projects in the underexplored Khundii Minerals District, focused on expanding production and exploration around its flagship operation.
Average Trading Volume: 175,996
Technical Sentiment Signal: Buy
Current Market Cap: C$495.6M